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1Abstract
Mean field games with singular controls of bounded velocity
by
Joon Seok Lee
Doctor of Philosophy in Engineering–Industrial Engineering and Operations Research
University of California, Berkeley
Professor Xin Guo, Chair
This thesis studies a class of mean field games (MFG) with singular controls of bounded
velocity. By relaxing absolute continuity of control processes, it generalizes the MFG frame-
work of Lasry and Lions [58] and Huang, Malhame´, and Caines [46]. It provides a unique
solution to the MFG with singular controls of bounded velocity and its explicit optimal
control policy establishes an -Nash equilibrium of the corresponding stochastic differential
N player game with singular controls. It also includes MFGs on an infinite time horizon.
Our method to approach MFGs with singular controls is from bounded velocity processes,
and we analyse the relationship between singular controls with finite variation processes and
singular controls with bounded velocity.
Finally, it illustrates particular MFGs with explicit solutions in a systemic risk model
originally formulated by Carmona, Fouque, and Sun [23] in a regular control setting and
an optimal partially reversible investment problem with N players originally formulated by
Guo and Pham [39] in a single player setting.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction of MFG
The theory of Mean Field Games (MFG) studies stochastic differential N player games of
a large population with small interactions. Although stochastic differential N player games
are useful and applicable in various fields, as N becomes large number, the game has high
complexity, and finding a Nash equilibrium of the game is intractable in general. Because
of these difficulties, the theory of MFGs suggests a new approach to approximate Nash
equilibria of stochastic differential N player games. The key idea of MFGs is to approximate
the dynamics and the objective function from population’s probability distributions. Instead
of considering all other players’ behaviour directly, considering a probability distribution of
all other players’ behaviour decreases complexity of the game. As such, the MFG provides
a simple and elegant analytical approach to approximate the Nash equilibrium of N player
games. The MFG is first introduced by Lasry and Lions [58] and independently studied by
Huang, Malhame´, and Caines [46]. In additions to the PDEs and control approach, there
is an alternative probabilistic approach of Carmona, Delarue, and Lacker ([19], [20], [22]).
There are many applications of MFGs in economics and finance, such as the systemic risk
by Carmona, Fouque, and Sun [23] and by Garnier, Papanicolaou, and Yang [33], and the
growth theory by Lasry, Lions, and Gueant [59], high frequency trading by Jaimungal and
Nourian [47], and by Lachapelle, Lasry, Lehalle, and Lions [56], non-renewable resources
by Bauso, Tembine, and Basar [5] and by Gueant, Lasry, and Lions [36], and finally the
queueing theory by Manjrekar, Ramaswamy, and Shakkottai [64], by Wiecek, Altman, and
Ghosh [80], and by Bayraktar, Budhiraja, and Cohen [6].
1.1 Toy model of MFG
Let us start with a toy model to illustrate the main idea and solution technique behind
the MFG. This toy model is “the meeting start time” in [36]. Suppose that there are iden-
tical N = 10K agents distributed on the negative half-line according to the probability
distribution m0. Consider the probability space (Ω,F ,F = (Ft)0≤t<∞, P ), and let {W it }
for i = 1, 2, · · · , N be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) standard Brownian
motions on this probability space. Let m(t, x) be a probability distribution of agents’ po-
sitions at time t and m(0, x) = m0(x) = 0 for ∀x ≥ 0. The location of the meeting is
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x = 0. Let X it be a position of agent i at time t and α
i
t be an agent i’s control variable
at time t with dynamics dX it = α
i
tdt + σdW
i
t . Although the announced meeting time is
t0 > 0, the meeting actually starts at T , when 90% of agents present at the meeting place
0. τi is the time at which agent i would like to arrive but in reality the agent i will arrive
at time τ˜ i = τ i + σi = min
t
{t : X it = 0} where i for i = 1, 2, · · · , N are i.i.d. normal
distributions with variance 1. The cost function for each agent consists of four parts: a
cost by controls
∫ τ˜ i
0
1
2
αi2t dt, a cost of lateness (reputation effect) c1(t0, T, τ˜
i) = α[τ˜ i − t]+, a
cost of lateness (personal inconvenience) c2(t0, T, τ˜
i) = β[τ˜ i − T ]+, and a waiting time cost
c3(t0, T, τ˜
i) = γ[T − τ˜ i]+. Denote c(t0, T, τ˜ i) = c1(t0, T, τ˜ i) + c2(t0, T, τ˜ i) + c3(t0, T, τ˜ i). Then,
each agent tries to minimize its cost by controlling αit based on all other agents’ arrival time.
There are two different methods: the N player game approach and the MFG approach.
In the N player game approach, each agent chooses its controls in the view of N identi-
cal distributions (1, · · · , N). One can simplify the problem using order statistics for 90%
percentile of arrival times (˜(9k−1), ˜(9k)). A given player’s optimal strategy τ ∗ satisfies
τ ∗ = argmin
τ
E[C(τ ∗ + σ1, τ ∗ + σ2, · · · , τ ∗ + σN)]
= argmin
τ
E[C(τ ∗ + σ1, τ ∗ + σ˜(9k−1), τ ∗ + σ˜(9k))],
where C is the cost function for the player 1 with respect to other players’ arrival times.
1.2 From N player game to MFG
Let’s formulate general N player game first, and then heuristically derive the MFG from the
N player game. Let (Ω,F ,F = (Ft)0≤t≤T , P ) be a probability space with W i = {W it }0≤t≤T
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) standard Brownian motions in this space for
i = 1, 2, . . . , N . Fix a finite time T and assume that there are N identical players. The state
process for the ith player is X it satisfying the dynamics for t ∈ [0, T ]
dX it =
1
N
N∑
j=1
b0(t,X
i
t , X
j
t , α
i
t)dt+
1
N
N∑
j=1
σ0(t,X
i
t , X
j
t , α
i
t)dW
i
t , X
i
0 = x
i ∈ Rd, (1.1)
where αit is the control process for the ith player. b0 : [0, T ] × Rd × Rd × Rd → Rd and
σ0 : [0, T ] × Rd × Rd × Rd → Rd are Lipschitz continuous functions. Then, the stochastic
differential N player game is for any i = 1, 2, · · · , N ,
inf
αi∈A
E
[∫ T
0
1
N
N∑
j=1
f0(t,X
i
t , X
j
t , α
i
t)dt+
1
N
N∑
j=1
h0(X
i
T , X
j
T )
]
, (1.2)
subject to (1.1) where f0 : [0, T ] × Rd × Rd × Rd → Rd and h0 : Rd × Rd → Rd are
Lipschitz continuous functions. The ith player chooses its optimal control process based on
all N stochastic processes X1t , X
2
t , · · · , XNt . Hence, the optimal control αit is a function of
X1t , X
2
t , · · · , XNt .
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The strong law of large numbers is for any i.i.d. random variables Y1, Y2, · · · , YN with
E[Yi] <∞,
1
N
N∑
i=1
Yi → E[Yi] a.s. as N →∞.
Consequently, with some technical condition on f0, h0, b0, σ0, as N goes to infinity, the strong
law of large numbers applies to φ0 = f0, h0, b0, σ0 as
1
N
N∑
j=1
φ0(t,X
i
t , X
j
t , α
i
t)→ E[φ0(t,X it , Xjt , αit)] =
∫
φ0(t,X
i
t , x, α
i
t)µt(dx) = φ(t,X
i
t , µt, α
i
t),
where µt is the probability measure for {Xjt }j=1,··· ,N . Define f, b, σ : [0, T ]×Rd×P(Rd)×Rd →
Rd and h : Rd × P(Rd) → Rd as corresponding functions if P(Rd) is a set of all probability
measures on Rd. Then, the mean field game with regular controls (MFG) can be formulated
as following:
inf
α∈A
E
[∫ T
0
f(t,Xt, µt, αt)dt+ h(XT , µT )
]
subject to
dXt = b(t,Xt, µt, αt)dt+ σ(t,Xt, µt, αt)dWt, ∀t ∈ [0, T ], X0 = x, µ0 = µ.
(1.3)
where µt is the probability measure of Xt for any t ∈ [0, T ]. Here {αt} is the control process
in an appropriate admissible control set A. The player determines its control based on its
current state Xt and the probability measure µt rather than based on the state of all players.
The solution to the MFG can be defined as below.
Definition 1. A solution of the MFG (3.1) is defined as a pair of the optimal control α∗t ∈ A
and the flow of probability measures {µ∗t} if they satisfy
v(s,X∗s ) = E
[∫ T
s
f(t,X∗t , µ
∗
t , α
∗
t )dt+ h(X
∗
T , µ
∗
T )
]
for all (s,X∗s ) ∈ [0, T ] × Rd and for each
t ∈ [0, T ] µ∗t is a probability measure of the optimal controlled process X∗t which is
dX∗t = b(t,X
∗
t , µ
∗
t , α
∗
t )dt+ σ(t,X
∗
t , µ
∗
t , αt)dWt, ∀t ∈ [0, T ], X∗0 = x, µ∗0 = µ.
1.3 PDEs/control approach
Because of probability measures µt, a MFG is different from a stochastic control problem.
To use the PDE/control method, one needs to fix µt as a deterministic function first.
PDE/controls approach to MFGs The PDE/control approach of [58, 18, 46] consists of
three steps. The first step is to fix a deterministic mean information process and to analyse
the corresponding stochastic control problem. Given the solution to the optimal control, the
second step is to analyse the optimal controlled process, i.e., the McKean–Vlasov equation
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or stochastic differential equation (SDE). The third step is to show that the iterations of
previous two steps converge to a fixed point solution to the MFG. In this approach, the
MFG is essentially analysed by studying two coupled PDEs, the backward Hamilton–Jacobi–
Bellman (HJB) equation and the forward McKean–Vlasov SDE. This approach requires three
main technical questions. The first question is existence and uniqueness of optimal controls
{αt} and the value function v of the stochastic control problem in the first step. The second
question is existence and uniqueness of the flow of probability measures {µ′t} which is the
solution to the stochastic differential equation in the second step. The last question is
existence and uniqueness of the fixed point solution in the third step.
For the first step, fix a deterministic function t ∈ [0, T ] → µt ∈ P(Rd), and then the
MFG (3.1) is equivalent to the stochastic control problem:
v(s, x) = inf
α∈A
E
[∫ T
s
f(t,Xt, µt, αt)dt+ h(XT , µT )
]
s.t. dXt = b(t,Xt, µt, α
i
t)dt+ σ(t,Xt, µt, αt)dWt and Xs = x,
where A is the admissible set which contains all progressively measurable processes satisfy-
ing the condition E
∫ T
0
|αt|2dt < ∞. There are two approaches to solve the stochastic con-
trol problem: the Dynamic Programming Principle (DPP) which refers to the PDE/control
method and the stochastic maximum principle which refers to the probabilistic method. The
DPP established by Bellman is a technique to solve the optimization problem from consid-
ering sub-optimization problems in different time and states. Suppose the value function
v(s, x) provides the optimized value for time s ∈ [0, T ] and state x ∈ Rd. Then, the DPP
relies on Bellman’s principle of optimality: for any s ≤ S ≤ T ,
v(s, x) = inf
α∈A[s,S]
E
[∫ S
s
f(t,Xt, µt, αt)dt+ v(S,XS)
]
,
where A[s,S] denotes the admissible set over [s, S]. One can derive an infinitesimal version of
Bellman’s principle of optimality, the HJB equation:
−∂tv(t, x)− inf
α∈A
{1
2
tr(σ(t, x, µ, α)σ(t, x, µ, α)TDxxv(t, x))
+ b(t, x, µ, α) ·Dxv(t, x) + f(t, x, µ, α)} = 0
with v(T, x) = h(x, µT ).
(1.4)
Because the HJB equation (1.4) could have multiple solutions or does not have smooth
solutions, one needs to verify the solution. If the HJB equation (1.4) has a C1,2([0, T ]× Rd)
solution, w, then using the Itoˆ’s formula, one can prove w(s, x) = v(s, x) for any (s, x) ∈
[0, T ]×Rd. If it does not have a C1,2([0, T ]×Rd) solution, one can use the viscosity solution
to (1.4). 1 By proving that the viscosity solution to (1.4) is the value function v and the
viscosity solution to (1.4) is unique, one concludes that the value function v is the viscosity
solution to (1.4). Within the verification step, one can also show that there is a unique
1The definition of the viscosity solution to (1.4) is in appendix A.2.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION OF MFG 5
optimal control αt(µt) ∈ A if there is a unique value function to the problem. Therefore, by
the uniqueness of the value function v and optimal control αt(µt) of (3.1) under fixed {µt},
one can define a mapping Γ1 such that Γ1({µt}) = {αt(µt)}.
The second step is the consistency part. Under the optimal control αt(µt) from the first
step, one will update the flow of probability measures µ′t using PXt which is a probability
measure of Xt. There are two different methods in this step. In [46], they approach the
second step with the McKean-Vlasov SDE:
dXt = b(t,Xt, PXt , αt(µt))dt+ σ(t,Xt, PXt , αt(µt))dWt, ∀t ∈ [0, T ], X0 = x ∈ Rd.
Under fixed αt(µt), with some technical assumptions, the McKean-Valsov SDE has a unique
solution pair (Xt, PXt) where PXt is a probability measure of Xt. Another method is to use
the SDE under fixed µt. With fixed µt and αt(µt) from the first step, the second step is
equivalent to solve the SDE:
dXt = b(t,Xt, µt, αt(µt))dt+ σ(t,Xt, µt, αt(µt))dWt, ∀t ∈ [0, T ], X0 = x ∈ Rd. (1.5)
The Kolmogorov forward equation for (1.5) is for any x ∈ Rd and t ∈ [0, T ]
∂tP (t, x) =−
d∑
j=1
∂xj(b(t, x, µt, αt(µt))P (t, x)) (1.6)
+
1
2
d∑
k=1
d∑
j=1
∂xk∂xj(σ(t, x, µt, αt(µt))σ(t, x, µt, αt(µt))
TP (t, x)). (1.7)
The solution to the Kolmogorov forward equation, P (t, x), is the probability measure for
Xt with αt(µt). So, one can update new fixed flow of probability measures {µ′t} using
the solution to the McKean-Vlasov SDE or the Kolmogorov forward equation. Therefore,
with the uniqueness of probability measure under fixed {µt} and {αt(µt)}, one can define a
mapping Γ2 such that Γ2({αt(µt)}) = {µ′t}.
The third step is the fixed point part. One can define Γ1 and Γ2 in previous two steps,
and the MFG framework repeats Γ2◦Γ1 until convergence. By Schauder fixed point theorem,
if the mapping Γ2 ◦ Γ1 is continuous mapping, there exists a fixed point solution, and under
some technical conditions it is unique [58, 18, 46].
Therefore, the PDE/controls approach to MFGs is of solving these three main technical
questions. After all, the MFG framework can be converted as two time conflict PDEs:
the HJB equation (1.4) and the Kolmogorov forward equation (1.6). The HJB equation
is associated with the stochastic control part, so it is backward in time. The Kolmogorov
forward equation is associated with the consistency part of the statical distribution, so it is
forward in time. Because these two differential equations are nonlinear PDE and conflicting
direction of time, solving these two equations is not easy in general.
Let us illustrate the PDE/control approach to the toy model in section 1.1.
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The MFG framework for the toy example Fix an actual meeting start time as deter-
ministic T . Then, with fixed T , the problem is equivalent to the stochastic control problem:
v(x0) = inf
α
E[c(t0, T, τ˜) +
1
2
∫ τ˜
0
α2tdt]
s.t. dXt = αtdt+ σdWt, X0 = x0, τ˜ = min{s : Xs = 0}.
Then, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation for the value function v is
0 = ∂tv + min
α
{α∂xv + 1
2
αi2}+ σ
2
2
∂2xxv.
However, this solution is the optimal solution under fixed T , finding the proper T is also
crucial to solve the MFG. Let’s use fixed point method for finding the solution T . The
Kolmogorov forward equation for the distribution of agents’ position at time t, m(t, x), is
∂tm+ ∂x((−∂xv)m) = σ
2
2
∂2xxm.
Define the cumulative distribution function of arrival times as F (s) = − ∫ s
0
∂xm(τ, 0)dτ .
Then, one can update T ′ = F−1(0.9) as new actual meeting start time. With new fixed T ′,
one can repeat the same iterations, the HJB equation and the Kolmogorov forward equation.
Repeat these iterations until the solution converges to a fixed point solution of T ∗ and v∗.
Then, this is the solution to the MFG.
1.4 Probabilistic approach
The stochastic maximum principle is also one of the most common approaches to solve
stochastic control problems as well as the PDE/control approach. Because the HJB equa-
tion only works for Markovian controls, the stochastic maximum principle is suitable to solve
the stochastic controls with non-Markovian controls or open loop controls. The stochastic
maximum principle is a probabilistic approach using the duality principle and an adjoint pro-
cess. It gives necessary conditions for optimality, so by solving adjoint backward stochastic
differential equations (BSDE) it suggests an optimal solution to the problem.
The theory of BSDE is introduced by Bismut [9, 10] and it is widely studied in 1990s.
Pardoux and Peng [66] prove the existence of uniqueness of general BSDEs with Lipschitz
conditions, and there are works connecting BSDEs and stochastic control problems [67, 68,
55]. Beyond BSDEs, the forward backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDE) which
are coupled BSDEs is introduced by Antonelli [1], and Ma, Protter, and Yong [62] study more
general FBSDEs. Because of connection between stochastic control problems and (F)BSDEs,
it has many applications in finance such as [29, 73].
BSDEs are stochastic differential equations in backward time with terminal conditions.
For any fixed time interval [0, T ], define Ft-adapted processes {yt}, {zt} with dynamics
dyt = h(t, yt, zt)dt+ ztdWt, t ∈ [0, T ), yT = ξ,
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where ξ is in L2(F ;Rd). The solution to the BSDE is a pair of (yt, zt) satisfying the above
BSDE with terminal condition. If h(t, y, z) is Lipschitz continuous in y and z, the BSDE has
a unique solution which has finite second moments. In general, because the proof of existence
and uniqueness of the solution to BSDEs relies on the second order norm and the fixed point
method, the space of processes is with L2 norm. Based on the relationship between BSDEs
and the stochastic maximum principle, BSDE is widely used to solve stochastic control
problems.
Canonically, interest on alternative probabilistic approach on the MFG with stochastic
maximum principles arises. Buckdahn et al. [13, 14] and Carmona, Delarue, and Lacker [19,
20, 22] propose probabilistic approaches to directly analyse the combined FBSDE. For the
following MFG
inf
α∈A
E
[∫ T
0
f(t,Xt, µt, αt)dt+ h(XT , µT )
]
subject to dXt = b(t,Xt, µt, αt)dt+ σdWt, ∀t ∈ [0, T ], X0 = x, µ0 = µ,
(1.8)
with proper admissible set A, define the Hamiltonian H as H(t, x, µ, y, α) = b(t, x, µ, α) ·
y + f(t, x, µ, α) for any (t, x, µ, y) ∈ [0, T ] × Rd × P2(Rd) × Rd. In stochastic controls,
because a minimizer of the Hamiltonian with respect to the control process is the minimizer
of the stochastic control problem, it is important to analyse the Hamiltonian. If the drift
b is an affine function in control processes and the cost function f is convex and Lipschitz
continuous derivatives, then, with some technical assumptions the Hamiltonian H has a
unique minimizer αˆ(t, x, µ, y).
As in the PDE/control approach, with fixed {µt}, the MFG (1.8) is equivalent to the
stochastic control problem. From the Hamiltonian H and its minimizer αˆ, one can apply the
stochastic maximum principle to find necessary and sufficient conditions for the problem.
With adjoining process {Yt}, if the FBSDE
dXt = b(t,Xt, µt, αˆ(t,Xt, µt, Yt))dt+ σdWt, X0 = x ∈ Rd,
dYt = −∂xH(t,Xt, µt, Yt, αˆ(t,Xt, µt, Yt))dt+ ZtdWt, YT = ∂xh(XT , µT ),
has a solution with finite second moments, then the minimizer αˆ of the Hamiltonian H is the
optimal controls and Xt is the optimal controlled process. Since the stochastic maximum
principle provides an optimal solution only under fixed {µt}, the consistency part which
studies updating probability measures {µt} needs to be analysed. In [19], Carmona and
Delarue derive the FBSDE of the McKean-Vlasov type such as
dXt = b(t,Xt, PXt , αˆ(t,Xt, PXt , Yt))dt+ σdWt, X0 = x ∈ Rd,
dYt = −∂xH(t,Xt, PXt , Yt, αˆ(t,Xt, PXt , Yt))dt+ ZtdWt, YT = ∂xh(XT , PXT ),
(1.9)
where PXt is the probability distribution of Xt. Under some technical conditions such as
functions are Lipschitz continuous and the drift is affine, (1.9) has a unique solution, and
furthermore it is the solution to the MFG (1.8). Therefore, there exists a unique solution to
the MFG (1.8).
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There are many recent works on the probabilistic MFG theory: Carmona and Lacker [22],
who study a weak formulation of MFGs, Lacker [57], who analyses MFGs with controlled
martingale problems, and Carmona, Delarue, and Lacker [21], who add common noise to
MFGs.
1.5 MFG solution and -Nash equilibrium
Another main result of the theory of MFG is that the optimal control to the MFG is actually
an -Nash equilibrium of the corresponding N player game.2 In [46], Huang, Malhame´, and
Caines prove that the optimal control to the MFG (3.1) is an N -Nash equilibrium of the
corresponding N player game (1.2) for some special class of games; the dimension of the
space d is 1, the terminal cost function h is 0, and σ is constant. Furthermore, N has a
bound c 1
N
for some constant c > 0, N converges to 0 as N goes to infinity.
In the MFG probabilistic approach [19], Carmona and Delarue also show relationship
between the solution to the MFG and an -Nash equilibrium. Consider the MFG (1.8) and
let α∗t is the optimal control to the MFG (1.8). The corresponding N player game of the
MFG (1.8) is formulated as, for any i = 1, 2, · · · , N ,
JN,i(α1, · · · , αNt ) = inf
α∈A
E
[∫ T
0
f(t,X it , δ
N
t , α
i
t)dt+ h(X
i
T , δ
N
T )
]
,
subject to the dynamics
dX it = b(t,X
i
t , δ
N
t , α
i
t)dt+ σdW
i
t , ∀t ∈ [0, T ], X i0 = xi ∈ Rd,
where δNt =
1
N
∑N
i=1X
i
t is the empirical distribution of X
1
t , · · · , XNt at time t, A is the same
admissible set, and W it are i.i.d. standard Brownian motions. Then, with some technical
assumptions, for any βi ∈ A the following inequality holds:
JN,i(α∗1, · · · , βi, · · · , α∗Nt ) ≥ JN,i(α∗1, · · · , α∗Nt )− N ,
with N = O(N
− 1
d+4 ).
Therefore, the optimal control of the MFG is an N -Nash equilibrium of the corresponding
N player game and N goes to 0 as N goes to infinity.
The toy model case In [36], there exist explicit solutions to the toy model by the MFG
approach and by the N player game approach. Denote τ ∗N as the solution to the toy model
by the N player game approach and τ ∗MFG as the solution to the toy model by the MFG
approach, then it provides the relation as
τ ∗N = τ
∗
MFG −
1
N
G+ o(
1
N
),
where G is a some function which is independent to N . So, the MFG solution τ ∗MFG converges
to the solution of N player game τ ∗N as N goes to infinity, and it is an N -Nash equilibrium
where N =
1
N
G+ o( 1
N
).
2The definition of -Nash equilibrium is in appendix A.1.
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1.6 MFG with common noise
In the previous MFG (3.1), there were only i.i.d. noises for each player. However, because
in reality there are many possible common impacts to players within the industry, studying
games with common noise as well as individual noises is important. Let W 0t be another
Brownian motion in the same space and W 0t is independent and identical to W
i
t for i =
1, · · · , N . Then, the MFG with common noise is
v(s, x) = inf
α∈A
E
[∫ T
s
f(t,Xt, µt, αt)dt+ h(T,XT , µT )
]
s.t. dXt = b(t,Xt, µt, αt)dt+ σ(t,Xt, µt)dWt + σ0(t,Xt, µt)dW
0
t , and Xs = x.
With conditioning on common noise W 0t , Carmona, Delarue, and Lacker [21] develop the
theory from weak formations and prove the uniqueness and existence solution of the MFG
with common noise. In economics literatures, idiosyncratic noises can be eliminated by
the exact law of large numbers [26, 53, 71, 75]. Using the exact law of large numbers and
conditional exact law of large numbers, Nutz [65] studies MFGs of optimal stopping problems
with common noise, and Carmona, Fouque, and Sun [23] apply the MFG with common noise
to systemic risk. Because of the common noise term, the HJB equation and Kolmogorov
forward equation for MFGs have different form. Consider the following example in [23]
v(s, x,m) = inf
α∈A
E
[∫ T
s
f(t,Xt,mt, αt)dt+ h(XT ,mT )
]
s.t. dXt = b(t,Xt,mt, αt)dt+ σ
√
1− ρ2dWt + σρdW 0t , and Xs = x,ms = m,
where mt =
∫
xPXt(dx) is the mean of Xt with conditioning on W
0. Then, by conditioning
on the common noise, the HJB equation and Kolmogorov forward equation for this MFG
become following stochastic PDEs:
dPXt =
[
−∂x (b(t,Xt,mt, αt)PXt) +
1
2
σ2(1− ρ2)∂xxPXt
]
dt− ρσ∂xPXtdW 0t ,
and
dv +
[
1
2
σ2(1− ρ2)∂xxv + Lmv + ∂xmvd < m, x >
dt
]
dt
+ inf
α∈U
[b(t, x,m, α)∂xv + f(t, x,m, α)] dt
+ ρσ∂mvdW
0
t + ρσ∂xvdW
0
t = 0,
where Lm + ρσ∂mdW 0t is an infinitesimal generator for mt.
1.7 Mean–field SDE and McKean–Vlasov type
controls
After Lions introduces differentiability with respect to the probability measure in his MFG
course [18], there are many works in stochastic controls with mean field interaction using
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derivatives with respect to the probability measure. For any random variable Y ∈ L2(F ;Rd),
let PY be a probability measure of Y , then one can define the lift function as Φ˜(Y ) = Φ(PY )
for any function Φ : P2(Rd) → R. Then, differentiability of Φ with respect to PY can be
defined as differentiability in Fre´chet sense of Φ˜ in [18, 15].
Definition 2. If Φ˜ is differentiable in Fre´chet sense at Y0 ∈ L2(F ;Rd), there exists a unique
h0 : Rd → Rd such that Φ(PY ) − Φ(PY0) = E[h0(Y0) · (Y − Y0)] + o(|Y − Y0|L2) for any
Y ∈ L2(F ;Rd). Then, define ∂µΦ(PY0 , y) = h0(y) for any y ∈ Rd.
Using the derivative with respect to the probability measure, Buckdahn, Li, Peng, and
Rainer [15] derive the generalized Itoˆ’s formula for mean-field SDEs
dXt = b(Xt, PXt)dt+ σ(Xt, PXt)dWt, X0 = x, PX0 = Pξ,
and for the function Φ : [0, T ]×Rd×P2(Rd)→ R in C1,(2,1)b ([0, T ]×Rd×P2(Rd)) as following:
Φ(s,Xs, PXs)− Φ(r,Xr, PXr)
=
∫ s
r
∂tΦ(t,Xt, PXt) +
d∑
i=1
∂xiΦ(t,Xt, PXt)bi(Xt, PXt)
+
1
2
d∑
i,j,k=1
∂2xixjΦ(t,Xt, PXt)σi,kσk,j(Xt, PXt) + E¯
[ d∑
i=1
(∂µΦ)i(t,Xt, PXt , X¯t)bi(X¯t, PXt)
+
1
2
d∑
i,j,k=1
∂xi
(
(∂µΦ)j(t,Xt, PXt , X¯t)
)
σi,kσk,j(X¯t, PXt
]
dt
+
∫ s
r
d∑
i,j=1
∂xiΦ(t,Xt, PXt)σi,j(Xt, PXt)dW
j
t , 0 ≤ r ≤ s ≤ T,
(1.10)
where X¯t is independent and identical copy of Xt. Using the generalized Itoˆ’s formula,
recently, Pham and Wei [69, 70] study following stochastic McKean–Vlasov control problems:
inf
α∈A
J(α) = inf
α∈A
E
∫ T
0
f(t,Xt, αt, PXt,αt)dt+ g(XT , PXT )
s.t. dXt = b(t,Xt, αt, PXt,αt)dt+ σ(t,Xt, αt, PXt,αt)dWt, X0 = x0,
where b, σ are Lipschitz continuous, f, g satisfies the quadratic condition in [69], and A is
the admissible set which includes progressively measurable and square integrable processes
with closed loop in feedback forms. Then, the dynamic programming principle holds for
this stochastic McKean–Vlasov control problem, and they derive the Bellman equation and
prove the verification theorem using results in [15].
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1.8 Notations
Throughout the thesis, use the following notation, unless otherwise specified.
• (Ω,F ,F = (Ft)0≤t≤T , P ) is a probability space and W i = {W it }0≤t≤T are i.i.d. standard
Brownian motions in this space for i = 1, 2, . . . , N ;
• P(R) is the set of all probability measures on R;
• Pp(R) is the set of all probability measures of p order on R such that µ ∈ Pp(R) if
(
∫ |x|pµ(dx)) 1p <∞;
• Lip(f) is a Lipschitz coefficient of f for any Lipschitz function f . That is, |f(x) −
f(y)| ≤ Lip(f)|x− y| for all x, y ∈ R;
• Dp is the pth order Wasserstein metric on Pp(R) between two probability measures µ
and µ′, defined as Dp(µ, µ′) = inf
µ˜
(∫ |y − y′|pµ˜(dy, dy′)) 1p , where µ˜ is a coupling of µ
and µ′;
• M[0,T ] ⊂ C([0, T ] : P2(R)) is a class of flows of probability measures {µt} on [0, T ] and
contains all {µt} so that
sup
s 6=t
D1(µt, µs)
|t− s| 12 ≤ c1, supt∈[0,T ]
∫
|x|2µt(dx) ≤ c1
where c1 is a positive constant. M[0,T ] is a metric space endowed with the metric dM
such that
dM({µt}, {µ′t}) = sup
0≤t≤T
D1(µt, µ
′
t); (1.11)
• Lψ(x) = b(x)∂xψ(x) + 12σ2(x)∂xxψ(x) for any stochastic process dxt = b(xt)dt +
σ(xt)dWt and any ψ(x) ∈ C2;
• A function f is said to satisfy a polynomial growth condition if f(x) ≤ c(|x|k + 1) for
some constants c, k, for all x.
• Pϑ is a probability distribution of the random variable ϑ;
• PX∞ is a limiting stationary distribution of the process {Xt}t≥0 if {Xt}t≥0 has a limiting
distribution and a stationary distribution and they are same.
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Chapter 2
Singular controls
2.1 Singular controls
The stochastic maximum principle and the dynamic programming principle are most com-
monly used approaches to solve stochastic control problems. Because the dynamic pro-
gramming principle only works for Markovian controls, for stochastic control problems with
non-Markovian controls the stochastic maximum principle is widely used to solve it. How-
ever, since the stochastic maximum principle relies on a unique maximizer or minimizer of
the Hamiltonian and on boundedness of the Hamiltonian, it fails to give a solution when
the Hamiltonian does not converge or maximizer or minimizer is not unique. It is called a
bang-bang situation.
Let’s look at an example of the bang-bang situation in [7]. Let xt = x + Wt + ξt be a
state process where x is an initial position, Wt is a Brownian motion, and ξt is a control
process which is a finite variation process. Since ξt is finite variation, it can be decomposed
as the difference of two nondecreasing processes ξt = ξ
+
t − ξ−t . The objective of controls is
to minimize the following function:
J(ξt) = E
∫ ∞
0
e−αt{dξ+t + dξ−t + h(x+ wt + ξt)dt}.
The Hamiltonian for this model is
H(x, p) = inf
ξt
{p · dξt + dξ+t + dξ−t } = inf
ξt
{(p+ 1)dξ+t − (p− 1)dξ−t }.
According to the stochastic maximum principle, the optimal control is a minimizer of the
Hamiltonian H, but if p > 1, the minimizer is dξ+t = 0, dξ
−
t = +∞. If p < −1, the minimizer
is dξ+t = +∞, dξ−t = 0. If p ∈ (−1, 1), the minimizer is dξt = 0. In this case, the Hamiltonian
diverges and one can not use the classical stochastic maximum principle.
Because of these situations, one needs to consider the singular control which control
processes are not absolutely continuous but finite variation processes. This class of controls
was introduced by Bather and Chernoff [2], and Benesˇ, Shepp, and Witzenhausen suggest
some singular control problems with explicit solutions. In 1970s and 1980s, Harrison and
Taylor [43], Karatzas [48, 49], and Karatzas and Shreve [50, 51] develop the theory of singular
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controls in one dimensional space. For any finite variation process ξt, by the Lebesgue
decomposition theorem one can decompose uniquely ξt as the pure jump part ξ
jp
t =
∑
0<s<t
∆ξs
and the continuous part ξct = ξt − ξjpt . The continuous part consists of the absolutely
continuous part ξact =
∫ t
0
ξ˙csds, and the singularly continuous part ξ
sc
t = ξ
c
t − ξact . The regular
control is a special case of the stochastic control with ξsc ≡ ξjp ≡ 0.
Because the Hamiltonian may diverge for singular controls, the HJB equation for singular
controls also does not have a solution in general. However, singular controls can be solv-
able when one analyses the variational inequality. Consider the following stochastic control
problem:
v(s, x) = sup
α∈A
J(s, x, α) = sup
α∈A
E
[∫ T
s
f(Xt, αt)dt+ g(XT )
]
,
s.t. dXt = b(Xt, αt)dt+ σ(Xt, αt)dWt, Xs = x ∈ Rd.
The Hamiltonian is H(x,Dv,D2v) = sup
α∈A
[
b(x, α)Dv + 1
2
tr(σσTD2v) + f(x, α)
]
, and
F (t, x, v, vt, Dv,D
2v) = −vt−H(x,Dv,D2v) is the HJB equation for this problem. Because
H may diverge, define H = {(x, p,M) ∈ (Rd,Rd,Sd+)|H(x, p,M) < ∞} where Sd+ is the
set of d× d semi positive definite matrices. Assume that there exists a continuous function
G : (Rd,Rd,Sd+) → R such that (x, p,M) ∈ H if and only if G(x, p,M) ≥ 0. Then, the
variational inequality for this stochastic control problem is
min{F (t, x, v, vt, Dv,D2v), G(x,Dv,D2v)} = 0. (2.1)
Then, as in regular controls, the solution to (2.1) is one of the solution candidates, so
one needs to verify that the solution to (2.1) is actually the value function of the problem
using the verification theorem or the uniqueness of the viscosity solution to the equation.
Regularity of the solution to the HJB equation or the variational inequality is useful to prove
the verification theorem. For the variational inequality, because of the existence of G, the
C2 regularity is not an easy problem in general. There are previous papers which study
the smooth fit regularity of the value function for singular controls by Benesˇ, Shepp, and
Witsenhausen [7], by Harrison [42], by Harrison and Taylor [43], by Karatzas [48, 49], by
Taksar [78], by Guo and Pham [39], and by Guo and Tomecek [41].
Unlike regular controls, the rates of optimal control processes in singular controls are
not Lipschitz continuous and the control space can be divided into two regions. On the set
H, the optimal control is equal to 0, “do nothing”, or on the set Hc, the optimal control
is singularly continuous or has a jump, “action”. It is interpreted as the optimal control is
either pushing the object with maximum force to keep the object in some specific region if
the object is out of that region, or doing nothing if the object is within the region.
2.2 Singular controls of bounded velocity
Because of difficulties on singular controls, approaching the singular controls from controls
with bounded velocity process is one of the useful techniques. The process ξt is called to the
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bounded velocity process if |dξt
dt
| ≤ θ for some constant θ ∈ [0,∞). Since a bounded velocity
process is absolutely continuous, the control problem with bounded velocity is again regular
control problem. However, the solution behaviour of the control problem with bounded
velocity is similar to the solution behaviour of the singular control problem, and furthermore
the solution to the singular control problem can be approximated by the solution to the
control problem with bounded velocity as θ go to ∞,.
The relationship between singular controls and singular controls with bounded velocity
is previously studied in [44]. In [44], under some technical assumptions with one direction
of controls, the value function and optimal controls of convex stochastic control problems
converge to some function and optimal controls as bounds going to∞, and resulting function
and optimal controls satisfy the optimality of the corresponding control problem.
Therefore, we approach the MFG with singular controls from bounded velocity in this
thesis. First, we formulate the MFG with singular controls of bounded velocity (with a bound
θ <∞) and prove uniqueness and existence of the solution to the MFG. Then, we show that
optimal controls of the solution to the MFG is an -Nash equilibrium to the corresponding
N player game and, furthermore,  converges to 0 as the number of players N and the bound
θ go to infinity.
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Chapter 3
MFG with singular controls of
bounded velocity
3.1 Introduction to MFG with singular controls of
bounded velocity
Let (Ω,F ,F = (Ft)0≤t≤T , P ) be a probability space with W = {Wt}0≤t≤T standard Brownian
motion in this space. Fix a finite time T and a probability measure µ. This paper introduces
and analyses the following class of stochastic games:
for any (s, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R,
v(s, x) = inf
ξ+· ,ξ−· ∈U
E
[∫ T
s
(
f(xt, µt)dt+ g1(xt)dξ
+
t + g2(xt)dξ
−
t
)]
, (3.1)
subject to
dxt = b(xt, µt)dt+ dξ
+
t − dξ−t + σdWt, ∀t ∈ [s, T ], xs = x, µs = µ. (3.2)
Here (ξ+t , ξ
−
t ) is a pair of non-decreasing ca`dla`g processes in an appropriate admissible control
set U , µt is a probability measure of xt, and f, g1, g2 are functions satisfying some technical
assumptions to be specified in Section 3.2.
This kind of problems belongs to a broad class of stochastic games known as the mean
field games (MFGs). The theoretical development of MFGs is led by the pioneering work
of [58] and [46], who studied stochastic games of a large population with small interactions.
MFG avoids directly analyzing the notoriously hard N -player stochastic games when N is
large. Instead, it approximates the dynamics and the objective function under the notion
of population’s probability distribution flows, a.k.a., mean information processes. (This
idea can be traced to physics on weakly interacting particles.) As such, MFG leads to an
elegant and analytically feasible framework to approximate the Nash equilibrium (equilibria)
of N -player stochastic games.
Our work with singular controls. Most research on MFG theory focuses on regular
controls where controls are absolutely continuous and rates of optimal controls are usually
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Lipschitz continuous. In practice, controls are not necessarily absolutely continuous and/or
the control rate might be constrained. These types of controls are called singular controls or
impulse controls depending on the degree of discontinuity of the control. Generally, singular
and impulse controls are much harder to analyse. For instance, studying singular controls
involves analyzing fully nonlinear PDEs with additional gradient constraints, an important
and difficult subject in PDE theory especially in terms of the regularity property. On the
other hand, the subject of singular controls has fascinated control theorists, with its distinct
“bang-bang” type control policy (Benesˇ, Shepp, and Witsenhausen [7]) and its connection
to optimal stopping and switching (Karatzas and Shreve [50, 51], Boetius [12], Guo and
Tomecek [40]).
Our thesis studies MFGs with singular controls with a bounded velocity for which the
rates of optimal controls are no longer Lipschitz continuous. For a class of MFGs in the form
of Eqn. (3.5), it shows that under appropriate technical conditions,
• the MFG admits a unique optimal control, and
• the value function of the MFG is an -Nash equilibrium to the corresponding N -player
game, with  = O
(
1√
N
)
.
These results are analogous to those for MFGs with regular controls. Furthermore, our paper
provides an MFG with singular control with an explicit analytic solution. This case study
illustrates a curious connection between MFGs with and without common noise, under some
“symmetric” problem structure.
Solution approach. Our solution approach is built on the PDE/control methodology
of [58] and [46]. However, the analysis is more difficult for both the HJB equation and the
SDE: not only the HJB equation is with additional state constraints, but also the rate of
optimal controls is no longer Lipschitz continuous. Our analysis technique is inspired by
the work of El Karoui, Kapoudjian, Pardoux, Peng, and Quenez [28] for reflected BSDEs.
The key element is to impose the rationality of players. Mathematically, it means that the
control is non-increasing with respect to the player’s current state. Intuitively, it says that
the better off the state of the individual player, the less likely the player exercises controls
(in order to minimize cost).
Related work. Some early work on MFG with singular controls includes Zhang [82] and
Hu, Oksendal, and Sulem [45]. Both establish the stochastic maximal principle while the
latter also proves the existence of optimal control policies for a class of MFGs with singular
controls. The work of Fu and Horst [32] adopts the notion of relaxed controls to prove the
existence of the solution of MFG with singular controls. Their problem setting and solution
approach, however, are different from ours. In addition, our thesis establishes both the
uniqueness and existence of the solution for MFGs, with explicit structures for the optimal
control.
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Outline of the chapter This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 defines the
MFG with singular controls of bounded velocity, and presents the main results regarding the
existence and uniqueness of the solution to the MFG, as well as its -Nash equilibrium to
the N -player game. Section 3.3 provides detailed proofs and Section 3.5 analyses a MFG in
a systemic risk model with explicit solutions.
3.2 Problem formulations and main results
N-player games with singular controls. Fix a finite time T and suppose there are N
identical players in the game. Denote {xit}0≤t≤T as the state process in R for the ith player
(i = 1, 2, . . . , N), with xis = x
i starting from time s ∈ [0, T ]. Now assume that the dynamics
of xit follows, for t ∈ [s, T ],
dxit =
1
N
N∑
j=1
b0(x
i
t, x
j
t)dt+ σdW
i
t + dξ
i
t, x
i
s = x
i,
where b0 : R × R → R is Lipschitz continuous and σ is a positive constant. Here {ξit}s≤t≤T
is the control by the ith player with i = 1, 2, . . . , N , assumed to be a ca`dla`g process and of
a finite variation with ξis = 0.
The finite variation process {ξit}s≤t≤T can be decomposed into two nondecreasing pro-
cesses {ξi+t }s≤t≤T , {ξi−t }s≤t≤T such that ξit = ξi+t − ξi−t with ξi+s = ξi−s = 0. Therefore the
dynamics of xit can be rewritten as
dxit =
1
N
N∑
j=1
b0(x
i
t, x
j
t)dt+ σdW
i
t + dξ
i+
t − dξi−t , xis = xi.
The objective of the ith player is to minimize a cost function J i,N∞ (s, x, ξ
i+
· , ξ
i−
· ; ξ
−i
· ) where
ξ−i· is all other players’ control processes {ξj+t , ξj−t }nj=1,j 6=i:
inf
ξi+t ,ξ
i−
t ∈U∞
J i,N∞ (s, x
i, ξi+· , ξ
i−
· ; ξ
−i
· )
= inf
ξi+t ,ξ
i−
t ∈U∞
E
[∫ T
s
1
N
N∑
j=1
f0(x
i
t, x
j
t)dt+ g1(x
i
t)dξ
i+
t + g2(x
i
t)dξ
i−
t
]
,
subject to dxit =
1
N
N∑
j=1
b0(x
i
t, x
j
t)dt+ σdW
i
t + dξ
i+
t − dξi−t , xis = xi,
(3.3)
for Lipschitz continuous functions f0 : R×R→ R and g1, g2 : R→ R, and over an appropriate
admissible control set
U∞ = {{ξit}|ξit is Ft-progressively measurable, nondecreasing, and ξis = 0},
where Ft is a sigma algebra of σ(x1t , · · · , xNt ). We consider that controls are closed loop in
feedback form. That is, dξit = dξ
i+
t − dξi−t = dψi1(t, xit;x1t , · · · , xNt ) − dψi2(t, xit;x1t , · · · , xNt )
for some function ψi1, ψ
i
2.
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Definition 3 (-Nash equilibrium). {ξi∗+t , ξi∗−t }ni=1 is called an -Nash equilibrium to (3.3)
if for any i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, any (s, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R, and any ξi′+t , ξi
′−
t ∈ U∞,
J i,N∞ (s, x, ξ
i′+
· , ξ
i′−
· ; ξ
∗−i
· ) ≥ J i,N∞ (s, x, ξi∗+· , ξi∗−· ; ξ∗−i· )− .
Note that in this N -player game, both the drift term in (3.3) for the dynamics and the
first term in (3.3) for the objective function are affected by both the local information (i.e.,
the state of the ith player itself) and the global information (i.e., the states of other players).
In general, this type of stochastic game is difficult to analyse: although the work of Uchida
[79] shows the existence of Nash equilibrium for such an N -player game, finding a Nash
equilibrium of the N -player game is in general intractable.
Now assume that the controls ξi+t , ξ
i−
t are with bounded velocity so that dξ
i+
t = ξ˙
i+
t dt
and dξi−t = ξ˙
i−
t dt with 0 ≤ ξ˙i+t , ξ˙i−t ≤ θ for a constant θ > 0. Corresponding N player game
with bounded velocity can be formulated as:
inf
ξi+t ,ξ
i−
t ∈Uθ
J i,Nθ (s, x
i, ξi+· , ξ
i−
· ; ξ
−i
· )
= inf
ξi+t ,ξ
i−
t ∈Uθ
E
[∫ T
s
1
N
N∑
j=1
f0(x
i
t, x
j
t)dt+ g1(x
i
t)ξ˙
i+
t dt+ g2(x
i
t)ξ˙
i−
t dt
]
,
subject to dxit =
1
N
N∑
j=1
b0(x
i
t, x
j
t)dt+ σdW
i
t + ξ˙
i+
t dt− ξ˙i−t dt, xis = xi.
(3.4)
Similarly with the game (3.3), the admissible control set is
Uθ = {{ξt}|{ξt} is Ft-progressively measurable, nondecreasing, and ξ0 = 0, ξ˙t ∈ U = [0, θ]},
where Ft is a sigma algebra of σ(x1t , · · · , xNt ), and we will again restrict ourselves to closed
loop controls in feedback form.
A heuristic derivation to the MFG formulation. Assume that all N players are
identical. Then, for each time t ∈ [0, T ], all xit for i = 1, 2, · · · , N have same probability
distribution. If εNt =
1
N
N∑
i=1
δxit is an empirical distribution of x
i
t for i = 1, 2, · · · , N , under
appropriate technical conditions, one can approximate via εt, according to SLLN, the drift
function and cost function of the ith player game when N →∞, so that
1
N
N∑
j=1
b0(xt, x
j
t)→
∫
b0(xt, y)εt(dy) = b(xt, εt),
1
N
N∑
j=1
f0(xt, x
j
t)→
∫
f0(xt, y)εt(dy) = f(xt, εt).
where b, f : R×P2(R)→ R and g1, g2 : R→ R are functions satisfying following assumptions;
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Assumptions
(A1) b(x, µ), f(x, µ), g1(x), and g2(x) are Lipschitz continuous in x and µ (i.e. |b(x1, µ1) −
b(x2, µ
2)| ≤ Lip(b)(|x1 − x2| + D1(µ1, µ2)) for some Lip(b) > 0 and |f(x1, µ1) −
f(x2, µ
2)| ≤ Lip(f)(|x1 − x2|+D1(µ1, µ2)) for some Lip(f) > 0 );
(A2) f(x, µ) has first order derivatives, and f and ∂xf(x, µ) satisfy the polynomial growth
condition;
(A3) b(x, µ), g1(x), and g2(x) have first and second order derivatives with respect to x, and
derivatives are uniformly continuous and bounded in x;
(A4) −g1(x) ≤ g2(x) and g1(x), g2(x) 6= 0 for any x ∈ R.
Note that now the drift term in the dynamics and the objective function rely only on the local
information xit and the aggregated mean information µt. This leads to an MFG formulation
of (3.4). The MFG problem of Eqn. (3.1) can be defined precisely as
vθ(s, x) = inf
ξ+· ,ξ−· ∈Uθ
J∞θ (s, x, ξ
+
· , ξ
−
· )
= inf
ξ+· ,ξ−· ∈Uθ
E
[∫ T
s
(
f(xt, µt) + g1(xt)ξ˙
+
t + g2(xt)ξ˙
−
t
)
dt
]
,
subject to dxt =
(
b(xt, µt) + ξ˙
+
t − ξ˙−t
)
dt+ σdWt, xs = x, µs = µ.
(3.5)
where µt is a probability measure of xt for any t ∈ [s, T ] and controls are closed loop in
feedback form over the admissible set Uθ. Since controls are closed loop in feedback form
and the control process ξt is bounded velocity, we can define the control function ϕ as
ξ˙t = ξ˙
+
t − ξ˙−t = ϕ(t, xt; {µt}) = ϕ1(t, xt; {µt}) − ϕ2(t, xt; {µt}) where ϕ1 = max{ϕ, 0} and
ϕ2 = −max{−ϕ, 0} .
Assumptions.
(A5) (Monotonicity of the cost function) Either i) f satisfies the following condition∫
(f(x, µ1)− f(x, µ2))(µ1 − µ2)(dx) > 0, for any µ1 6= µ2 ∈ P2(R),
or ii) f satisfies the following condition∫
(f(x, µ1)− f(x, µ2))(µ1 − µ2)(dx) ≥ 0, for any µ1, µ2 ∈ P2(R),
and H(x, p) = inf
ξ˙+,ξ˙−∈[0,θ]
{(ξ˙+−ξ˙−)p+g1(x)ξ˙++g2(x)ξ˙−} satisfies the following condition
for any x, p, q ∈ R
if H(x, p+ q)−H(x, p)− ∂pH(x, p)q = 0, then ∂pH(x, p+ q) = ∂pH(x, p);
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(A6) (Rationality of players) For any control functions ϕ, any t ∈ [0, T ], and any x, y ∈ R,
(x− y)(ϕ(t, x)− ϕ(t, y)) ≤ 0.
The assumption (A4) ensures the finiteness of the value function. For the game (3.3), if
−g1(x) > g2(x), by letting dξi+t = dξi−t = M and M → ∞, J i,N∞ goes to −∞. The
assumption (A5) which is used in the proof of proposition 4 is for the uniqueness of the
fixed point as in [58, 18] . The assumption (A6) which is used for the proof of theorem
2 is that closed loop in feedback type control functions are nonincreasing in current states
because tendency of increasing state decreases as the current state is higher.
Solution approach and main results. Our solution approach is in the spirit of [58, 46],
and consists of three steps. Fix a flow of probability measures {µt} which is in M[0,T ] 1.
The first step is to analyse a stochastic control problem under the fixed flow of probability
measures {µt}0≤t≤T . If such a control problem has a unique optimal control, denoted the
optimal control as ξ˙tdt = ϕ(t, xt|{µt})dt, then one can proceed to define a mapping Γ1 from
the class of flows of probability measures M[0,T ] to the space of optimal control functions
andM[0,T ] so that Γ1({µt}) = (ϕ(t, x|{µt}), {µt}). The second step is to analyse the optimal
controlled process, the SDE, given the optimal control function ϕ. If this SDE allows for a
unique flow of probability measures solution in M[0,T ], denoted as {µ˜t}0≤t≤T , then one can
define another mapping Γ2 from the space of optimal control functions andM[0,T ] toM[0,T ]
so that Γ2(ϕ(t, x|{µt}), {µt}) = {µ˜t}. Then, repeat the first and second step under fixed
flow of probability measures {µ˜t}. Keep repeat these steps until these iterations converge
to a fixed point of the flow of probability measures {µ∗t}. We will check if Γ = Γ1 ◦ Γ2 is a
continuous mapping to allow for a fixed point solution and if Γ has at most one fixed point
solution, leading to the solution of the MFG.
Definition 4. A solution of the MFG (3.5) is defined as a pair of an optimal control {ξ∗t }
and a flow of probability measures {µ∗t} ∈ M[0,T ] if they satisfy v(s, x) = J∞θ (s, x, ξ∗+· , ξ∗−· )
for all (s, x) ∈ [0, T ]×R and µ∗t is a probability measure of the optimal controlled process x∗t
for all t ∈ [0, T ] where the dynamics of x∗t is
dx∗t =
(
b(x∗t , µ
∗
t ) + ξ˙
∗+
t − ξ˙∗−t
)
dt+ σdWt, x
∗
s = x,
for s ≤ t ≤ T .
Now, we are ready to state the main results of the paper.
Theorem 1. Under (A1)–(A5), there exists a unique solution (ξ∗t , {µ∗t}) to the MFG (3.5).
Moreover, the corresponding value function v for the MFG (3.5) is a function in C1,2([0, T ]×
R), of a polynomial growth.
Theorem 2. Assume (A1)–(A6). Then,
1By proposition 2 in later section, a flow of probability measures for the optimally controlled state process
{µt}0≤t≤T is in M[0,T ].
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a) for any fixed µt ∈ M[0,T ], the value function to the stochastic control problem with
bounded velocity processes (3.5) converges to the value function to the stochastic control
problem with finite variations:
v∞(s, x : {µt}) = inf
ξ+· ,ξ−· ∈U∞
E
[∫ T
s
f(xt, µt)dt+ g1(xt)dξ
+
t + g2(xt)dξ
−
t
]
,
subject to dxt = b(xt, µt)dt+ dξ
+
t − dξ−t + σdWt, xs = x,
(3.6)
as θ goes to infinity;
b) the optimal control to the MFG with bounded velocity processes (3.5) is an N -Nash
equilibrium to the corresponding N-player game with bounded velocity processes (3.4),
with N = O(
1√
N
);
c) the optimal control to the MFG with bounded velocity processes (3.5) is an (N + θ)-
Nash equilibrium to the corresponding N-player game with finite variations (3.3), with
N = O(
1√
N
) and θ → 0 as θ →∞.
3.3 Proof of existence and uniqueness of solutions to
MFG
The stochastic control problem
Let {µt} ∈ M[0.T ] be a fixed exogenous flow of probability measures with µs = µ. Then,
(3.5) is the following control problem,
vθ(s, x; {µt}) = inf
ξ+· ,ξ−· ∈Uθ
E
[∫ T
s
(
f(xt, µt) + g1(xt)ξ˙
+
t + g2(xt)ξ˙
−
t
)
dt
]
, (3.7)
subject to
dxt =
(
b(xt, µt) + ξ˙
+
t − ξ˙−t
)
dt+ σdWt, xs = x.
This is a classical stochastic control problem, and the corresponding HJB equation with
the terminal condition is given by
−∂tvθ = inf
ξ˙+,ξ˙−∈[0,θ]
{(
b(x, µ) + (ξ˙+ − ξ˙−)
)
∂xvθ +
(
f(x, µ) + g1(x)ξ˙
+ + g2(x)ξ˙
−
)}
+
σ2
2
∂xxvθ
= inf
ξ˙+,ξ˙−∈[0,θ]
{
(∂xvθ + g1(x))ξ˙
+ + (−∂xvθ + g2(x))ξ˙−
}
+ b(x, µ)∂xvθ + f(x, µ) +
σ2
2
∂xxvθ
= min {(∂xvθ + g1(x))θ, (−∂xvθ + g2(x))θ, 0}+ b(x, µ)∂xvθ + f(x, µ) + σ
2
2
∂xxvθ,
with vθ(T, x) = 0, ∀x ∈ R.
(3.8)
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The existence and uniqueness of a C1,2([0, T ]×R) solution to (3.8) is clear by Theorem 6.2.
in Chapter VI. [31]. Moreover, we can show that such a solution to (3.8) is the value function
of (3.7).
Before establishing this result, let us recall the viscosity solution to (3.8).
Definition 5. vˆ is called a viscosity solution to (3.8) if vˆ is both a viscosity supersolution
and a viscosity subsolution, with the following definitions,
(i) viscosity supersolution: for any (t0, x0) ∈ [0, T ]×R and any ϑ ∈ C1,2, if (t0, x0) is a local
minimum of vˆ − ϑ with vˆ(t0, x0)− ϑ(t0, x0) = 0, then
− inf
ξ˙+,ξ˙−∈[0,θ]
{(
b(x0, µ) + (ξ˙
+ − ξ˙−)
)
∂xϑ(t0, x0) +
(
f(x0, µ) + g1(x0)ξ˙
+ + g2(x0)ξ˙
−
)}
− ∂tϑ(t0, x0)− σ
2
2
∂xxϑ(t0, x0) ≥ 0, and ϑ(T, x0) ≥ 0;
(ii) viscosity subsolution: for any (t0, x0) ∈ [0, T ]× R and any ϑ ∈ C1,2, if (t0, x0) is a local
maximum of vˆ − ϑ with vˆ(t0, x0)− ϑ(t0, x0) = 0, then
− inf
ξ˙+,ξ˙−∈[0,θ]
{(
b(x0, µ) + (ξ˙
+ − ξ˙−)
)
∂xϑ(t0, x0) +
(
f(x0, µ) + g1(x0)ξ˙
+ + g2(x0)ξ˙
−
)}
− ∂tϑ(t0, x0)− σ
2
2
∂xxϑ(t0, x0) ≤ 0, and ϑ(T, x0) ≤ 0.
Proposition 1. Assume a fixed {µt} in M[0,T ] for 0 ≤ t ≤ T . Under the assumptions
(A1)-(A5), the HJB Eqn. (3.8) with a terminal condition vθ(T, x) = 0 for any x ∈ R has a
unique solution v in C1,2([0, T ] × R), of a polynomial growth. Furthermore, the solution is
the value function to the problem (3.7), with the optimal control given by
ϕθ(t, xt|{µt}) = ξ˙+t,θ − ξ˙−t,θ =

θ if ∂xvθ(t, xt) ≤ −g1(xt),
0 if − g1(xt) ≤ ∂xvθ(t, xt) ≤ g2(xt),
−θ if g2(xt) ≤ ∂xvθ(t, xt).
Proof. By theorem 6.2. in Chapter VI. [31], there exists a unique solution w which is in
C1,2([0, T ]× R) with polynomial growth to (3.8) and let vθ be the value function of (3.7).
First, w is a viscosity subsolution to (3.8). That is, for any (s, x) ∈ [0, T ]×R, w(T, x) ≤ 0
and
−∂tw − inf
ξ˙+,ξ˙−∈[0,θ]
{(
b(x, µ) + (ξ˙+ − ξ˙−)
)
∂xw +
(
f(x, µ) + g1(x)ξ˙
+ + g2(x)ξ˙
−
)}
− σ
2
2
∂xxw ≤ 0.
On one hand, for any ξ˙+t , ξ˙
−
t ∈ Uθ, let xt be a controlled process with ξ˙+t , ξ˙−t . Then, by the
Itoˆ’s formula on w(s, x),
0 ≥ E[w(T, xT )]
= w(s, x) + E
[∫ T
s
∂tw(t, xt) + (b(xt, µt) + (ξ˙
+
t − ξ˙−t ))∂xw(t, xt) +
σ2
2
∂xxw(t, xt)dt
]
≥ w(s, x)− E
[ ∫ T
s
f(xt, µt) + g1(xt)ξ˙
+
t + g2(xt)ξ˙
−
t dt
]
.
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Hence, for any ξ˙+t , ξ˙
−
t ∈ Uθ,
E
[ ∫ T
s
f(xt, µt) + g1(xt)ξ˙
+
t + g2(xt)ξ˙
−
t dt
]
≥ w(s, x).
Therefore,
v(s, x) = inf
ξ˙+t ,ξ˙
−
t ∈U
E
[ ∫ T
s
f(xt, µt) + g1(xt)ξ˙
+
t + g2(xt)ξ˙
−
t dt
]
≥ w(s, x).
On the other hand, let ξ˙+t,θ, ξ˙
−
t,θ ∈ Uθ be a minimizer of the Hamiltonian:
inf
ξ˙+,ξ˙−∈[0,θ]
{(
b(x, µ) + (ξ˙+ − ξ˙−)
)
∂xw +
(
f(x, µ) + g1(x)ξ˙
+ + g2(x)ξ˙
−
)}
.
Then, since w(s, x) is the solution to (3.8), w(T, x) = 0 for any x ∈ R and with controls
ξ˙+t,θ, ξ˙
−
t,θ
−∂tw −
{(
b(x, µ) + (ξ˙+t,θ − ξ˙−t,θ)
)
∂xw +
(
f(x, µ) + g1(x)ξ˙
+
t,θ + g2(x)ξ˙
−
t,θ
)}
− σ
2
2
∂xxw = 0.
Let xt,θ be the controlled process with controls ξ˙
+
t,θ, ξ˙
−
t,θ . Then, applying the Itoˆ’s formula to
w(t, x),
0 = E[w(T, xT,θ)]
= w(s, x) + E
[∫ T
s
(
∂tw(t, xt,θ) + (b(xt,θ, µt) + (ξ˙
+
t,θ − ξ˙−t,θ)∂xw(t, xt,θ) +
σ2
2
∂xxw(t, xt,θ)
)
dt
]
= w(s, x)− E
[ ∫ T
s
(
f(xt,θ, µt) + g1(xt,θ)ξ˙
+
t,θ + g2(xt,θ)ξ˙
−
t,θ
)
dt
]
≤ w(s, x)− v(s, x).
Hence, v(s, x) ≤ w(s, x).
Combined, v(s, x) = w(s, x), and ξ˙+t,θ−ξ˙−t,θ =

θ if ∂xvθ(t, xt,θ) ≤ −g1(xt,θ),
0 if − g1(xt,θ) ≤ ∂xvθ(t, xt,θ) ≤ g2(xt,θ),
−θ if g2(xt,θ) ≤ ∂xvθ(t, xt,θ).
is the optimal controls.
Now, one can define Γ1 from the class of flows of probability measures M[0,T ] so that
Γ1({µt}) = (ϕ(t, x|{µt}), {µt}) which is a pair of the optimal control function under fixed
{µt} and the fixed flow of probability measures {µt}.
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Consistency part
Now with fixed {µt} and the optimal control function ϕ(t, x|{µt}), the dynamics of the
optimal controlled process xt follows
dxt = (b(xt, µt) + ϕ(t, xt|{µt})) dt+ σdWt, x0 = x (3.9)
Since the function |b(x, µ)+ϕ(t, x|{µt})| ≤M(1+|x|) for some positive M and σ is a positive
constant, the SDE (3.9) has weak solutions and it is unique in law by the Stroock-Varadhan
theorem (from the chapter V.19 and V.24 in [72]).
Consequently, one can define Γ2 so that Γ2(ϕ(t, x|{µt}), {µt}) = {µ˜t} which is an updated
mean information probability measure flow under the fixed control function ϕ.
The fixed point method
Define a mapping Γ as Γ({µt}) = Γ2 ◦ Γ1({µt}) = {µ˜t} . We will use the Schauder fixed
point theorem to show the existence of fixed point.
Lemma 1 (Schauder fixed point theorem). If K is a nonempty conves subset of a normed
space V and Γ is a continuous mapping of K into K such that the range Γ(K) is compact
in K, then Γ has a fixed point.
Let’s prove that Γ is a mapping ofM[0,T ] intoM[0,T ], and it is continuous and relatively
compact.
Proposition 2. Γ is the function from M[0,T ] to M[0,T ].
Proof. For any {µt} in M[0,T ], let’s prove that {µ˜t} = Γ({µt}) is also in M[0,T ]. Without
loss of generality, suppose s > t, and xs = xt +
∫ s
t
(b(xr, µr) + ϕ(r, xr))dr +
∫ s
t
σdWr. Since
b(x, µ) is Lipschitz and |ϕ(s, xs)| ≤ θ,
D1(µ˜s, µ˜t) ≤ E|xs − xt|
≤ E
∫ s
t
|b(xr, µr) + ϕ(r, xr)|dr + σE sup
r∈[t,s]
|Wr −Wt|
≤ E
∫ s
t
|b(xr, µr)− b(xt, µt) + b(xt, µt)|dr + θ|s− t|+ σE sup
r∈[t,s]
|Wr −Wt|
≤ E
∫ s
t
|b(xr, µr)− b(xt, µt)|dr + |s− t|E|b(xt, µt)|+ θ|s− t|+ σ|s− t| 12
≤ E
∫ s
t
Lip(b)(|xr − xt|+D1(µr, µt))dr + |s− t|(E|b(xt, µt)|+ θ) + σ|s− t| 12
≤ Lip(b)E
∫ s
t
|xr − xt|dr +
∫ s
t
c1|r − t| 12dr + |s− t|(E|b(xt, µt)|+ θ) + σ|s− t| 12
≤ Lip(b)E
∫ s
t
|xr − xt|dr + 2
3
c1|s− t| 32 + |s− t|(E|b(xt, µt)|+ θ) + σ|s− t| 12
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By Gronwall’s inequallity,
D1(µ˜s, µ˜t) ≤ E|xs − xt| ≤
(
2
3
c1|s− t| 32 + |s− t|(E|b(xt, µt)|+ θ) + σ|s− t| 12
)
e
∫ s
t Lip(b)dr
=
(
2
3
c1|s− t| 32 + |s− t|(E|b(xt, µt)|+ θ) + σ|s− t| 12
)
eLip(b)|t−s|
Since b is Lipschitz, for any t ∈ [0, T ], E|b(xt, µt)| < M for some positive M > 0. Therefore,
sup
s 6=t
D1(µ˜t, µ˜s)
|t− s| 12 ≤ c,
For any t ∈ [0, T ],∫
|x|2µ˜t(dx) ≤ 2E[
∫
|x|2dµ˜0 + c22t2 + σ2t] ≤ 2E[
∫
|x|2dµ˜0 + c22T 2 + σ2T ]
∴ sup
t∈[0,T ]
∫
|x|2µ˜t(dx) ≤ c
Proposition 3. Γ is continuous.
Proof. Let {µnt } ∈ M[0,T ] for n = 1, 2, · · · be a sequence of measure flows which converges
to {µt} ∈ M[0,T ] as n → ∞ in the sense of metric dM (1.11) i.e. dM({µnt }, {µt}) → 0 as
n→∞. For each n, denote ϕn(t, x) as the optimal control function of the MFG (3.5) under
fixed {µnt }, and {xnt } is corresponding optimal controlled process:
dxnt = (b(x
n
t , µ
n
t ) + ϕ
n(t, xnt ))dt+ σdWt, x
n
0 = x.
Let {µ˜nt } be a flow of probability measures of {xnt }, then Γ({µnt }) = {µ˜nt }.
Similarly, define ϕ(t, x) as the optimal control function with respect to {µt}, {xt} is
corresponding optimal controlled process:
dxt = (b(xt, µt) + ϕ(t, xt))dt+ σdWt, x0 = x,
and {µ˜t} is a flow of probability measures of {xt}. Let’s prove that dM({µ˜nt }, {µ˜t})→ 0 as
n→∞.
Step 1: Find a relation between D2({µ˜nt }, {µ˜t}) and D2({µnt }, {µt}).
For arbitrary t ∈ [0, T ], for any s such that 0 ≤ s ≤ t,
d(xs − xns ) = (b(xs, µs)− b(xns , µns ) + ϕ(s, xs)− ϕn(s, xns ))ds.
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By the chain rule,
|xt − xnt |2 = 2
∫ t
0
(b(xs, µs)− b(xns , µns ) + ϕ(s, xs)− ϕn(s, xns ))(xs − xns )ds
≤ 2
∫ t
0
|
∫
R
b0(xs, y)µs(dy)−
∫
R
b0(x
n
s , y
n)µns (dy
n)||xs − xns |
+ (ϕ(s, xs)− ϕn(s, xns ))(xs − xns )ds
≤ 2
∫ t
0
∫
R×R
|b0(xs, y)− b0(xns , yn)||xs − xns |Ξs(dy, dyn)
+ (ϕ(s, xs)− ϕn(s, xns ))(xs − xns )ds
where Ξs is an arbitrary coupling probability measure of µs and µ
n
s for any s ∈ [0, T ].∫
R×R
|b0(xs, y)− b0(xns , yn)||xs − xns |Ξs(dy, dyn)
=
∫
R×R
|b0(xs, y)− b0(xns , y) + b0(xns , y)− b0(xns , yn)||xs − xns |Ξs(dy, dyn)
≤
∫
R×R
(Lip(b0)|xs − xns |2 + Lip(b0)|y − yn||xs − xns |)Ξs(dy, dyn)
≤
∫
R×R
(
Lip(b0)|xs − xns |2 +
Lip(b0)
2
(|y − yn|2 + |xs − xns |2)
)
Ξs(dy, dy
n)
and, since ϕn(s, x) is nonincreasing function in x,
(ϕ(s, xns )− ϕn(s, xns ))(xs − xns )
≤(ϕ(s, xs)− ϕn(s, xs) + ϕn(s, xs)− ϕn(s, xns ))(xs − xns )
≤(ϕ(s, xs)− ϕn(s, xs))(xs − xns )
≤1
2
(|ϕ(s, xs)− ϕn(s, xs)|2 + |xs − xns |2)
Consequently,
|xt − xnt |2
≤
∫ t
0
(3Lip(b0) + 1)|xs − xns |2 + Lip(b0)
∫
R×R
|y − y˜|2Ξs(dy, dyn) + |ϕ(s, xs)− ϕn(s, xs)|2ds.
Because the inequality holds for any coupling measure Ξs and by the Gronwall’s inequality,
(D2(µ˜t, µ˜
n
t ))
2 ≤ c1
∫ t
0
Lip(b0)(D
2(µs, µ
n
s ))
2 + |ϕ(s, xs)− ϕn(s, xs)|2ds (3.10)
for some constant c1 depending on T and Lip(b0).
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Step 2: Using Itoˆ’s formula, find useful equations and inequalities.
By proposition 1, for fixed {µt} the stochastic control problem (3.7) has a unique value
function v(s, x) and optimal controls given by
ϕ(s, x) =

θ if ∂xv(s, x) ≤ −g1(x),
0 if − g1(x) ≤ ∂xv(s, x) ≤ g2(x),
−θ if g2(x) ≤ ∂xv(s, x),
and
for fixed {µnt } the stochastic control problem (3.7) has a unique value function vn(s, x) and
optimal controls given by
ϕn(s, x) =

θ if ∂xv
n(s, x) ≤ −g1(x),
0 if − g1(x) ≤ ∂xvn(s, x) ≤ g2(x),
−θ if g2(x) ≤ ∂xvn(s, x).
Let’s prove that for any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R as n goes to infinity, ∂xvn(t, x) converges to
∂xv(t, x).
Fix t ∈ [0, T ] again and let 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T . For each n, {xns}t≤s≤T is the optimal controlled
process:
dxns = (b(x
n
s , µ
n
s ) + ϕ
n(s, xns ))ds+ σdWs, x
n
t = x.
Similarly, {xs}t≤s≤T is the optimal controlled process:
dxs = (b(xs, µs) + ϕ(s, xs))ds+ σdWs, xt = x.
By proposition 1, v and vn are the solution to the HJB equation (3.8). Denote ϕ1(s, x) =
max{ϕ(s, x), 0}, ϕ2(s, x) = −max{−ϕ(s, x), 0}, ϕn1 (s, x) = max{ϕn(s, x), 0} and ϕn2 (s, x) =
−max{−ϕn(s, x), 0}.
By the Itoˆ’s formula and the HJB equation (3.8),
v(T, xT )− v(t, xt)
=
∫ T
t
∂tv(s, xs) + (b(xs, µs) + ϕ(xs))∂xv(s, xs) +
σ2
2
∂xxv(s, xs)ds+
∫ T
t
σ∂xv(s, xs)dWs
= −
∫ T
t
[f(xs, µs) + g1(xs)ϕ1(s, xs) + g2(xs)ϕ2(s, xs)]ds+
∫ T
t
σ∂xv(s, xs)dWs
Since v(T, x) = 0 for any x ∈ R,
v(t, x) =
∫ T
t
[f(xs, µs) + g1(xs)ϕ1(s, xs) + g2(xs)ϕ2(s, xs)]ds−
∫ T
t
σ∂xv(s, xs)dWs. (3.11)
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Similarly, for any n ∈ N, by the Itoˆ’s formula for vn(s, x) and {xs},
vn(T, xT )− vn(t, xt)
=
∫ T
t
∂tv
n(s, xs) + (b(xs, µs) + ϕ(s, xs))∂xv
n(s, xs) +
σ2
2
∂xxv
n(s, xs)ds
+
∫ T
t
σ∂xv
n(s, xs)dWs
=
∫ T
t
∂tv
n(s, xs) + (b(xs, µ
n
s ) + ϕ
n(s, xs))∂xv
n(s, xs) +
σ2
2
∂xxv
n(s, xs)ds
+
∫ T
t
σ∂xv
n(s, xs)dWs −
∫ T
t
(b(xs, µ
n
s )− b(xs, µs) + ϕn(s, xs)− ϕ(s, xs))∂xvn(s, xs)ds
= −
∫ T
t
[f(xs, µ
n
s ) + g1(xs)ϕ
n
1 (s, xs) + g2(xs)ϕ
n
2 (s, xs)]ds+
∫ T
t
σ∂xv
n(s, xs)dWs
−
∫ T
t
(b(xs, µ
n
s )− b(xs, µs) + ϕn(s, xs)− ϕ(s, xs))∂xvn(s, xs)ds
The last equality is due to the HJB equation (3.8).
vn(t, x) =
∫ T
t
[f(xs, µ
n
s ) + g1(xs)ϕ
n
1 (s, xs) + g2(xs)ϕ
n
2 (s, xs)]ds
−
∫ T
t
σ∂xv
n(s, xs)dWs +
∫ T
t
(b(xs, µ
n
s )− b(xs, µs) + ϕn(s, xs)− ϕ(s, xs))∂xvn(s, xs)ds.
(3.12)
From equations (3.11) and (3.12),
v(t, x)− vn(t, x)
=E[v(t, x)− vn(t, x)]
=E
[∫ T
t
f(xs, µs)− f(xs, µns ) + g1(xs)(ϕ1(s, xs)− ϕn1 (s, xs)) + g2(xs)(ϕ2(s, xs)− ϕn2 (s, xs))ds
]
+ E
[∫ T
t
(b(xs, µs)− b(xs, µns ) + ϕ(s, xs)− ϕn(s, xs))∂xvn(s, xs)ds
]
=E[
∫ T
t
f(xs, µs)− f(xs, µns ) + (g1(xs) + ∂xvn(s, xs))(ϕ1(s, xs)− ϕn1 (s, xs))
+ (g2(xs)− ∂xvn(s, xs))(ϕ2(s, xs)− ϕn2 (s, xs)) + (b(xs, µs)− b(xs, µns ))∂xvn(s, xs)ds]
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Hence,
|v(t, x)− vn(t, x)|+ E[
∫ T
t
|f(xs, µs)− f(xs, µns )|+ |(b(xs, µs)− b(xs, µns ))∂xvn(s, xs)|ds]
≥
∣∣∣∣v(t, x)− vn(t, x)− E[∫ T
t
f(xs, µs)− f(xs, µns ) + (b(xs, µs)− b(xs, µns ))∂xvn(s, xs)ds]
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣E[∫ T
t
(g1(xs) + ∂xv
n(s, xs))(ϕ1(s, xs)− ϕn1 (s, xs))
+ (g2(xs)− ∂xvn(s, xs))(ϕ2(s, xs)− ϕn2 (s, xs))ds]
∣∣∣∣
By definition of ϕn1 , if ϕ
n
1 (s, xs) = θ, then g1(xs) + ∂xv
n(s, xs) ≤ 0 (Because the controls are
Markovian, a closed loop in feedback form, ϕn(s, xs) does not depend on the process {xs}
but only depend the value xs ∈ R), and if ϕn1 (s, xs) = 0, then g1(xs) + ∂xvn(s, xs) ≥ 0 (same
here; because the controls are Markovian, a closed loop in feedback form, ϕn(s, xs) does not
depend on the process {xs} but only depend the value ”xs ∈ R”). So, by definitions of ϕ1
and ϕn1 , (g1(xs) + ∂xv
n(s, xs))(ϕ1(s, xs)− ϕn1 (s, xs)) ≥ 0.
By definition of ϕn2 , if ϕ
n
2 (s, xs) = θ, then g2(xs)− ∂xvn(s, xs) ≤ 0, and if ϕn2 (s, xs) = 0, then
g2(xs) − ∂xvn(s, xs) ≥ 0. So, by definitions of ϕ2 and ϕn2 , (g2(xs) − ∂xvn(s, xs))(ϕ2(s, xs) −
ϕn2 (s, xs)) ≥ 0.
Hence,
E[
∫ T
t
|(g1(xs) + ∂xvn(s, xs))(ϕ1(s, xs)− ϕn1 (s, xs))|
+ |(g2(xs)− ∂xvn(s, xs))(ϕ2(s, xs)− ϕn2 (s, xs))|ds]
≤|v(t, x)− vn(t, x)|+ E[
∫ T
t
|f(xs, µs)− f(xs, µns )|+ |(b(xs, µs)− b(xs, µns ))∂xvn(s, xs)|ds]
≤|v(t, x)− vn(t, x)|+ E[
∫ T
t
Lip(f)D1(µs, µ
n
s ) + Lip(b)D
1(µs, µ
n
s )|∂xvn(s, xs)|ds],
(3.13)
because f and b are Lipschitz continuous.
Since for any s ∈ [t, T ]D1(µns , µs)→ 0 as n→∞, |b(xs, µs)−b(xs, µns )| ≤ Lip(b)D1(µs, µns )→
0 as n → ∞. By proposition 4.1. in chapter 4 in [81], vn(t, x) → v(t, x) for any (t, x) ∈
[0, T ] × R as n → ∞. By definition of vn and boundedness of g1, g2, |∂xvn(s, x)| ≤ sup{x :
|g1(x)|, |g2(x)|} < M for some M . Hence, as n goes to infinity, the last term in the inequality
(3.13) goes to 0.
Consequently, for any x ∈ R, as n goes to infinity
|(g1(x) + ∂xvn(s, x))(ϕ1(s, x)− ϕn1 (s, x))|+ |(g2(x)− ∂xvn(s, x))(ϕ2(s, x)− ϕn2 (s, x))| → 0.
Step 3: Prove that ϕn(s, x) converges to ϕ(s, x) for any s, x ∈ [0, T ] × R as n goes to
infinity.
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From equations (3.11) and (3.12), by the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality and the Itoˆ’s isom-
etry,
(v(t, x)− vn(t, x))2 + σ2E[
∫ T
t
(∂xv(s, xs)− ∂xvn(s, xs))2ds]
≤4(T − t)E
[∫ T
t
{f(xs, µs)− f(xs, µns )}2 + {(b(xs, µs)− b(xs, µns ))∂xvn(s, xs)}2
+ {(g1(xs) + ∂xvn(s, x))(ϕ1(s, xs)− ϕn1 (s, xs))
+ (g2(x)− ∂xvn(s, x))(ϕ2(s, xs)− ϕn2 (s, xs))}2ds
]
≤4(T − t)E
[∫ T
t
{Lip(f)D1(µs, µns )}2 + {Lip(b)D1(µs, µns )∂xvn(s, xs)}2
+ {(g1(xs) + ∂xvn(s, xs))(ϕ1(s, xs)− ϕn1 (s, xs))
+ (g2(xs)− ∂xvn(s, xs))(ϕ2(s, xs)− ϕn2 (s, xs))}2ds
]
Because of the result in step 2 and D1(µs, µ
n
s ) → 0, the last term goes to 0 as n goes to
infinity. Therefore, ∂xv
n(s, x) converges to ∂xv(s, x) for any (s, x) ∈ [t, T ]×R. Furthermore,
by definition of ϕn and ϕ, ϕn(s, x) converges to ϕ(s, x) for any s, x ∈ [t, T ]× R. This holds
for any t ∈ [0, T ]. Therefore, ϕn(s, x) converges to ϕ(s, x) for any s, x ∈ [0, T ]× R.
Step 4: Prove dM({µ˜t}, {µ˜nt })→ 0 as n→∞.
From previous steps, as n goes to infinity, for any s, x ∈ [0, T ]×R, ϕn(s, x) converges to
ϕ(s, x) and D2(µs, µ
n
s ) converges to 0. Hence, by the inequality (3.10), D
2(µ˜t, µ˜
n
t ) converges
to 0 for any t ∈ [0, T ]. Since D1(µ˜t, µ˜nt ) ≤ D2(µ˜t, µ˜nt ), D1(µ˜t, µ˜nt ) converges to 0 for any
t ∈ [0, T ], and dM({µ˜t}, {µ˜nt })→ 0 as n→∞. Therefore, Γ is continuous.
Proposition 4. Γ has a fixed point, and the MFG (3.5) has a unique solution.
Proof. As the proof in lemma 5.7 in [18], the range of the mapping Γ is relatively compact,
and by proposition 3, Γ is a continuous mapping. Hence, due to the Schauder fixed point
theorem, Γ has a fixed point such that Γ({µt}) = {µt} ∈ M[0,T ]. By the assumption (A5),
the fixed point is at most one ([58],[18]). Therefore, there exists a unique fixed point solution
of flow of probability measures {µ∗t}. Then, consider the MFG (3.5) with fixed {µ∗t}. It is
again stochastic control problem and by proposition 1, there exists a unique optimal controls
{ξ∗t } for the MFG (3.5) with fixed {µ∗t}. by definition of the solution to a MFG, {ξ∗t } is a
optimal control solution to the MFG (3.5) and by proposition 1, it is unique. (If there is
another optimal controls, there are two optimal controls for the the MFG (3.5) with fixed
{µ∗t}. So, it is contradiction.)
3.4 Proof of -Nash equilibrium
Suppose ({ξt,θ}, {µt,θ}) is a MFG solution to the MFG (3.5) with bound θ, vθ(s, x : {µt}) is
the value function of the MFG (3.5) with any fixed flow of probability measures {µt} (i.e.
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vθ(s, x : {µt,θ}) is the value function of the MFG (3.5)), and xt,θ is the optimal controlled
process:
dxt,θ = (b(xt,θ, µt,θ) + ϕ1,θ(t, xt,θ|{µt,θ})− ϕ2,θ(t, xt,θ|{µt,θ}))dt+ σdWt, xs,θ = x,
where ξ˙t,θ = ϕθ(t, x|{µt}) = ϕ1,θ(t, x|{µt})− ϕ2,θ(t, x|{µt}) is the optimal control function.
Proof of theorem 2 a) For any fixed {µt} ∈ M[0,T ], vθ(s, x : {µt}) converges to v∞(s, x :
{µt}) as θ →∞.
Proof. Fix {µt} ∈ M[0,T ]. For any ζ+t,∞, ζ−t,∞ ∈ U∞, since each path of a finite varia-
tion process is almost everywhere differentiable, there exists a sequence of bounded ve-
locity functions which converges to the path as bounds go to infinity. Hence, there ex-
ists a sequence {ζ+t,θ}θ∈[0,∞), {ζ−t,θ}θ∈[0,∞) such that ζ+t,θ, ζ−t,θ ∈ Uθ and E
∫ T
0
|ζ˙+t,θdt − dζ+t,∞| →
0, E
∫ T
0
|ζ˙−t,θdt− dζ−t,∞| → 0 as θ →∞.
Denote
dxˆt,θ = (b(xˆt,θ, µt) + ζ˙
+
t,θ − ζ˙−t,θ)dt+ σdWt, xˆs,θ = x, and
dxˆt = b(xˆt, µt)dt+ σdWt + dζ
+
t,∞ − dζ−t,∞, xˆs = x.
Then, for any τ ∈ [s, T ],
|xˆτ,θ − xˆτ | ≤
∫ τ
s
|b(xˆt,θ, µt)− b(xˆt, µt)|dt+
∫ τ
s
|ζ˙+t,θdt− dζ+t,∞|+
∫ τ
s
|ζ˙−t,θdt− dζ−t,∞|
≤
∫ τ
s
Lip(b)|xˆt,θ − xˆt|dt+
∫ τ
s
|ζ˙+t,θdt− dζ+t,∞|+
∫ τ
s
|ζ˙−t,θdt− dζ−t,∞|
By the Gronwall’s inequality,
E|xˆτ,θ − xˆτ | ≤ O
(
E
∫ τ
s
|ζ˙+t,θdt− dζ+t,∞|+ E
∫ τ
s
|ζ˙−t,θdt− dζ−t,∞|
)
.
Consequently,
|J∞∞ (s, x, ζ+t,∞, ζ−t,∞ : {µt})− J∞θ (s, x, ζ+t,θ, ζ−t,θ : {µt})|
≤E[|
∫ T
s
f(xˆt, µt)− f(xˆt,θ, µt) + g1(xˆt)dζ+t,∞ + g2(xˆt)dζ−t,∞ − g1(xˆt,θ)ζ˙+t,θdt− g2(xˆt,θ)ζ˙−t,θdt|]
≤E[
∫ T
s
Lip(f)|xˆt − xˆt,θ|+ Lip(g1)|xˆt − xˆt,θ|dζ+t,∞ + Lip(g2)|xˆt − xˆt,θ|dζ−t,∞
+ g1(xˆt,θ)|dζ+t,∞ − ζ˙+t,θdt|+ g2(xˆt,θ)|dζ−t,∞ − ζ˙−t,θdt|]
≤O
(
E
∫ T
s
|ζ˙+t,θdt− dζ+t,∞|+ E
∫ T
s
|ζ˙−t,θdt− dζ−t,∞|
)
.
Hence, |v∞(s, x : {µt})− vθ(s, x : {µt})| → 0 as θ → 0
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Define θ as sup
s,x,{µt}∈[0,T ]×R×M[0,T ]
|v∞(s, x : {µt}) − vθ(s, x : {µt})| ≤ θ with θ → 0 as
θ →∞.
Consider the stochastic control problem (3.6) with {µt,θ}. v∞(s, x : {µt,θ}) is the value
function, and let xt,∞ be the optimal controlled process:
dxt,∞ = b(xt,∞, µt,∞)dt+ σdWt + dξ+t,∞ − dξ−t,∞, xs,∞ = x.
The optimal controls ξt,∞ is also of feedback form. Hence, denote dϕ∞(t, x|{µt,θ}) =
dϕ1,∞(t, x|{µt,θ}) − dϕ2,∞(t, x|{µt,θ}) = dξ+t,∞ − dξ−t,∞ as the optimal control function for
the stochastic control problem (3.3) with fixed {µt,θ}.
Denote,2 for i = 1, · · · , N,
dxit,θ = (b(x
i
t,θ, µt,θ) + ϕ1,θ(t, x
i
t,θ)− ϕ2,θ(t, xit,θ))dt+ σdW it , xis,θ = x,
dxit,∞ = b(x
i
t,∞, µt,θ)dt+ dϕ1,∞(t, x
i
t,∞)− dϕ2,∞(t, xit,∞) + σdW it , xis,∞ = x,
dxi,Nt,θ = (
1
N
∑
j=1,··· ,N
b0(x
i,N
t,θ , x
i,N
t,θ ) + ϕ1,θ(t, x
i,N
t,θ )− ϕ2,θ(t, xi,Nt,θ ))dt+ σdW it , xi,Ns,θ = x,
Since (µt,θ, ϕθ) is the solution to the MFG (3.5), µt,θ is the probability measure of x
i
t,θ for
any i = 1, · · · , N ( xit,θ for i = 1, · · · , N are i.i.d.) .
Lemma 2. For any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, E sup
s≤t≤T
|xit,θ − xi,Nt,θ |2 = O( 1N ).
Proof.
d(xit,θ − xi,Nt,θ ) =
(∫
b0(x
i
t,θ, y)µt,θ(dy)−
1
N
N∑
j=1
b0(x
i,N
t,θ , x
j,N
t,θ ) + ϕθ(t, x
i
t,θ)− ϕθ(t, xi,Nt,θ )
)
dt,
and
d(xit,θ − xi,Nt,θ )2 =
(
2(xit,θ − xi,Nt,θ )(
∫
b0(x
i
t,θ, y)µt,θ(dy)−
1
N
N∑
j=1
b0(x
i,N
t,θ , x
j,N
t,θ )
+ ϕθ(t, xit,θ)− ϕθ(t, xi,Nt,θ ))
)
dt.
2In this proof, omit {µt,θ} for notations simplicity. Denote ϕi,θ(t, x) = ϕi,θ(t, x|{µt,θ}) and ϕi,∞(t, x) =
ϕi,∞(t, x|{µt,θ}) for i = 1, 2.
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Since ϕθ(t, x) is nonincreasing in x, (x
i
t,θ − xi,Nt,θ )(ϕθ(t, xit,θ)− ϕθ(t, xi,Nt,θ )) ≤ 0. So,
|xiT,θ − xi,NT,θ |2 ≤
∫ T
s
2|xit,θ − xi,Nt,θ ||
∫
b0(x
i
t,θ, y)µt,θ(dy)−
1
N
N∑
j=1
b0(x
i,N
t,θ , x
j,N
t,θ )|dt
≤
∫ T
s
2|xit,θ − xi,Nt,θ ||
∫
b0(x
i
t,θ, y)µt,θ(dy)−
1
N
N∑
j=1
b0(x
i,N
t,θ , x
j
t,θ)|dt
+
∫ T
s
2|xit,θ − xi,Nt,θ ||
1
N
N∑
j=1
b0(x
i,N
t,θ , x
j
t,θ)−
1
N
N∑
j=1
b0(x
i,N
t,θ , x
j,N
t,θ )|dt
≤
∫ T
s
2|xit,θ − xi,Nt,θ ||
∫
b0(x
i
t,θ, y)µt,θ(dy)−
1
N
N∑
j=1
b0(x
i,N
t,θ , x
j
t,θ)|dt
+
∫ T
s
2|xit,θ − xi,Nt,θ |
1
N
N∑
j=1
Lip(b0)|xjt,θ − xj,Nt,θ |dt
≤
∫ T
s
|xit,θ − xi,Nt,θ |2 + |
∫
b0(x
i
t,θ, y)µ
θ
t (dy)−
1
N
N∑
j=1
b0(x
i,N
t,θ , x
j
t,θ)|2dt
+
∫ T
s
1
N
Lip(b0)
N∑
j=1
(|xit,θ − xi,Nt,θ |2 + |xjt,θ − xj,Nt,θ |2)dt
≤ (1 + Lip(b0))
∫ T
s
|xit,θ − xi,Nt,θ |2dt
+
∫ T
s
|
∫
b0(x
i
t,θ, y)µt, θ(dy)−
1
N
N∑
j=1
b0(x
i,N
t,θ , x
j
t,θ)|2dt
+
∫ T
s
1
N
Lip(b0)
N∑
j=1
|xjt,θ − xj,Nt,θ |2dt
Hence,
E|xiT,θ − xi,NT,θ |2 ≤ (1 + Lip(b0))E
∫ T
s
|xit,θ − xi,Nt,θ |2dt
+ E
∫ T
s
|
∫
b0(x
i
t,θ, y)µt,θ(dy)−
1
N
N∑
j=1
b0(x
i,N
t,θ , x
j
t,θ)|2dt
+ E
∫ T
s
Lip(b0)|xit,θ − xi,Nt,θ |2dt,
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and
E
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
b0(x
i
t,θ, y)µt,θ(dy)−
1
N
N∑
j=1
b0(x
i,N
t,θ , x
j
t,θ)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
≤ 2E
∣∣∣∣∫ b0(xit,θ, y)− b0(xi,Nt,θ , y)µt(dy)∣∣∣∣2 + 2E
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
b0(x
i,N
t,θ , y)µt(dy)−
1
N
N∑
j=1
b0(x
i,N
t,θ , x
j
t,θ)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
≤ 2E
∣∣∣∣∫ Lip(b0)|xit,θ − xi,Nt,θ |µt(dy)∣∣∣∣2 + 2E
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
b0(x
i,N
t,θ , y)µt(dy)−
1
N
N∑
j=1
b0(x
i,N
t,θ , x
j
t,θ)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
= 2Lip(b0)
2E|xit,θ − xi,Nt,θ |2 + 2,
with  = O( 1√
N
) by the central limit theorem. Consequently,
E|xiT,θ − xi,NT,θ |2 ≤ E
∫ T
s
(1 + 2Lip(b0))|xit,θ − xi,Nt,θ |2dt+ E
∫ T
s
(
2Lip(b0)
2|xit,θ − xi,Nt,θ |2 + 2
)
dt.
By the Gronwall’s inequality,
E sup
s≤t≤T
|xiT,θ − xi,NT,θ |2 ≤
∫ T
s
2dt · E[exp(
∫ T
s
(1 + 4Lip(b0)
2)dt)]
=
∫ T
s
2dt · e(1+4Lip(b0)2)T = O
(
1
N
)
.
Therefore, E sup
s≤t≤T
|xit,θ − xi,Nt,θ |2 = O
(
1
N
)
.
Proof of theorem 2 b)
Proof. Suppose that the first player chooses a different control function ξ′t ∈ U∞ which
is bounded velocity and all other players i = 2, 3, . . . , N choose to stay with the optimal
control function {ξt,θ}. Denote dξ′t = ξ˙′tdt = ϕ′(t, x)dt and dξt,θ = ξ˙t,θdt = ϕθ(t, x)dt. Then
the corresponding dynamics for the MFG is
dx˜1t,θ = (b(x˜
1
t,θ, µt,θ) + ϕ
′(t, x˜1t,θ))dt+ σdW
1
t ,
and the corresponding dynamics for N -player game are
dx˜1,Nt,θ =
(
1
N
N∑
j=1
b0(x˜
1,N
t,θ , x˜
j,N
t,θ ) + ϕ
′(t, x˜1,Nt,θ )
)
dt+ σdW 1t ,
dx˜i,Nt,θ =
(
1
N
N∑
j=1
b(x˜i,Nt,θ , x˜
j,N
t,θ ) + ϕθ(t, x˜
i,N
t,θ )
)
dt+ σdW it , 2 ≤ i ≤ N.
We can show
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Lemma 3. sup
2≤i≤N
E sup
0≤t≤T
|xi,Nt,θ − x˜i,Nt,θ | ≤ O( 1√N ).
Proof. For any 2 ≤ i ≤ N ,
d(xi,Nt,θ − x˜i,Nt,θ ) =
[
1
N
N∑
j=1
(
b0(x
i,N
t,θ , x
j,N
t,θ )− b0(x˜i,Nt,θ , x˜j,Nt,θ )
)
+ ϕθ(t, x
i,N
t,θ )− ϕθ(t, x˜i,Nt,θ )
]
dt.
Because ϕθ(t, x) is nonincreasing in x,
|xi,NT,θ − x˜i,NT,θ |2 ≤
∫ T
s
2(xi,Nt,θ − x˜i,Nt,θ )
(
1
N
N∑
j=1
(
b0(x
i,N
t,θ , x
j,N
t,θ )− b0(x˜i,Nt,θ , x˜j,Nt,θ )
))
dt
≤
∫ T
s
2(xi,Nt,θ − x˜i,Nt,θ )
1
N
N∑
j=1
Lip(b0)(|xi,Nt,θ − x˜i,Nt,θ |+ |xj,Nt,θ − x˜j,Nt,θ |)dt
≤ 2Lip(b0)
∫ T
s
|xi,Nt,θ − x˜i,Nt,θ |2 + |xi,Nt,θ − x˜i,Nt,θ |
1
N
N∑
j=1
|xj,Nt,θ − x˜j,Nt,θ |dt
≤ 2Lip(b0)
∫ T
s
|xi,Nt,θ − x˜i,Nt,θ |2 +
1
2N
N∑
j=1
(|xi,Nt,θ − x˜i,Nt,θ |2 + |xj,Nt,θ − x˜j,Nt,θ |2)dt
≤ Lip(b0)
∫ T
s
3|xi,Nt,θ − x˜i,Nt,θ |2 +
1
N
N∑
j=1
|xj,Nt,θ − x˜j,Nt,θ |2)dt,
and
sup
2≤i≤N
E sup
s≤t≤T
|xi,Nt,θ − x˜i,Nt,θ |2
≤ Lip(b0)
∫ T
s
[ sup
2≤i≤N
E sup
s≤t′≤t
3|xi,Nt′,θ − x˜i,Nt′,θ |2
+
N − 1
N
sup
2≤j≤N
E sup
s≤t′≤t
|xj,Nt′,θ − x˜j,Nt′,θ |2 +
1
N
E|x1,Nt,θ − x˜1,Nt,θ |2]dt
= Lip(b0)
∫ T
s
[
4N − 1
N
sup
2≤i≤N
E sup
s≤t′≤t
|xi,Nt′,θ − x˜i,Nt′,θ |2 +
1
N
E|x1,Nt,θ − x˜1,Nt,θ |2
]
dt.
By the Gronwall’s inequality,
sup
2≤i≤N
E sup
s≤t≤T
|xi,Nt,θ − x˜i,Nt,θ |2 ≤ Lip(b0)
∫ T
s
1
N
E|x1,Nt,θ − x˜1,Nt,θ |2dt · e
∫ T
0 Lip(b0)
4N−1
N
dt = O
(
1
N
)
.
So, sup
2≤i≤N
E sup
s≤t≤T
|xi,Nt,θ − x˜i,Nt,θ | = O( 1√N ).
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From the Lemma 2, for any 2 ≤ i ≤ N , sup
s≤t≤T
E|xit,θ − xi,Nt,θ | = O
(
1√
N
)
, and by the
triangle inequality, sup
2≤i≤N
E sup
s≤t≤T
|xit,θ − x˜i,Nt,θ | = O( 1√N ). Therefore,
sup
2≤i≤N
E sup
s≤t≤T
|xit,θ − x˜i,Nt,θ |+ sup
1≤i≤N
E sup
s≤t≤T
|xit,θ − xi,Nt,θ | = O
(
1√
N
)
.
Define
dx¯1,Nt,θ =
(
1
N
N∑
j=1
b0(x¯
1,N
t,θ , x
j
t,θ) + ϕ
′(t, x¯1,Nt,θ )
)
dt+ σdW 1t ,
Since (x−y)(ϕ′(t, x)−ϕ′(t, y)) ≤ 0 by the assumption (A6), then an approach as in Lemma 2
shows E sup
0≤t≤T
|x˜1,Nt,θ − x¯1,Nt,θ | = O
(
1√
N
)
and E sup
0≤t≤T
|x¯1,Nt,θ − x˜1t,θ| = O
(
1√
N
)
. Therefore,
J i,Nθ (s, x
1, ξ
′+
· , ξ
′−
· ; ξ
−1
·,θ ) = E
[∫ T
s
1
N
N∑
j=1
f0(x˜
1,N
t,θ , x˜
j,N
t,θ )dt+ g(x˜
1,N
t,θ )ϕ
′(t, x˜1,Nt,θ )dt
]
≥ E
[∫ T
s
1
N
N∑
j=1
f0(x˜
1,N
t,θ , x
j
t,θ)dt+ g(x˜
1,N
t,θ )ϕ
′(t, x˜1,Nt,θ )dt
]
−O
(
1√
N
)
≥ E
[∫ T
s
1
N
N∑
j=1
f0(x¯
1,N
t,θ , x
j
t,θ)dt+ g(x¯
1,N
t,θ )ϕ
′(t, x¯1,Nt,θ )dt
]
−O
(
1√
N
)
≥ E
[∫ T
s
∫
f0(x˜
1
t,θ, y)µt,θ(dy) + g(x˜
1
t,θ)ϕ
′(t, x˜1t,θ)dt
]
−O
(
1√
N
)
≥ E
[∫ T
s
∫
f0(x
1
t,θ, y)µt,θ(dy) + g(x
1
t,θ)ϕθ(t, x
1
t,θ)dt
]
−O
(
1√
N
)
= E
[∫ T
s
1
N
N∑
j=1
f0(x
1,N
t,θ , x
j,N
t,θ )dt+ g(x
1,N
t,θ )ϕ(t, x
1,N
t,θ )dt
]
−O
(
1√
N
)
= J i,Nθ (s, x
1, ξ+·,θ, ξ
−
·,θ; ξ
−1
·,θ )−O
(
1√
N
)
,
the last inequality is due to the optimality of ϕ as the optimal control function of the MFG
(3.5), and the last equality is due to the central limit theorem. This completes the proof.
Proof of theorem 2 c)
Proof. Similarly, let the player 1 choose any other controls ξ′t ∈ U∞ which is a finite variation
process but all other players choose same optimal controls ξt,θ. Denote dξ
′
t = dϕ
′(t, x) =
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dϕ′1(t, x)− dϕ′2(t, x).
dx˜1t,∞ = b(x˜
1
t,∞, µ
θ
t )dt+ dϕ
′
1(t, x˜
1
t,∞)− dϕ′2(t, x˜1t,∞) + σdW 1t x˜1s,∞ = x,
dx˜1,Nt,∞ =
1
N
∑
j=1,··· ,N
b0(x˜
1,N
t,∞, x˜
j,N
t,∞)dt+ dϕ
′
1(t, x˜
1,N
t,∞)− dϕ′2(t, x˜1,Nt,∞) + σdW 1t , x˜1,Ns,∞ = x,
dx˜i,Nt,∞ = (
1
N
∑
j=1,··· ,N
b0(x˜
i,N
t,∞, x˜
j,N
t,∞) + ϕ1,θ(t, x˜
i,N
t,∞)− ϕ2,θ(t, x˜i,Nt,∞))dt+ σdW it , xi,Ns,∞ = x,
for i = 2, · · · , N,
Lemma 4. sup
2≤i≤N
E sup
s≤t≤T
|xi,Nt,θ − x˜i,Nt,∞| = O( 1√N ).
Proof. For any 2 ≤ i ≤ N ,
d(xi,Nt,θ − x˜i,Nt,∞) =
[
1
N
N∑
j=1
(
b0(x
i,N
t,θ , x
j,N
t,θ )− b0(x˜i,Nt,∞, x˜j,Nt,∞)
)
+ ϕθ(t, x
i,N
t,θ )− ϕθ(t, x˜i,Nt,∞)
]
dt.
By the definition, ϕθ(t, x) is nonincreasing in x. Hence, similarly with the proof of the lemma
3, we can prove sup
2≤i≤N
E sup
s≤t≤T
|xi,Nt,θ − x˜i,Nt,∞| = O( 1√N ).
From the Lemma 2, for any 2 ≤ i ≤ N , sup
s≤t≤T
E|xit,θ − xi,Nt,θ | = O
(
1√
N
)
. Then, by the
triangle inequality, sup
2≤i≤N
E sup
s≤t≤T
|xit,θ − x˜i,Nt,∞| = O( 1√N ). Therefore,
sup
2≤i≤N
E sup
s≤t≤T
|xit,θ − x˜i,Nt,∞|+ sup
1≤i≤N
E sup
s≤t≤T
|xit,θ − xi,Nt,θ | = O
(
1√
N
)
.
Since dϕ′(t, x) is also nonincreasing in x, then an approach as in Lemma 2 shows
E sup
s≤t≤T
|x˜1,Nt,∞ − x˜1t,∞| = O
(
1√
N
)
. Therefore, due to Lipschitz continuity of f, f0, g1, g2,
J1,N∞ (s, x, ξ
′+
· , ξ
′−
· ; ξ
−1
·,θ )
= E
[∫ T
s
1
N
N∑
j=1
f0(x˜
1,N
t,∞, x˜
j,N
t,∞)dt+ g1(x˜
1,N
t,∞)dϕ
′
1(t, x˜
1,N
t,∞) + g2(x˜
1,N
t,∞)dϕ
′
2(t, x˜
1,N
t,∞)
]
≥ E
[∫ T
s
1
N
N∑
j=1
f0(x˜
1,N
t,∞, x
j
t,θ)dt+ g1(x˜
1,N
t,∞)dϕ
′
1(t, x˜
1,N
t,∞) + g2(x˜
1,N
t,∞)dϕ
′
2(t, x˜
1,N
t,∞)
]
−O
(
1√
N
)
≥ E
[∫ T
s
∫
f(x˜1,Nt,∞, y)µt,θ(dy)dt+ g1(x˜
1,N
t,∞)dϕ
′
1(t, x˜
1,N
t,∞) + g2(x˜
1,N
t,∞)dϕ
′
2(t, x˜
1,N
t,∞)
]
−O
(
1√
N
)
≥ E
[∫ T
s
∫
f(x˜1t,∞, y)µt,θ(dy)dt+ g1(x˜
1
t,∞)dϕ
′
1(t, x˜
1,N
t,∞) + g2(x˜
1
t,∞)dϕ
′
2(t, x˜
1,N
t,∞)
]
−O
(
1√
N
)
.
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By definition of ϕ′1, ϕ
′
2,
E
∣∣∣dϕ′1(t, x˜1,Nt,∞)− dϕ′1(t, x˜1t,∞)− dϕ′2(t, x˜1,Nt,∞) + dϕ′2(t, x˜1t,∞)∣∣∣
≤ Ed|x˜1,Nt,∞ − x˜1t,∞|+ E
∣∣∣∣∣ 1N ∑
j=1,··· ,N
b0(x˜
1,N
t,∞, x˜
j,N
t,∞)− b(x˜∞1t , µt,θ)
∣∣∣∣∣ dt = O
(
1√
N
)
.
By definition of ϕ′i,∣∣∣(dϕ′1(t, x˜1,Nt,∞)− dϕ′1(t, x˜1t,∞))+ (−dϕ′2(t, x˜1,Nt,∞) + dϕ′2(t, x˜1t,∞))∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣dϕ′1(t, x˜1,Nt,∞)− dϕ′1(t, x˜1t,∞)∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣−dϕ′2(t, x˜1,Nt,∞) + dϕ′2(t, x˜1t,∞)∣∣∣ .
Consequently, E sups≤t≤T
∣∣∣dϕ′1(t, x˜1,Nt,∞)− dϕ′1(t, x˜1t,∞)∣∣∣ = O ( 1√N) and
E sups≤t≤T
∣∣∣−dϕ′2(t, x˜1,Nt,∞) + dϕ′2(t, x˜1t,∞)∣∣∣ = O ( 1√N) .
Therefore, since g1, g2 are bounded,
E
[∫ T
s
∫
f(x˜1t,∞, y)µt,θ(dy)dt+ g1(x˜
1
t,∞)dϕ
′
1(t, x˜
1,N
t,∞) + g2(x˜
1
t,∞)dϕ
′
2(t, x˜
1,N
t,∞)
]
−O
(
1√
N
)
≥ E
[∫ T
s
∫
f(x˜1t,∞, y)µt,θ(dy)dt+ g1(x˜
1
t,∞)dϕ
′
1(t, x˜
1
t,∞) + g2(x˜
∞1
t )dϕ
′
2(t, x˜
1
t,∞)
]
−O
(
1√
N
)
≥ E
[∫ T
s
∫
f(x1t,∞, y)µt,θ(dy)dt+ g1(x
1
t,∞)dϕ1,∞(t, x
1
t,∞) + g2(x
1
t,∞)dϕ2,∞(t, x
1
t,∞)
]
−O
(
1√
N
)
= v∞(s, x : {µt,θ})−O
(
1√
N
)
,
the last inequality is due to the optimality of ϕ∞. By theorem 2 a), |vθ(s, x : {µt,θ})) −
v∞(s, x : {µt,θ}))| ≤ O(θ) .
Hence, by E sup
s≤t≤T
|xit,θ−xi,Nt,θ | = O( 1√N ) and similarly with previous steps, we could derive
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J1,N∞ (s, x, ξ
′+
· , ξ
′−
· ; ξ
−1
·,θ ) = v∞(s, x : {µt,θ})−O
(
1√
N
)
≥ vθ(s, x : {µt,θ})−O
(
1√
N
+ θ
)
≥ E
[∫ T
s
∫
f(x1t,θ, y)µt,θ(dy)dt+ g1(x
1
t,θ)dϕ1,θ(t, x
1
t,θ) + g2(x
1
t,θ)dϕ2,θ(t, x
1
t,θ)
]
−O
(
1√
N
+ θ
)
≥ E
[∫ T
s
1
N
N∑
j=1
f0(x
1,N
t,θ , x
j,N
t,θ )dt+ g1(x
1,N
t,θ )dϕ
θ
1(t, x
1,N
t,θ ) + g2(x
1,N
t,θ )dϕ
θ
2(t, x
1,N
t,θ )
]
−O
(
1√
N
+ θ
)
= J1,N∞ (s, x, ξ
+
·,θ, ξ
−
·,θ; ξ
−1
·,θ ).
3.5 An MFG with singular controls of bounded
velocity: systemic risk
In this section, we study a particular MFG and provide explicit solutions. For comparison
purposes, we present a singular control counterpart of the MFG originally formulated with
regular controls by [23] for systemic risk. We will see that our solution structure is consistent
with theirs, despite the differences in problem settings.
The basic idea behind the interbank systemic risk model of [23] is as follows. (A similar
model can also be found in [33].) There are N banks in the system that borrow and lend
money among each other. Each bank controls its rates of borrowing and lending to minimize
a cost function. There are common noise and individual noise for each bank. Define xit to
be the log-monetary reserve for bank i with i = 1, 2, . . . , N . Then, the dynamics of xit is
assumed to be
dxit =
a
N
N∑
j=1
(xjt − xit)dt+ ξ˙itdt+ σ(ρdW 0t +
√
1− ρ2dW it ),
= a(mt − xit)dt+ ξ˙itdt+ σ(ρdW 0t +
√
1− ρ2dW it ), xis = xi.
(3.14)
Here, {W it }0≤t≤T represents the individual noise for the ith player with i = 1, 2, . . . , N ,
and {W 0t }0≤t≤T is another independent Brownian motion representing the common noise,
mt =
1
N
N∑
j=1
xjt with ms = m, ξ
i
t is the control by bank i, a is a mean-reversion rate, and σ,
ρ, q, c, and  are nonnegative constants.
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The objective is to solve this stochastic game over an admissible control set A, which
includes adapted processes satisfying proper integrability condition. That is to solve
v(s, x) = inf
ξ·∈A
Es,x,m
[∫ T
s
(
1
2
ξ˙2t − qξ˙t(mt − xt) +

2
(mt − xt)2)dt+ c
2
(mT − xT )2
]
, (3.15)
subject to dxt = a(mt − xt)dt+ ξ˙tdt+ σ(ρdW 0t +
√
1− ρ2dWt), xs = x,ms = m.
Our model. Now consider the model with singular controls of bounded velocity. Assuming
(realistically) that the rate of bank borrowing and lending is bounded, the MFG takes the
following form
v(s, x) = inf
ξ˙·∈Uθ
Es,x,m
[∫ T
s
(r|ξ˙t|+ 
2
(mt − xt)2)dt+ c
2
(mT − xT )2
]
, (3.16)
subject to
dxt = a(mt − xt)dt+ dξt + σ(ρdW 0t +
√
1− ρ2dWt),
=
[
a(mt − xt) + ξ˙t
]
dt+ σ(ρdW 0t +
√
1− ρ2dWt), xs = x,ms = m.
(3.17)
Here mt =
∫
xµt(dx) is a mean information process with µt a probability measure of x
i
t.
r, , c, a, σ, ρ are nonnegative constants, and the admissible control set is given by
Uθ = {{ξ˙t} | {ξt} is Ft-progressively measurable, finite variation, ξ0 = 0, ξ˙t ∈ [−θ, θ]}.
Remark 1. It is worth noting that the choice of q = 0 here is mainly for exposition simplicity
and does not change the general solution structure. Also, instead of the quadratic form, |ξ˙it|
is used. Technically, it could be replaced by any convex and symmetric function as far as
explicit solution is concerned, as demonstrated in Karatzas [49] which generalizes the earlier
work of [7] for singular control problems.
This particular MFG appears different from the general problem setting presented in
Eqn. (3.1), with the additional term of common noise. We will show, nevertheless, that
appropriate conditioning argument coupled with the symmetric structure in the problem
will reduce this MFG to to the case without common noise.
Solution for ρ = 0 (no common noise). Step 1. Fix mt as a deterministic process with
ms = m ∈ R. The problem now is a stochastic control problem. The HJB equation is
∂tv +
1
2
σ2∂xxv + inf
ξ˙∈Uθ
{(a(m− x) + ξ˙)∂xv + r|ξ˙|+ 
2
(m− x)2} = 0,
with the terminal condition v(T, x) = c
2
(mT − x)2. By Proposition 1, the optimal control is
ξ˙t(x|{mt}) =

θ if ∂xv(t, x) ≤ −r,
0 if − r < ∂xv(t, x) < r,
−θ if r ≤ ∂xv(t, x).
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By symmetry of the model, v(t,mt − h) = v(t,mt + h) for any t ∈ [0, T ] and any h > 0.
Hence, ∂xv(t,mt − h) = −∂xv(t,mt + h) for any h > 0. So, we can denote the optimal
controls as
ξ˙t(x|{mt}) =

θ, if x ≤ mt − ht,
0, if mt − ht < x < mt + ht,
−θ, if mt + ht ≤ x,
(3.18)
for some deterministic ht > 0.
Step 2. Solve the McKean–Vlasov equation: 3
dxt =
[
a(m′t − xt) + ξ˙t(xt|{m′t})
]
dt+ σdWt, xs = x,m
′
s = m,
where m′t is an updated mean information process with ξ˙t such that m
′
t =
∫
xµt(dx), with
µt a probability measure of optimal state process xt. The Kolmogorov forward equation for
µt is
∂tµt = −∂x
(
(a(m′t − xt) + ξ˙t)µt
)
+
1
2
σ2∂xxµt. (3.19)
Then, by (3.19) and m′t =
∫
xµt(dx),
dm′t = θ
(
P (ξ˙t = −θ)− P (ξ˙t = θ)
)
dt = θ (P (xt > m
′
t + ht)− P (xt < m′t − ht)) dt = 0,
because xt is symmetric to m
′
t. Hence, dm
′
t = 0 and m
′
t = m for t ∈ [s, T ].
From step 1 and 2, updated mean information process is always m′t = m for t ∈ [s, T ].
So, let’s solve the associated HJB for the value function with fixed mt = m:
∂tv +

2
(m− x)2 + a(m− x)∂xv + 1
2
σ2∂xxv + θmin{0, r + ∂xv, r − ∂xv} = 0, (3.20)
with the terminal condition v(T, x) = c
2
(m− x)2.
One can solve for the value function explicitly. Indeed, since the value function v(s, ·) is
convex, define
f1(s,m) = sup{x : ∂xv(s, x) = −r},
and
f2(s,m) = inf{x : ∂xv(s, x) = r}.
Then, on f1(s) ≤ x ≤ f2(s),
∂tv +

2
(m− x)2 + a(m− x)∂xv + 1
2
σ2∂xxv = 0, v(T, x) =
c
2
(m− x)2. (3.21)
3In previous section 2, we use the stochastic differential equation for the second step (consistency part)
instead of the McKean-Vlasov equation. With the existence and uniqueness of the fixed point solution to
the MFG, both methods suggest same fixed point solution, so either method gives the solution to the MFG.
So, we use the McKean-Vlasov method for this example.
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The Laplace transform of v is v˜(λ, x) =
∫ T
−∞ e
−λtv(t, x)dt for λ < 0, which satisfies
∂˜tv(λ, x,m) =
∫ T
−∞
e−λt∂tv(t, x)dt
= e−λtv(t, x)|Tt=−∞ + λ
∫ T
−∞
e−λtv(t, x)dt
= e−λT

2
(m− x)2 + λ
∫ T
−∞
e−λtv(t, x)dt
= e−λT

2
(m− x)2 + λv˜(λ, x).
Thus, (
1− 1
λ
)

2
e−λT (m− x)2 + λv˜ + a(m− x)∂xv˜ + 1
2
σ2∂xxv˜ = 0. (3.22)
A particular solution to (3.22) is given by

4a− 2λ
(
1− 1
λ
)
e−λT (m− x)2 − σ
2
λ(4a− 2λ)
(
1− 1
λ
)
e−λT .
The fundamental solutions to (3.22) are sums of two parabolic cylinder functions
φ˜1(λ,m− x) = e
a(x−m)2
2σ2 Dλ
a
(
−x−m
σ
√
2a
)
,
ψ˜1(λ,m− x) = e
a(x−m)2
2σ2 Dλ
a
(
x−m
σ
√
2a
)
= φ˜1(λ, x−m),
where Dα(x) =
e−
x2
4
Γ(−α)
∫∞
0
t−α−1e−
t2
2
−xtdt. Therefore, solution to (3.22) is
v˜(λ, x,m) =

4a− 2λ
(
1− 1
λ
)
e−λT (m− x)2 − σ
2
λ(4a− 2λ)
(
1− 1
λ
)
e−λT
+ c1φ˜1(λ,m− x) + c2φ˜1(λ, x−m)
=

4a− 2λ
(
1− 1
λ
)
e−λT (m− x)2 − σ
2
λ(4a− 2λ)
(
1− 1
λ
)
e−λT
s+
c1
Γ(−λ
a
)
∫ ∞
0
z−
λ
a
−1e−
z2
2
+x−m
σ
√
2azdz +
c2
Γ(−λ
a
)
∫ ∞
0
z−
λ
a
−1e−
z2
2
−x−m
σ
√
2azdz.
for some constant c1, c2. That is,
v˜(λ, x) = η˜1(λ)(m− x)2 + η˜3(λ) + c1φ˜1(λ,m− x) + c2φ˜1(λ, x−m).
Inverting this function yields the solution to the original PDE (3.21),
v(s, x) = η1(s)(m− x)2 + η3(s) + c1φ1(s,m− x) + c2φ1(s, x−m).
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where φ1 is the inverse Laplace transform of φ˜1. Here η1(s), η2(s), η3(s) are solutions to
ODEs
∂tη1 − 2aη1 + 
2
= 0, η1(T ) =
c
2
,
∂tη3 + σ
2η1 = 0, η3(T ) = 0,
and can be expressed explicitly as
η1(s) =
( c
2
− 
4a
)
e2a(s−T ) +

4a
,
and
η3(s) = −σ2 1
2a
( c
2
− 
4a
)
e2a(s−T ) − σ2 
4a
(s− T ) + σ2 1
2a
( c
2
− 
4a
)
.
Similarly, on x < f1(s), the HJB equation is
∂tv +

2
(m− x)2 + rθ + (a(m− x) + θ)∂xv + 1
2
σ2∂xxv = 0, v(T, x) =
c
2
(m− x)2.
The solution is
v(s, x) = ζ1(s)(m− x)2 + ζ2(s)(m− x) + ζ3(s) + c3φ2(s,m− x) + c4ψ2(s,m− x),
where φ2, ψ2 are the inverse Laplace transforms of φ˜2 and ψ˜2 respectively, with
φ˜2(λ,m− x) = e
a(x−m− θa )2
2σ2 Dλ
a
(
−x−m−
θ
a
σ
√
2a
)
,
and
ψ˜2(λ,m− x) = e
a(x−m− θa )2
2σ2 Dλ
a
(
x−m− θ
a
σ
√
2a
)
.
Here ζ1(s), ζ2(s), ζ3(s) satisfy
∂tζ1 − 2aζ1 + 
2
= 0, ζ1(T ) =
c
2
,
∂tζ2 − aζ2 − 2θζ1 = 0, ζ2(T ) = 0,
∂tζ3 + rθ − θζ2 + σ2ζ1 = 0, ζ3(T ) = 0.
Hence,
ζ1(s) =
( c
2
− 
4a
)
e2a(s−T ) +

4a
,
ζ2(s) = −θ
a
(
c− 
a
)
ea(s−T ) +
θ
a
(
c− 
2a
)
e2a(s−T ) − θ
2a2
,
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and
ζ3(s) =
(
−rθ − θ
2
2a2
− σ
2
4a
)
(s− T )− θ
2
a2
(
c− 
a
)
(ea(s−T ) − 1)
+
(
θ2
2a2
(
c− 
2a
)
− σ
2
2a
( c
2
− 
4a
))
(e2a(s−T ) − 1).
On f2(s) < x, the HJB equation is
∂tv +

2
(m− x)2 + rθ + (a(m− x)− θ)∂xv + 1
2
σ2∂xxv = 0, v(T, x) =
c
2
(m− x)2.
Therefore,
v(s, x) = Λ1(s)(m− x)2 + Λ2(s)(m− x) + Λ3(s) + c5ψ2(s, x−m) + c6φ2(s, x−m).
where Λ1,Λ2,Λ3 satisfy
∂tΛ1 − 2aΛ1 + 
2
= 0, Λ1(T ) =
c
2
,
∂tΛ2 − aΛ2 + 2θΛ1 = 0, Λ2(T ) = 0,
∂tΛ3 + rθ + θΛ2 + σ
2Λ1 = 0, Λ3(T ) = 0.
That is,
Λ1(s) =
( c
2
− 
4a
)
e2a(s−T ) +

4a
,
Λ2(s) =
θ
a
(
c− 
a
)
ea(s−T ) − θ
a
(
c− 
2a
)
e2a(s−T ) +
θ
2a2
,
and
Λ3(s) =
(
−rθ − θ
2
2a2
− σ
2
4a
)
(s− T )− θ
2
a2
(
c− 
a
)
(ea(s−T ) − 1)
+
(
θ2
2a2
(
c− 
2a
)
− σ
2
2a
( c
2
− 
4a
))
(e2a(s−T ) − 1).
Note that η1(s) = ζ1(s) = Λ1(s), −ζ2(s) = Λ2(s), and ζ3(s) = Λ3(s). Hence, the value
function v is also symmetric to m, meaning c1 = c2, c3 = c6 and c4 = c5. Moreover, the
regularity and convexity of v(s, ·,m) implies that ∂xv is nondecreasing and that there are
x1 < x2 satisfying
x1 = sup{x : ∂xv(s, x) = −r},
and
x2 = inf{x : ∂xv(s, x) = r}.
Now, the symmetry of v(s, ·) with respect to m implies that x1 = m− h and x2 = m+ h for
some h > 0.
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In fact, one can solve for c1, c3, c4 and h from the C2-smoothness of vi(s, ·) at x2, and get
c1 =
2Λ1(s)h− r
−φ′1(s, h) + φ′1(s,−h)
,
c3 =
1
φ2(s,−h)((2Λ1(s)h− r)
φ1(s, h) + φ1(s,−h)
−φ′1(s, h) + φ′1(s,−h)
− Λ2(s)h− Λ3(s) + η2(s))
− φ2(s,−h)
ψ2(s,−h)
1
ψ′2(s,−h)φ2(s,−h)− ψ2(s,−h)φ′2(s,−h)
(φ2(s,−h)(2Λ1(s)h+ Λ2(s)− r)
− φ′2(s,−h)((2Λ1(s)h− r)
φ1(s, h) + φ1(s,−h)
−φ′1(s, h) + φ′1(s,−h)
− Λ2(s)h− Λ3(s) + η2(s))),
c4 =
1
ψ′2(s,−h)φ2(s,−h)− ψ2(s,−h)φ′2(s,−h)
(φ2(s,−h)(2Λ1(s)h+ Λ2(s)− r)
− φ′2(s,−h)((2Λ1(s)h− r)
φ1(s, h) + φ1(s,−h)
−φ′1(s, h) + φ′1(s,−h)
− Λ2(s)h− Λ3(s) + η2(s))),
and eventually
c4ψ
′′
2(s,−h) + c3φ′′2(s,−h) = c1φ′′1(s, h) + c1φ′′1(s,−h).
By definitions of x1 and x2 and convexity of v(s, ·,m), x1 = m− h and x2 = m+ h with
h = inf{κ : c4ψ′′2(s,−κ) + c3φ′′2(s,−κ) = c1φ′′1(s, κ) + c1φ′′1(s,−κ)}. (3.23)
Note that the degenerate case of h =∞ means that there is no action region and ξ∗t = 0 for
all x ∈ R.
In summary, the solution to the MFG (3.16) with ρ = 0 is given by Eqn. (3.18) for the
optimal control, and
dm∗t = 0 ∀t ∈ [s, T ], m∗s = m, (3.24)
v(s, x) = a1(s)(m− x)2 + a2(s)(m− x) + a3(s)
+ a4(s)φ1(s,m− x) + a5(s)φ1(s, x−m) + a6(s)φ2(s,m− x) + a7(s)ψ2(s,m− x).
(3.25)
for deterministic functions aj(s) =

ζj(s), if x < m− h,
ηj(s), if m− h ≤ x ≤ m+ h,
ζj(s), if m+ h < x,
for j = 1, 3,
a2(s) =

ζ2(s), if x < m− h,
0, if m− h ≤ x ≤ m+ h,
−ζ2(s), if m+ h < x,
aj(s) =

0, if x < m− h,
c1, if m− h ≤ x ≤ m+ h,
0, if m+ h < x,
for j = 4, 5,
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a6(s) =

c3, if x < m− h,
0, if m− h ≤ x ≤ m+ h,
c3, if m+ h < x,
and
a7(s) =

c4, if x < m− h,
0, if m− h ≤ x ≤ m+ h,
c4, if m+ h < x.
Solution for ρ 6= 0 (with common noise). As the alternative method to deal with the
presence of common noise [21, 23], we approach this problem with conditioning on W 0t .
Step 1: stochastic control part Let’s derive the HJB equation for (3.16) with condi-
tioning on W 0t and fixed mt.
v(s, x) = inf
ξ˙·∈Uθ
Es,x,m
[∫ T
s
(r|ξ˙t|+ 
2
(mt − xt)2)dt+ c
2
(mT − xT )2
]
≤
∫ s+δ
s
(
r|ξ˙t|+ 
2
(mt − xt)2
)
dt+ v(s+ δ, xs+δ)
Hence, for any ξt,
v(s, x)− v(s+ δ, xs+δ)
δ
≤ 1
δ
(∫ s+δ
s
(r|ξ˙t|+ 
2
(mt − xt)2)dt
)
.
Let δ → 0, then v(s, x)− v(s+ dt, xs+dt) ≤
(
r|ξ˙s|+ 2(m− x)2
)
dt. By the Itoˆ’s formula for
xt, we can derive
dv +
[
1
2
σ2(1− ρ2)∂xxv + 
2
(m− x)2
]
dt+ inf
ξ˙∈Uθ
[
(a(m− x) + ξ˙)∂xv + r|ξ˙|
]
dt+ ρσ∂xvdW
0
t = 0,
(3.26)
Similar to the special case without common noise, the value function with a fixed mt,
v(t, x) is also symmetric with respect to mt. That is, v(t,mt−h) = v(t,mt+h) for any h ≥ 0.
From the HJB (3.26), the optimal control is given by Eqn. (3.18), which is independent of
the common noise, and P (xt > mt + ht) = P (xt < mt − ht) for some deterministic ht > 0.
Step 2: Consistency part Let’s solve the Mckean-Vlasov equation:
dxt =
[
a(m′t − xt) + ξ˙t
]
dt+ σ(ρdW 0t +
√
1− ρ2dWt), xs = x,m′s = m. (3.27)
Kramers-Moyal Expansion of the master equation for the SDE (3.27) with conditioning on
W 0t is
dµt(x) =
∞∑
m=1
(−1)m
m!
∂m
∂xm
[a(m)(t, x)µt(x)]dt, (3.28)
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where a(m)(t, x) = 1
dt
E[(dxt)
m|W 0t ]|xt=x and µt is the probability measure of xt.
Then, a(1)(t, x) = a(m′t − x) + ξ˙t + ρσ dW
0
t
dt
,
a(2)(t, x) = σ2(1− ρ2)dt, and a(m)(t, x) = 0 for any m ≥ 3.
∴ dµt =
[
−∂x
(
(a(m′t − x) + ξ˙t)µt
)
+
1
2
σ2(1− ρ2)∂xxµt
]
dt− ρσ∂xµtdW 0t ,
and from m′t =
∫
xµt(dx),
dm′t = θ(P (xt > m
′
t + ht)− P (xt < m′t − ht)dt+ ρσdW 0t = ρσdW 0t .
Hence, conditioning on W 0, m′t satisfies dm
′
t = ρσdW
0
t with m
′
s = m for t ∈ [s, T ].
Step 3: Fixed point part As in the previous case, for any give fixed mt, the updated
mean information process which is the result from step 1 and 2 is always dm′t = ρσdW
0
t with
m′s = m for t ∈ [s, T ]. Therefore, with conditioning on W 0t , there exists a unique fixed point
solution and it is
dm∗t = ρσdW
0
t ∀t ∈ [s, T ], m∗s = m. (3.29)
Let’s prove thatm∗t is a unique optimal solution to the MFG (3.16) subject to (3.17). Suppose
there is a better or another solution m∗∗t to the MFG. Since m
∗∗
t is also solution to the MFG,
if we iterate steps with initial fixed m∗∗t , then the fixed point solution would be m
∗∗
t . However,
according to the previous steps, resulting fixed point solution m∗t is independent to the initial
fixed mt and it is always dm
∗
t = ρσdW
0
t . Hence, m
∗
t = m
∗∗
t and it is a unique solution to the
MFG.
Because of common noise, we rewrite v(t, xt) = w(t, xt,m
∗
t ). Then,
dv = ∂tvdt = ∂twdt+ ∂mwdm
∗
t = dw + ∂mwρσdW
0
t .
dw +
[
1
2
σ2(1− ρ2)∂xxw + 
2
(m− x)2
]
dt+ inf
ξ˙∈Uθ
[
(a(m− x) + ξ˙)∂xw + r|ξ˙|
]
dt
+ ρσ∂mwdW
0
t + ρσ∂xwdW
0
t = 0,
(3.30)
By the model structure, w(t, x,m) = w(t, x+h,m+h) for any h > 0. So, ∂mw = −∂xw and
the HJB equation (3.30) is same as the HJB equation without common noise. Therefore,
value functions are same.
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Chapter 4
MFG with singular controls over
infinite time
4.1 Problem Formulations and Main Results
Background: Single player optimal partially reversible investment
Consider the optimal partially reversible investment model which is formulated as singular
controls in [39]. There is a player who produces a single product, and the player controls
its production capacity to maximize its profit on an infinite time horizon. The player can
expand or contract its capacity, but it is partially reversible.
Mathematically, let {Kt}0≤t<∞ be a ca`dla`g process representing the production capacity
of the player. We assume that given initial position k ∈ R+ the dynamics of Kt is
dKt = Kt(δdt+ γdWt) + dLt − dMt, K0− = k,
for constants γ > 0 and δ. {Lt}0≤t<∞ and {Mt}0≤t<∞ are ca`dla`g control processes in an
admissible set U which includes all nondecreasing σ(Kt)-adapted processes satisfying the
integrability condition E[
∫∞
0
e−rtdLt] < ∞ or E[
∫∞
0
e−rtdMt] < ∞ and L0 = M0 = 0.
There is a nonnegative discount rate r satisfying r > δ. Π1 : R → R is the production
output function which is continuous, nondecreasing, and concave. The typical example of
Π1 function is the Cobb-Douglass production function: Π1(k) = ck
α with some positive
constants c, α ∈ (0, 1). We also assume that one unit of increasing capacity needs p units
of investment cost and one unit of decreasing capacity generates (1 − λ)p units of profit.
Because of 0 < λ < 1, it is partially reversible. Then, the optimal partially reversible
investment with singular control on an infinite time horizon in [39] can be formulated as
w(k) = sup
Lt,Mt∈U
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt[Π1(Kt)dt− pdLt + p(1− λ)dMt]
]
s.t. dKt = Kt(δdt+ γdWt) + dLt − dMt, K0− = k.
(4.1)
The HJB equation associated with (4.1) is
min{rw − Lw − Π1, ∂kw − (1− λ)p, p− ∂kw} = 0,
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and according to results in [39], this equation has a unique C2-solution, which is the value
function of the model. For the case of Π1(k) = k
α, the value function w(k) is
w(k) =

A1 + pk k ≤ kb
A2k
m + A3k
n +Hkα kb < k < ks
A4 + p(1− λ)k ks ≤ k
for some constants kb < ks and m,n,H,A1, A2, A3, A4 which are defined in [39]. The opti-
mally controlled process K∗t is a reflected geometric Brownian motion with two boundaries
[kb, ks] and the optimal controls {L∗t} and {M∗t } are processes in such Skorohod type problem
for K∗t :
dK∗t = K
∗
t (δdt+ γdWt) + dL
∗
t − dM∗t , K∗0− = k, K∗t ∈ [kb, ks] a.s.∫ ∞
0
1{K∗t >kb}dL
∗
t = 0,
∫ ∞
0
1{K∗t <ks}dM
∗
t = 0.
This model is a single player model, so by adding other players’ behaviour and interaction
among players one could generalize the control problem to a game.
Optimal partially reversible investment stationary MFG
Suppose that there are identical N players in same industry and they produce the same
product. For i = 1, 2, . . . , N , let {Kit}0≤t<∞ be the production capacity process for ith
player which is a ca`dla`g process satisfying the dynamics for any ki ∈ R
dKit = K
i
t(δdt+ γdW
i
t ) + dL
i
t − dM it Ki0− = ki,
where δ, γ are nonnegative constants. Let µt ∈ P2(R) be a probability measure of {Kit}i=1,2,··· ,N
at time t. Then, the optimal partially reversible investment for N players can be formulated
as
sup
Lit,M
i
t∈U
J iN(k
i, Lit,M
i
t ) = sup
Lit,M
i
t∈U
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt[
1
N
N∑
j=1
Π0(K
i
t , K
j
t )dt− pdLit + p(1− λ)dM it ]
]
= sup
Lit,M
i
t∈U
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt[Π(Kit , 
N
t )dt− pdLit + p(1− λ)dM it ]
]
s.t. dKit = K
i
t(δdt+ γdW
i
t ) + dL
i
t − dM it , Ki0− = ki,
where Nt is an empirical distribution of {Kit}i=1,2,··· ,N at time t and can be consider as
price information at time t. Each player’s admissible control processes are {Lit}0≤t<∞ and
{M it}0≤t<∞ which are ca`dla`g nondecreasing processes with Li0 = M i0 = 0. Let’s assume
that our controls are closed loop feedback type. Let U be an admissible set including such
admissible controls. Let r > 0 be a discount rate and λ ∈ (0, 1), p be nonnegative constants.
Let Π : R × P2(R) → R be a revenue function for the ith player which depends on the
production output of the ith player (Kit) and the price (
N
t ).
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As N goes to infinity, we can approximate the N player game using a MFG;
sup
Lt,Mt∈U
J∞(k, Lt,Mt) = sup
Lt,Mt∈U
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt[Π(Kt, µt)dt− pdLt + p(1− λ)dMt]
]
s.t. dKt = Kt(δdt+ γdWt) + dLt − dMt, K0− = k.
where µt is a probability measure of Kt at time t and U is the admissible set and controls
are closed loop feedback form adapted in σ(Kt−, µt−).
µt is the price information at time t in this model. The model can be with short run price
which is changing as time or with long run average price which is constant over time. Let’s
consider the model with stationary µt = µ first which determines the long run average price
in this section, and then consider the model with general nonstationary µt which determines
short run prices in next section.
Then, the stationary MFG (SMFG) can be formulated as
w(k) = sup
Lt,Mt∈U
Js∞(k, Lt,Mt) = sup
Lt,Mt∈U
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt[Π(Kt, µ)dt− pdLt + p(1− λ)dMt]
]
s.t. dKt =Kt(δdt+ γdWt) + dLt − dMt, K0− = k,
(4.2)
where µ is a limiting stationary distribution of {Kt} if it exists, and the admissible set of
controls U is
U ={Lt,Mt|Lt,Mt are FKt−-adapted, ca´dla´g, and nondecreasing with
L0 = M0 = 0, and E
∫ ∞
0
e−rtdLt <∞, E
∫ ∞
0
e−rtdMt <∞}.
Again controls are closed loop feedback form.
Assumption
(A1) Π(k, µ) is Lipschitz continuous, nondecreasing, bounded and concave over k ∈ (0,∞).
It also satisfies two conditions: lim
k↓0
Π(k,µ)
k
=∞ and the Legendre-Fenchel transform of
Π is finite: Π˜(z) = sup
k>0
[Π(k, µ)− kz] <∞.
Let’s define a solution to the SMFG (4.2).
Definition 6. A solution of the SMFG (4.2) is defined as a pair of optimal control processes
{L∗t}, {M∗t } and a probability measures µ∗ ∈ P2(R) if the optimal controlled process {K∗t }
has a limiting stationary distribution µ∗ and w(k) = Js∞(k, L
∗
t ,M
∗
t ) for all k ∈ R.
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SMFG framework We can solve the SMFG (4.2) by following three steps.
• Step 1: (stochastic control part) Fix {µ} as deterministic first, then (4.2) becomes a
stochastic control problem. Solve this stochastic control problem, and let {Lt}, {Mt}
be optimal controls and {Kt} be the corresponding optimal controlled process.
Define the mapping Γ(µ) = ({Lt}, {Mt}).
• Step 2: (consistency part) Given the optimal controls ({Lt}, {Mt}) from step 1, solve
stochastic differential equation:
dKt = Kt(δdt+ γdWt) + dLt − dMt K0− = k. (4.3)
Update fixed flow of probability measures µ′ as a limiting stationary probability dis-
tributions of {Kt} if it exists.
Define the mapping Γ0({Lt}, {Mt}) = µ′.
• Step 3: (fixed point part) Under new fixed {µ′}, repeat step 1 and 2 until convergence
to a fixed point solution µ∗, {L∗t}, {M∗t }.
Theorem 3. Under (A1),
1) for any fixed µ, there exists a unique optimal controls {Lt}, {Mt} for the step 1 in the
SMFG framework. The mapping Γ is well-defined;
2) for any optimal controls {Lt}, {Mt} from the step 1, the optimal controlled process
{Kt} following the dynamics (4.3) has a limiting stationary distribution. The mapping
Γ0 is well-defined;
3) if Γ◦Γ0 is a contraction mapping, the SMFG (4.2) has a unique solution (µ∗, {L∗t}, {M∗t }).
Proof. 1) Step 1: well-definedness of Γ. Fix µ as deterministic first. With deterministic
µ, the SMFG (4.2) is equivalent to the stochastic control problem (4.1). As we have seen
in previous section, there exists a unique value function and optimal controls. Hence, the
mapping Γ is well-defined.
2) Step 2: well-definedness of Γ0. Under given {Lt}, {Mt}, we use the limiting stationary
distribution of Kt from (4.3). For any Markov chain, if it is irreducible, aperiodic, and
positive recurrent, then there exists a unique stationary distribution and it is a limiting
distribution. The optimal controlled process Kt is a geometric Brownian motion with two
reflected constant boundaries by definition of Lt,Mt. Hence, Kt has a unique limiting sta-
tionary distribution. Consequently, the mapping Γ0 is also well-defined.
3) Step 3: The space of probability measures P2(R) with 2nd order Wasserstein metric is
complete. By Banach fixed-point theorem, if Γ ◦ Γ0 is a contraction mapping, the SMFG
framework has a unique fixed point (µ∗, {L∗t}, {M∗t }). By definition of each mapping, the
fixed point solution satisfies definition 6.
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Remark By the theorem, whether Γ ◦ Γ0 is contraction or not is critical for the solution
to the MFG. Actually it depends on coefficients of the model so we will illustrate explicit
numerical examples when Γ ◦ Γ0 is a contraction mapping in section 4.3.
Optimal partially reversible investment MFG
Let’s generalize the model with a general drift function and with a mean information process
{µt} which does not need to be stationary. The model can be formulated as
sup
Lt,Mt∈U
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt[Π(Kt, µt)dt− pdLt + p(1− λ)dMt]
]
s.t. dKt = b(Kt, µt)dt+ σdWt + dLt − dMt K0− = k, µ0− = µ.
(4.4)
where b : R × P2(R) → R is Lipschitz continuous, µt is the probability measure of Kt,
and the admissible set U . This game is a MFG with singular controls on an infinite time
horizon. Because of difficulties when we approach MFG with singular controls using PDE
method directly, we will approach this game through MFG with singular controls of bounded
velocity. We will discuss the relation between singular controls and singular controls of
bounded velocity in the later section.
MFG with singular controls of bounded velocity For any fixed θ > 0, we assume that
{Lt} and {Mt} are bounded velocity processes which means dLt = L˙tdt and dMt = M˙tdt
with 0 ≤ L˙t ≤ θ and 0 ≤ M˙t ≤ θ. Then, the value function for any fixed µ ∈ P2(R) is
v(s, k) = sup
Lt,Mt∈Uθ
J(s, k, Lt,Mt)
= sup
Lt,Mt∈Uθ
E
[∫ ∞
s
e−r(t−s)[Π(Kt, µt)dt− pL˙tdt+ p(1− λ)M˙tdt]
]
s.t. dKt = b(Kt, µt)dt+ σdWt + L˙tdt− M˙tdt Ks− = k, µs− = µ,
(4.5)
for any s ∈ [0,∞) and k ∈ R. We impose assumption (A1) and additional assumptions as
follows
Assumptions
(A2) For any fixed µ ∈ P2(R), b(k, µ) are measurable and linear function in k. So, there
exists some constant δ0 > 0 such that |b(k, µ)| + |σ| ≤ δ0(1 + k). Furthermore, we
assume r > δ0.
Admissible set
Uθ ={ξt|ξt is F (Kt−,µt−)-adapted, cadlag, and nondecreasing with
0 ≤ ξ˙t ≤ θ, ξ0 = 0, and E
∫ ∞
0
e−rtξ˙tdt <∞}
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MFG solution Let’s define the solution to the MFG (4.5).
Definition 7. A solution of the MFG (4.5) is defined as a pair of optimal control pro-
cesses {L∗t}, {M∗t } and a flow of probability measures {µ∗t} ∈ M[0,∞) if they satisfy v(s, k) =
J(s, k, L∗t ,M
∗
t ) for all (s, k) ∈ [0,∞) × R and µ∗t is a probability measure of the optimal
controlled process {K∗t } for all t ∈ [0,∞).
MFG framework We can solve the MFG (4.5) by following three steps.
• Step 1: (stochastic control part) Fix {µt} as deterministic first, then (4.5) becomes a
stochastic control problem. Solve this stochastic control problem, and let {L∗t}, {M∗t }
be optimal controls and {K∗t } be the corresponding optimal controlled process.
• Step 2: (consistency part) Solve stochastic differential equation:
dKt = b(Kt, µt)dt+ σdWt + dLt − dMt K0− = k, µ0− = µ.
Let PKt be the weak solution, then update fixed flow of probability measures {µ′t} as
probability distributions of {Kt}: µ′t(k) = PKt(k).
• Step 3: (fixed point part) Under new fixed {µ′t}, repeat step 1 and 2 until convergence
to a fixed point solution {µ∗t}, {L∗t}, {M∗t }.
Before approaching the MFG (4.5) on an infinite time horizon, let’s define value functions
for the MFG (4.5) on a finite time horizon as in [37]. For any finite time T > 0, denote
v¯(s, T, k) = sup
Lt,Mt∈Uθ
E
[∫ T
s
e−r(t−s)[Π(Kt, µt)dt− pL˙tdt+ p(1− λ)M˙tdt]
]
s.t. dKt = b(Kt, µt)dt+ σdWt + L˙tdt− M˙tdt Ks− = k, µs− = µ
(4.6)
for any (s, k) ∈ [0,∞) × R. Then, the HJB equation associate with the MFG (4.6) with
fixed {µt} is
− ∂tv¯ + rv¯ − Π− 1
2
σ2∂kkv¯ − b∂kv¯ + θmin{0, ∂kv¯ − p(1− λ), p− ∂kv¯} = 0
with terminal conditions v¯(T, T, k) = 0 ∀k ∈ R
(4.7)
According to the theorem 1 in [37], (4.7) has a unique C1,2 solution, and this solution is the
value function of (4.6) with fixed {µt}.
Definition 8 (Supersolution and subsolution). The υ is a continuous viscosity solution to
(4.7) on [0, T ]× (0,∞) if υ satisfies
1) Viscosity supersolution: for any (s0, k0) ∈ [0, T ) × R and for any function ψ ∈ C1,2 such
that (s0, k0) is a local minimum of υ − ψ with υ(s0, T, k0) = ψ(s0, T, k0),
− ∂tψ + rψ − Π− 1
2
σ2∂kkψ − b∂kψ + θmin{0, ∂kψ − p(1− λ), p− ∂kψ} ≥ 0,
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and for any k0 ∈ R, ψ(T, T, k0) ≥ 0;
2) Viscosity subsolution: for any (s0, k0) ∈ [0, T ) × R and for any function ψ ∈ C1,2 such
that (s0, k0) is a local maximum of υ − ψ with υ(s0, T, k0) = ψ(s0, T, k0),
− ∂tψ + rψ − Π− 1
2
σ2∂kkψ − b∂kψ + θmin{0, ∂kψ − p(1− λ), p− ∂kψ} ≤ 0
and for any k0 ∈ R, ψ(T, T, k0) ≤ 0.
Let’s look at main results of the model. Proofs of propositions and theorems are in the
next section.
Proposition 5. Under fixed {µt},
v(s, k) = lim
T→∞
v¯(s, T, k) ∀(s, k) ∈ [0,∞)× R,
and for any fixed s ∈ [0,∞) the value function v(s, k) is concave and differentiable in k.
Then, the MFG (4.5) with fixed {µt} has a unique value function v and unique optimal
control processes {L∗t}, {M∗t }.
The optimal control process will have two threshold functions kb(τ), ks(τ) : [0,∞) → R
such that kb(τ) = sup{k : ∂kv(τ, k) = p} ks(τ) = inf{k : ∂kv(τ, k) = p(1 − λ)} and the
optimal control processes are
Lt =
∫ t
0
θ1{Kτ<kb(τ)}dτ Mt =
∫ t
0
θ1{Kτ>ks(τ)}dτ.
So, we can define a mapping from the fixed flow of probability measures to optimal control
processes under fixed µt as Γ1({µt}) = ({Lt}, {Mt}).
Proposition 6. Under fixed {µt}, {Lt}, {Mt}, dynamics of Kt
dKt = b(Kt, µt)dt+ σdWt + L˙tdt− M˙tdt, t ≥ 0, K0− = k (4.8)
has a unique weak solution PK∗t . Furthermore, the corresponding Kolmogorov forward equa-
tion is
∂tPKt(k) = −∂k[(b(k, µt) + L˙t − M˙t)PKt(k)] +
1
2
∂kk[σ
2PKt(k)], ∀k ∈ R. (4.9)
Update µ′t using PKt . Then, define a mapping Γ2({Lt}, {Mt}) = {µ′t}.
Theorem 4. If Γ1 ◦Γ2 is a contraction mapping, then the MFG (4.5) has a unique solution
({µ∗t}, {L∗t}, {M∗t }).
Remark Whether Γ1 ◦ Γ2 is a contraction mapping or not depends on the coefficients of
functions in the model. We will illustrate explicit numerical examples when Γ1 ◦ Γ2 is a
contraction mapping in section 4.3.
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Relationship between MFGs and N-player games One of the goals of this paper
is showing that optimal control processes {L∗t}, {M∗t } of the MFG with singular controls of
bounded velocity is a -Nash equilibrium of correspondingN -player game. The corresponding
N -player game of the MFG (4.5) is
sup
Lit,M
i
t∈U
E
[∫ ∞
s
e−r(t−s)[
1
N
∑
j=1,··· ,N
Π0(K
i
t , K
j
t )dt− pL˙itdt+ p(1− λ)M˙ itdt]
]
s.t. dKit =
1
N
∑
j=1,··· ,N
b0(K
i
t , K
j
t )dt+ σdW
i
t + L˙
i
tdt− M˙ itdt, Kis− = ki.
(4.10)
Under some technical condition, we can approximate the objective function and drift func-
tion by the strong law of large numbers:
1
N
∑
j=1,...,N
Π0(K
i
t , K
j
t )→
∫
Π0(K
i
t , y)µt(dy) = Π(K
i
t , µt) and
1
N
∑
j=1,...,N
b0(K
i
t , K
j
t )→
∫
b0(K
i
t , y)µt(dy) = b(K
i
t , µt) as N goes to ∞ where {µt} is a flow of
probability measures of {Kjt }j=1,··· ,N . So, we can consider that the MFG (4.5) is a approxi-
mated game of the N -player game (4.10), and they have following relation.
Theorem 5. The optimal control processes of the solution to the MFG (4.5) is an -Nash
equilibrium of the N-player game (4.10) with  = O( 1√
N
).
Remark If the game has a well-known form of stochastic controls problems such as a
linear-quadratic form, we could find an exact Nash equilibrium for some cases. However,
in general N -player games, finding an exact Nash equilibrium is intractable. Therefore,
studying MFG for -Nash equilibrium for N -player game is useful, and it is an approximated
Nash equilibrium as N goes to infinity. We prove the general results under our formulation,
and we will illustrate examples of solutions of MFGs.
4.2 Proofs of the MFG with singular controls of
bounded velocity on an infinite time horizon
Existence and uniqueness of solutions to the MFG
Fix {µt} as deterministic. Then, the MFG (4.5) and (4.6) are stochastic problems with
singular controls of bounded velocity.
v(s, k) = sup
Lt,Mt∈Uθ
J(s, k, Lt,Mt)
= sup
Lt,M∈Uθ
E
[∫ ∞
s
e−r(t−s)[Π(Kt, µt)dt− pL˙tdt+ p(1− λ)M˙tdt]
]
s.t. dKt = b(Kt, µt)dt+ σdWt + L˙tdt− M˙tdt Ks− = k, µs− = µ.
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v¯(s, T, k) = sup
Lt,Mt∈Uθ
E
[∫ T
s
e−r(t−s)[Π(Kt, µt)dt− pL˙tdt+ p(1− λ)M˙tdt]
]
s.t. dKt = b(Kt, µt)dt+ σdWt + L˙tdt− M˙tdt Ks− = k, µs− = µ.
Proof on proposition 5
Proof.
Lemma 5. Let ϕ(s, k) be a nonnegative C1,2 supersolution to (4.7) with fixed T > 0, then
v¯(s, T, k) ≤ ϕ(s, k) for any (s, k) ∈ [0,∞)× R.
Proof. Let ϕ ∈ C1,2([0,∞) × R) and {Lt}, {Mt} be control processes in the admissible set
Uθ. Let {Kt} be a corresponding controlled process under {Lt}, {Mt}. Define τn = inf{t ≥
0;Kt ≥ n} ∧ (n ∧ T ), n ∈ N
Then, for [s, τn], by the Itoˆ’s formula,
E[e−rτnϕ(τn, Kτn)] =e
−rsϕ(s, k) + E
[∫ τn
s
e−rt(−rϕ+ ∂tϕ+ Lϕ)(t,Kt)dt
]
+ E
[∫ τn
s
e−rt∂kϕ(t,Kt)(L˙tdt− M˙tdt)
]
Let’s prove ∀t, k ∈ [s,∞]× R,
(−rϕ+ ∂tϕ+ Lϕ)(t, k) + ∂kϕ(t, k)L˙t − ∂kϕ(t, k)M˙t ≤ −Π(k, µ) + pL˙t − (1− λ)pM˙t.
1) If (1− λ)p ≤ ∂kϕ(t, k) ≤ p, the inequality is true since L˙t, M˙t ≥ 0.
2) If p ≤ ∂kϕ(t, k), since ϕ is the supersolution, rϕ− ∂tϕ− Π− Lϕ+ θ(p− ∂kϕ) ≥ 0. So,
(−rϕ+ ∂tϕ+ Lϕ)(t, k) + ∂kϕ(t, k)L˙t − ∂kϕ(t, k)M˙t
≤ −Π(k, µ) + θ(p− ∂kϕ(t, k)) + ∂kϕ(t, k)L˙t − ∂kϕ(t, k)M˙t
≤ −Π(k, µ)dt+ pL˙t − (1− λ)pM˙t
3) If ∂kϕ(t, k) ≤ (1− λ)p , similarly the inequality is ture.
Therefore,
E
[∫ τn
s
e−rt{Π(Kt, µt)dt− pdLt + (1− λ)pdMt}
]
+ E[e−rτnϕ(Kτn)] ≤ e−rsϕ(s, k)
Since ϕ is nonnegative,
E
[∫ τn
s
e−rt{Π(Kt, µt)dt+ (1− λ)pdMt}
]
− E
[∫ T
s
e−rtpdLt
]
≤ e−rsϕ(s, k)
By Fatou’s lemma with taking n goes to ∞,
E
[∫ T
s
e−r(t−s){Π(Kt, µt)dt− pdLt + (1− λ)pdMt}
]
≤ ϕ(s, k)
for any admissible Lt and Mt. Hence, v¯(s, T, k) ≤ ϕ(s, k) ∀s, k > 0.
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From [37], the HJB equation (4.7) with fixed T has a unique solution, and the solution
is the value function v¯(s, T, k). Let’s prove that v¯(s, T, k) pointwisely converges to some
function as T goes to infinity. Denote v¯(s, k) = lim sup
T→∞
v¯(s, T, k).
Lemma 6. v¯(s, T, k) converges to v¯(s, k) as T goes to ∞ for any (s, k) ∈ [0,∞)× R.
Proof. Let {Tn}n∈N be any monotonic increasing positive sequence satisfying lim
n→∞
Tn =∞.
By definition, v¯(s, Ti, k) are monotonic increasing as Ti increases.
Let’s prove that v¯(s, Tn, k) converges to v¯(s, k) as n → ∞. To prove this, we need to prove
enough that for any  > 0, there exists n0 such that for any m > n ≥ n0, v¯(s, Tm, k) −
v¯(s, Tn, k) < .
For any q ∈ ((1−λ)p, p), let q0 = Π˜((r−δ0)q)r where Π˜ is the Legendre-Fenchel transform, then
ϕ(k) = qk+ q0 is a supersolution of (4.7) with Tm. By lemma 5, v¯(·, Tm, k) ≤ qk+ q0. Then,
v¯(s, Tm, k) ≤ v¯(s, Tn, k) + e−r(Tn−s)E[v¯(Tn, Tm, KTn)]
≤ v¯(s, Tn, k) + e−r(Tn−s)E[qKTn + q0]
By assumption 2, for any fixed µ ∈ P2(R), b(k, µ) ≤ δ0(1 + k). Then, by the Itoˆ’s formula
with f(t, k) = ke−δ0t, E[KTn ] ≤ k0 δ0+θδ0 eδ0Tn(1− e−δ0Tn).
v¯(s, Tm, k)− v¯(s, Tn, k) ≤ qk0 δ0 + θ
δ0
e−(r−δ0)(Tn−s) + q0e−r(Tn−s) < 
for large enough Tn since r > δ0.
Therefore, v¯(s, Tn, k) pointwisely converges to v¯(s, k) as n goes to ∞.
Now, let’s prove that the limit of solutions for finite interval, v¯(s, k), is the value function
v(s, k) of (4.5).
Lemma 7. (Verification theorem) v¯(s, k) = v(s, k) for any (s, k) ∈ [0,∞)× R
Proof. Fix (s, k) ∈ [0,∞)× R
1) v(s, k) ≤ v¯(s, k)
Fix T > 0, v¯(s, T, k) is a classical C1,2 solution to (4.7) with T , so it is a supersolution. So,
−∂tv¯ + rv¯ − Π(k, µ)− 1
2
σ2∂kkv¯ − b∂kv¯ + θmin{0, ∂kv¯ − p(1− λ), p− ∂kv¯} ≥ 0
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For any Lt,Mt ∈ Uθ, let {Kt}t∈[s,∞) be the state process with control processes Lt,Mt.
By the Itoˆ’s formula,
E[e−r(T−s)v¯(T, T,KT )]
=v¯(s, T,Ks) + E[
∫ T
s
e−r(t−s)(−rv¯ + ∂tv¯ + Lv¯)(t, T,Kt)dt]
+ E[
∫ T
s
e−r(t−s)σ∂kv¯(t, T,Kt)dWt] + E[
∫ T
s
e−r(t−s)∂kv¯(t, T,Kt)(L˙t − M˙t)dt]
=v¯(s, T,Ks) + E[
∫ T
s
e−r(t−s)((−rv¯ + ∂tv¯ + Lv¯)(t,Kt) + ∂kv¯(t, T,Kt)(L˙t − M˙t))dt]
≤v¯(s, T,Ks) + E[
∫ T
s
e−r(t−s)(−Π(Kt, µ) + θmin{0, ∂kv¯ − p(1− λ), p− ∂kv¯}
+ (L˙t − M˙t)∂kv¯(t, T,Kt))dt]
≤v¯(s, T,Ks) + E[
∫ T
s
e−r(t−s)(−Π(Kt, µ) + pL˙t − p(1− λ)M˙t)dt
Since v¯(T, T, k) = 0 for any T > 0, k ∈ R,
E[
∫ T
s
e−r(t−s)(Π(Kt, µ)− pL˙t + p(1− λ)M˙t)dt ≤v¯(s, T,Ks)
Hence, as T →∞,
E[
∫ ∞
s
e−r(t−s)(Π(Kt, µ)− pL˙t + p(1− λ)M˙t)dt ≤v¯(s,Ks)
This is true for any Lt,Mt ∈ Uθ. So,
v(s, k) = sup
Lt,Mt∈Uθ
E[
∫ ∞
s
e−r(t−s)(Π(Kt, µ)− pL˙t + p(1− λ)M˙t)dt ≤ v¯(s, k)
Therefore, v(s, k) ≤ v¯(s, k) for any (s, k) ∈ [0,∞)× R.
2) v(s, k) ≥ v¯(s, k)
Fix T > s,
Let L˙∗Tt − M˙∗Tt =

θ if p ≤ ∂kv¯(t, T,Kt)
0 if p(1− λ) < ∂kv¯(t, T,Kt) < p
−θ if ∂kv¯(t, T,Kt) ≤ p(1− λ)
Then, the HJB equation (4.7) is
−∂tv¯ + rv¯ − Π(k, µ)− 1
2
σ2∂kkv¯ − b∂kv¯ −
(
(L˙∗Tt − M˙∗Tt )∂kv¯ − pL˙∗Tt + p(1− λ)M˙∗Tt
)
= 0
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Similarly with 1),
E[e−r(T−s)v¯(T, T,KT )]
=v¯(s, T, k) + E[
∫ T
s
e−r(t−s)((−rv¯ + ∂tv¯ + Lv¯)(t,Kt) + ∂kv¯(t, T,Kt)(L˙∗Tt − M˙∗Tt ))dt]
=v¯(s, T, k) + E[
∫ T
s
e−r(t−s)
(
−Π(Kt, µt) + pL˙∗Tt − p(1− λ)M˙∗Tt
)
dt
Hence,
v¯(s, T, k) = E[e−r(T−s)v¯(T, T,KT )]
+ E[
∫ T
s
e−r(t−s)
(
Π(Kt, µt)− pL˙∗Tt + p(1− λ)M˙∗Tt
)
dt
= E[
∫ T
s
e−r(t−s)
(
Π(Kt, µt)− pL˙∗Tt + p(1− λ)M˙∗Tt
)
dt
≤ v(s, k)
Therefore, as T →∞, v¯(s, k) ≤ v(s, k).
By 1) and 2), v¯(s, k) = v(s, k)
We proved that the value function v(s, k) is the limit of v(s, T, k). Now, let’s prove that
there exists a unique optimal control process L∗t ,M
∗
t . As in finite time horizon models, if
v(s, k) is differentiable in k, we can define optimal controls as
L˙∗t − M˙∗t =

θ if p ≤ ∂kv
0 if p(1− λ) < ∂kv < p
−θ if ∂kv ≤ p(1− λ)
. Let’s prove that v(s, k) is differentiable in k.
Lemma 8. For any fixed s ∈ [0,∞), the value function v(s, k) is concave and continuous
on k ∈ R.
Proof. Because Π is nondecreasing, v(s, k) is also nondecreasing. By using concavity of Π
over k and linearity of dynamics with Lt and My, the value function v is concave. Since
v(s, k) is finite and concave on (0,∞), it is continuous.
We will use the viscosity solution method. The HJB equation associated with the MFG
(4.5) with fixed {µt} is for any (t, k) ∈ [0,∞)× R and for any µ ∈ P2(R),
−∂tv(t, k) + rv(t, k)− Π(k, µ)− 1
2
σ2∂kkv(t, k)− b(k, µ)∂kv(t, k)
+ θmin{0, ∂kv(t, k)− p(1− λ), p− ∂kv(t, k)} = 0.
(4.11)
Define the viscosity solution to (4.11) as
Definition 9. (Viscosity solution) The υ is a continuous viscosity solution to (4.11) on
[0,∞)× (0,∞) if υ satisfies
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1) Viscosity supersolution: for any (s0, k0) ∈ [0,∞)× R and for any function ψ ∈ C1,2 such
that (s0, k0) is a local minimum of υ − ψ with υ(s0, k0) = ψ(s0, k0),
− ∂tψ + rψ − Π− 1
2
σ2∂kkψ − b∂kψ + θmin{0, ∂kψ − p(1− λ), p− ∂kψ} ≥ 0
2) Viscosity subsolution: for any (s0, k0) ∈ [0,∞) × R and for any function ψ ∈ C1,2 such
that (s0, k0) is a local maximum of υ − ψ with υ(s0, k0) = ψ(s0, k0),
− ∂tψ + rψ − Π− 1
2
σ2∂kkψ − b∂kψ + θmin{0, ∂kψ − p(1− λ), p− ∂kψ} ≤ 0
Lemma 9. The value function v(s, k) is a continuous viscosity solution to (4.11).
Proof. 1) v is a viscosity supersolution.
Let k0 be any point and ϕ ∈ C1,2 satisfying v(s0, k0) = ϕ(s0, k0) and v(s, k) ≥ ϕ(s, k) on
(s, k) ∈ B(s0, k0) for small enough . Define τ = inf{t ≥ 0; (s0, Ks0+t) /∈ B(s0, k0) for
Ks0 = k0}. Let Lt(θ) = θt for t ∈ (0, h) where 0 ≤ θ1 ≤ θ for any h > 0, and M it = 0.
ϕ(s0, k0) = v(s0, k0)
≥ E
[∫ s0+τ∧h
s0
e−r(t−s0)(Π(Kt, µt)dt− pθdt) + e−r(s0+τ∧h)v(s0 + τ ∧ h,Ks0+τ∧h)
]
≥ E
[∫ s0+τ∧h
s0
e−r(t−s0)(Π(Kt, µt)dt− pθdt) + e−r(s0+τ∧h)ϕ(s0 + τ ∧ h,Ks0+τ∧h)
]
By the Itoˆ’s formula,
E[e−r(τ∧h)ϕ(s0 + τ ∧ h,Ks0+τ∧h)]
=ϕ(s0, k0) + E[
∫ s0+τ∧h
s0
e−r(t−s0)(−rϕ+ ∂tϕ+ Lϕ)(t,Kt)dt]
+ E[
∫ s0+τ∧h
s0
e−r(t−s0)∂kϕ(t,Kt)θdt]
≥E
[∫ s0+τ∧h
s0
e−r(t−s0)(Π(Kt, µt)dt− pθdt) + e−r(τ∧h)ϕ(s0 + τ ∧ h,Ks0+τ∧h)
]
+ E[
∫ s0+τ∧h
s0
e−r(t−s0)(−rϕ+ ∂tϕ+ Lϕ)(t,Kt)dt]
+ E[
∫ s0+τ∧h
s0
e−r(t−s0)∂kϕ(t,Kt)θdt]
Hence,
E[
∫ s0+τ∧h
s0
e−r(t−s0){(rϕ− ∂tϕ− Lϕ)(t,Kt)− Π(Kt, µt)}dt]
+ E[
∫ s0+τ∧h
s0
e−r(t−s0)pθdt]− E[
∫ s0+τ∧h
s0
e−r(t−s0)∂kϕ(Kt)θdt] ≥ 0
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Let θ1 = 0. Then,
E[
∫ s0+τ∧h
s0
e−r(t−s0){(rϕ− ∂tϕ− Lϕ)(t,Kt)− Π(Kt, µt)}dt] ≥ 0
Letting h→ 0.
(rϕ− ∂tϕ− Lϕ)(s0, k0)− Π(k0, µs0) ≥ 0
Let θ1 = θ and h→ 0. Then,
(rϕ− ∂tϕ− Lϕ)(s0, k0)− Π(k0, µs0) + θ(p− ∂kϕ(s0, k0)) ≥ 0
Similarly, let M˙t = θ and L˙t = 0 for t ∈ (0, h) for some h > 0. Then, as letting h goes to 0,
then
(rϕ− ∂tϕ− Lϕ)(s0, k0)− Π(k0, µs0) + θ(∂kϕ(s0, k0)− (1− λ)p) ≥ 0
∴ rϕ− ∂tϕ− Π− Lϕ+ θmin{0, ∂kϕ− p(1− λ), p− ∂kϕ} ≥ 0 at (s0, k0)
Hence, v is a viscosity supersolution to (4.11).
2) v is a viscosity subsolution.
Suppose not. Suppose that v is not a viscosity subsolution.
There exists a (s0, k0) ∈ [0,∞) × (0,∞) and ϕ ∈ C1,2 satisfying ϕ(s0, k0) = v(s0, k0) and
ϕ(s, k) ≥ v(s, k) for any (s, k) ∈ B¯(s0, k0), but
rϕ− ∂tϕ− Π− Lϕ+ θmin{0, ∂kϕ− p(1− λ), p− ∂kϕ} > 0 at (s0, k0).
Then, there exists α > 0 such that
rϕ− ∂tϕ− Π− Lϕ+ θmin{0, ∂kϕ− p(1− λ), p− ∂kϕ} ≥ α
for all (s, k) ∈ B¯(s0, k0) for small enough 0 < , because it is continuous.
Define τ = inf{t ≥ 0; (s0, Ks0+t) /∈ B¯(s0, k0) where Ks0 = k0}.
For any admissible Lt,Mt, by the Itoˆ’s formula,
E[e−rτϕ(s0 + τ, Ks0+τ)]
=ϕ(s0, k0) + E[
∫ s0+τ
s0
e−r(t−s0)(−rϕ+ ∂tϕ+ Lϕ)(t,Kt)dt]
+ E[
∫ s0+τ
s0
e−r(t−s0)∂kϕ(t,Kt)(L˙t − M˙t)dt]
For any (t,Kt) ∈ B¯(s0, k0) and µt,
if (1− λ)p ≤ ∂kϕ(t,Kt) ≤ p,
because of rϕ− ∂tϕ− Π− Lϕ ≥ α, then (−rϕ+ ∂tϕ+ Lϕ)(Kt) ≤ −Π(Kt, µt)− α
By ϕk(t,Kt)(L˙t − M˙t) ≤ pL˙t − (1− λ)pM˙t,
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(−rϕ+ ϕt + Lϕ)(t,Kt) + ∂kϕ(t,Kt)(L˙t − M˙t) ≤ −Π(Kt, µt) + pL˙t − (1− λ)pM˙t − α
If (1− λ)p < p < ϕk(t,Kt),
(−rϕ+ ∂tϕ+ Lϕ)(Kt) + ϕk(t,Kt)(L˙t − M˙t)
≤ (−rϕ+ ∂tϕ+ Lϕ)(Kt) + ϕk(t,Kt)L˙t − (1− λ)pM˙t
≤ −Π(Kt, µt)− α + θ(p− ∂kϕ(t,Kt)) + ∂kϕ(t,Kt)L˙t − (1− λ)pM˙t
≤ −Π(Kt, µt)− α + (p− ∂kϕ(t,Kt))L˙t + ∂kϕ(t,Kt)L˙t − (1− λ)pM˙t
≤ −Π(Kt, µt) + pL˙t − (1− λ)pM˙t − α
If ∂kϕ(t,Kt) < (1− λ)p < p, similarly (−rϕ+ ϕt + Lϕ)(t,Kt) + ∂kϕ(t,Kt)(L˙t − M˙t)
≤ −Π(Kt, µt) + pL˙t − (1− λ)pM˙t − α.
So, (−rϕ+ϕt +Lϕ)(t,Kt) + ∂kϕ(t,Kt)(L˙t− M˙t) ≤ −Π(Kit , µt) + pL˙t− (1−λ)pM˙t−α, and
E[e−rτϕ(s0 + τ, Ks0+τ)]
≤ϕ(s0, k0) + E[
∫ s0+τ
s0
e−r(t−s0)(−Π(Kt, µt)dt+ pL˙tdt− (1− λ)pM˙tdt− αdt}]
By definition of ϕ,
E[e−rτv(s0 + τ, Ks0+τ)]
≤v(s0, k0) + E[
∫ s0+τ
s0
e−r(t−s0){−Π(Kt, µt)dt+ pL˙tdt− (1− λ)pM˙tdt− αdt}]
E
[∫ s0+τ
s0
e−r(t−s0){Π(Kt, µt)dt− pL˙tdt+ (1− λ)pM˙tdt}+ e−rτv(s0 + τ, Ks0+τ)
]
+αE[
∫ s0+τ
s0
e−r(t−s0)dt] ≤ v(s0, k0)
Taking the supremum over all admissible Lt,Mt, then
v(s0, k0) + αE[
∫ s0+τ
s0
e−r(t−s0)dt] ≤ v(s0, k0)
Since α > 0, it is contradiction. Therefore, v is a viscosity subsolution.
So, the value function v is a continuous viscosity solution on (0,∞) to (4.11).
Lemma 10. For any fixed s ∈ [0,∞), the value function v(s, k) is differentiable in k.
Proof. Fix s ∈ [0,∞). By previous lemma, the value function v is a viscosity solution
to the HJB equation (4.11), and v(s, k) is continuous, nondecreasing, and concave in k.
Hence, for any k ∈ (0,∞), ∂k+v(s, k) ≤ ∂k−v(s, k). Suppose that v(s, ·) is not C1 at k0.
Then, there exists q such that ∂k+v(s, k0) < q < ∂k−v(s, k0). Define ϕ(t, k) = v(t, k0) +
q(k − k0) − 12(k − k0)2 − 12(s − t)2. Then, ϕ(s, k0) = v(s, k0) and ∂kϕ(s, k0) = q. Since
∂k+v(s, k0) < q < ∂k−v(s, k0) and ∂kϕ(s, k0) = q, then v(t, k)−ϕ(t, k) has a local maximum
at (s, k0). Because v is a viscosity subsolution for the HJB equation (4.11),
rϕ − ∂tϕ − Π− Lϕ + θmin{0, ∂kϕ − p(1− λ), p− ∂kϕ} ≤ 0
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Case1 : p(1− λ) < ∂kϕ(s, k0) = q < p
Hence,
rϕ(s, k0)− ∂tϕ(s, k0)− Π(s, k0)− Lϕ(s, k0)
=rϕ − Π− Lϕ + θmin{0, ∂kϕ − p(1− λ), p− ∂kϕ} ≤ 0
∂kϕ
(s, k0) = q and ∂kkϕ
(s, k0) = − 12 ⇒ Lϕ(s, k0) = 12σ2(− 12) + b(k0, ·)q
∴ rϕ(s, k0)− Π(k0, ·) + 14σ2 − b(k0, ·)q = rϕ(s, k0)− Π(k0, ·)− Lϕ(s, k0) ≤ 0
Since k0, σ are constants, and ϕ
 and Π are continuous function and bounded on the bounded
set, as letting →∞ , it is contradiction.
Case2 : ∂kϕ
(s, k0) = q ≥ p
Hence,
rϕ(s, k0)− ∂tϕ(s, k0)− Π(k0, ·)− Lϕ(s, k0) + θ(p− ∂kϕ(s, k0))
=rϕ∂tϕ
 − Π− Lϕ + θmin{0, ∂kϕ − p(1− λ), p− ∂kϕ} ≤ 0
∂kϕ
(s, k0) = q and ∂kkϕ
(s, k0) = − 12 ⇒ Lϕ(s, k0) = 12σ2(− 12) + b(k0, ·)q.
∴ rϕ(s, k0)− ∂tϕ(s, k0)− Π(k0, ·) + 14σ2 − b(k0, ·)q + θ(p− q)
= rϕ(s, k0)− ∂tϕ(s, k0)− Π(k0, ·)− Lϕ(s, k0) + θ(p− ∂kϕ(s, k0)) ≤ 0
Since k0, θ, σ are constants, and ϕ
 and Π are continuous function and bounded on the
bounded set, as letting →∞ , it is contradiction.
Case3 : ∂kϕ
(s, k0) = q ≤ p(1− λ)
Hence,
rϕ(s, k0)− ∂tϕ(s, k0)− Π(k0, ·)− Lϕ(s, k0) + θ0(∂kϕ(s, k0)− p(1− λ))
=rϕ − ∂tϕ − Π− Lϕ + θmin{0, ∂kϕ − p(1− λ), p− ∂kϕ} ≤ 0
∂kϕ
(s, k0) = q and ∂kkϕ
(s, k0) = − 12 ⇒ Lϕ(s, k0) = 12σ2(− 12) + b(k0, ·)q
∴ rϕ(s, k0)− ∂tϕ(s, k0)− Π(k0, ·) + 14σ2 − b(k0, ·)q + θ(q − p(1− λ))
= rϕ(s, k0)− ∂tϕ(s, k0)− Π(k0, ·)− Lϕ(s, k0) + θ(∂kϕ(s, k0)− p(1− λ)) ≤ 0
Since k0, θ0, σ are constants, and ϕ and Π are continuous function and bounded on the
bounded set, as letting →∞ , it is contradiction.
Hence, ∂k−v(s, k) = ∂k+v(s, k) ∀k ∈ (0,∞).
∴ v(s, k) is differentiable in k.
Optimal controls Since v(s, k) is differentiable and concave in k, for fixed t ∈ [s,∞), we
can define kb(t) < ks(t) where kb(t) = sup{k|∂kv(t, k) = p} and ks(t) = inf{k|∂kv(t, k) =
(1− λ)p}, and define
Lt =
∫ t
s
θ1{Kr≤kb(r)}dr, Mt =
∫ t
s
θ1{Kr≥ks(r)}dr.
Then, because v is differentiable and concave in k, we apply the Tanaka’s formula which is
generalized Itoˆ’s formula for v with Lt,Mt. Similarly with the proof in lemma 7, it is the
optimal controls.
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Proof of proposition 6
Proof. Under fixed {µt}, {Lt}, {Mt}, the existence and uniqueness of the martingale problem
(4.8) is equivalent to the existence and uniqueness of weak solution to (4.8), and by the
Stroock-Varadhan theorem, since |b(k, µt)| + θ + |σ| ≤ δ2(1 + |k|) for some δ2 > 0, (4.8)
has a unique weak solution (from the chapter 4.19 and 4.24 in [72]). Hence, (4.8) has a
unique probability distribution PKt and update the mean process from this distribution for
consistency part.
Furthermore, using Kramers-Moyal Expansion of the master equation
∂tPKt(k) =
∞∑
m=1
(−1)m
m!
∂km [a
(m)(t, k)PKt(k)]
where a(m)(t, k) = lim
∆t→0
1
∆t
E[(Kt+∆t−Kt)m]|Kt=k, it is easy to derive the Kolmogorov forward
equation (4.9).
Remark. For general finite variation processes Lt,Mt, a
(m)(t, k) may not converge for some
m.
Approximation to N-player games and its Nash equilibrium
Proof of theorem 5
Proof. In this paper, we only prove the case which the drift function is b(k). For general
b(k, µ), using the proof in [37] and combining this proof for the model on an infinite time
horizon, we can prove this theorem.
Let L˙i∗t and M˙
i∗
t be optimal control processes to (4.5). Let only player 1 choose other
control L˙1
′
t and M˙
1′
t but all other players choose L˙
i∗
t and M˙
i∗
t as controls. K
i
t does not change
because dynamics of Kit only depends on player’s own state and controls. µt is a distribution
of Kit for i = 2, 3, · · · , N . Let K1′t be a new state process for player 1 under controls L˙1′t and
M˙1
′
t .
Because of lemma 5 and lemma 6 in previous section, if ϕ(k) is a supersolution of the HJB
equation (4.11), vi(s, k) ≤ ϕ(k) = qk+ q0 for same q and q0 in the proof of lemma 6. Hence,
1
N
E
[∫ ∞
s
e−rtΠ(K1s , µt)dt
]
≤ 1
N
v1(K1s ) ≤
1
N
(qK1s + q0) = O(
1
N
)
1
N
E
[∫ ∞
s
e−rtΠ0(K1
′
t , K
1′
t )dt
]
≤ 1
N
v1(K1s ) ≤
1
N
(qK1s + q0) = O(
1
N
)
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
Π0(K
i
t , K
j
t ) = Π(K
i
t , µt) +O(
1√
N
)
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E
[∫ ∞
s
e−rt[
1
N
∑
j=1,··· ,N
Π0(K
1′
t , K
j
t )dt− pL˙1
′
t dt+ p(1− λ)M˙1
′
t dt]
]
=E
[∫ ∞
s
e−rt[
1
N
Π0(K
1′
t , K
1′
t ) +
1
N
∑
j 6=1
Π0(K
1′
t , K
j
t )dt− pL˙1
′
t dt+ p(1− λ)M˙1
′
t dt]
]
=E
[∫ ∞
s
e−rt[
1
N
Π0(K
1′
t , K
1′
t ) +
N − 1
N
Π(K1
′
t , µt)dt− pL˙1
′
t dt+ p(1− λ)M˙1
′
t dt]
]
+O(
1√
N
)
≤E
[∫ ∞
s
e−rt[
N − 1
N
Π(K1
′
t , µt)dt− pL˙1
′
t dt+ p(1− λ)M˙1
′
t dt]
]
+O(
1√
N
) +O(
1
N
)
≤E
[∫ ∞
s
e−rt[Π(K1
′
t , µt)dt− pL˙1
′
t dt+ p(1− λ)M˙1
′
t dt]
]
+O(
1√
N
)
≤E
[∫ ∞
s
e−rt[Π(K1t , µt)dt− pL˙1∗t dt+ p(1− λ)M˙1∗t dt]
]
+O(
1√
N
)
≤E
[∫ ∞
s
e−rt[
1
N
∑
j=1,··· ,N
Π0(K
1
t , K
j
t )dt− pL˙1∗t dt+ p(1− λ)M˙1∗t dt]
]
+O(
1√
N
)
Last two inequality is due to the optimality of L˙1∗t , M˙
1∗
t , and due to the central limit theorem.
This inequality holds for any (L˙′t, M˙
′
t). Hence, optimal controls of the MFG (4.5) is an -Nash
equilibrium for this N−player game (4.10), and  = O( 1√
N
).
4.3 Stationary optimal partially reversible investment
MFG
Let’s solve the toy model of optimal partially reversible investment SMFG. We will solve one
toy model with singular controls and another toy model with singular controls of bounded
velocity. Then, we shall compare both models and study limit behaviours as the bound goes
to infinity.
Problems
SMFG with singular controls Consider the toy model which is a SMFG model with
singular controls as follows:
v(k) = sup
Lt,Mt∈U
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt[Π(Kt, µ)dt− pdLt + p(1− λ)dMt]
]
s.t. dKt =Kt(δdt+ γdWt) + dLt − dMt, K0− = k, µ = PK∞
(4.12)
where δ, γ are nonnegative constants and PK∞ is a limiting stationary distribution of Kt.
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SMFG with singular controls of bounded velocity The toy SMFG model which is
singular controls of bounded velocity is for any fixed θ > 0
v˜(k : θ) = sup
Lt,Mt∈Uθ
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt[Π(Kt, µ)dt− pKtL˙tdt+ p(1− λ)KtM˙tdt]
]
s.t. dKt =Kt(δdt+ γdWt) +KtL˙tdt−KtM˙tdt, K0− = k, µ = PK∞ .
(4.13)
In this model, we re-parametrize control variables L˙tdt → KtL˙tdt for calculation. Assume
that θ > δ.
Revenue function Π(k, µ) is the revenue function which is the long run average price
ρ times the production output level. By the Cobb-Douglass model, we assume Π(k, µ) =
ρckα for constant c > 0 and α ∈ (0, 1). The limiting stationary distribution µ of {Kt}
determines the long run average price. According to the inverse demand function, we set
ρ = a0 − a2(ckα) 1−αα for some positive constant a0, a2 where ρ is the long run average price
and ckα is the production output level. So, ρ = a0 − a1k1−α for some constant a1. Then,
Π(k, µ) = ckαρ = ckα
∫
(a0 − a1k1−α)µ(dk)
Solution to the SMFG model (4.13)
Let’s solve it through the MFG framework.
Step 1 Fix µ as deterministic. Then, the HJB equation to the SMFG model (4.13) under
fixed µ is
0 = rv˜ − ckαρ− δk∂kv˜ − 1
2
γ2k2∂kkv˜ + θkmin{0, p− ∂kv˜, ∂kv˜ − p(1− λ)} (4.14)
Then, the solution v˜ is
v˜(k : θ) =

B1k
n′ +H1k
α +H2k k ≤ k˜b
B2k
m +B3k
n +Hkα k˜b < k < k˜s
B4k
m′′ +H3k
α +H4k k˜s ≤ k
where k˜b = inf{k : ∂kv˜(k : θ) = p}, k˜s = sup{k : ∂kv˜(k : θ) = p(1− λ)} and
m′, n′ = −δ + θ
γ2
+
1
2
∓
√
(−δ + θ
γ2
+
1
2
)2 +
2r
γ2
m′′, n′′ = −δ − θ
γ2
+
1
2
∓
√
(−δ − θ
γ2
+
1
2
)2 +
2r
γ2
H1 =
2cρ
γ2(n′ − α)(α−m′) , H2 = −
2θp
γ2(n′ − 1)(1−m′)
H3 =
2cρ
γ2(n′′ − α)(α−m′′) , H4 =
2θ(1− λ)p
γ2(n′′ − 1)(1−m′′) .
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Then, k˜b = c4ρ
1
1−α and k˜s = c5ρ
1
1−α
where the numerator of c1−α4 is
(
n′(n′ − 1)−m(m− 1)
m
yn2 − yα2
yn2 − ym2
+
n(n− 1)− n′(n′ − 1)
n
ym2 − yα2
yn2 − ym2
)
2cα
γ2(n− α)(α−m)
+ (
2c(α(α− 1)− n′(n′ − 1))
γ2(n− α)(α−m) −
2c(α(α− 1)− n′(n′ − 1))
γ2(n′ − α)(α−m′) ),
and the denominator of c1−α4 is
n′(n′ − 1)−m(m− 1)
m
yn2 − (1− λ)y2
yn2 − ym2
p+
n(n− 1)− n′(n′ − 1)
n
ym2 − (1− λ)y2
yn2 − ym2
p+ n′(n′ − 1)H2,
and the numerator of of c1−α5 is
(
m′′(m′′ − 1)− n(n− 1)
n
y−m2 − y−α2
y−m2 − y−n2
+
m(m− 1)−m′′(m′′ − 1)
m
y−n2 − y−α2
y−m2 − y−n2
)
2cα
γ2(n− α)(α−m)
+ (
2c(α(α− 1)−m′′(m′′ − 1))
γ2(n− α)(α−m) −
2c(α(α− 1)−m′′(m′′ − 1))
γ2(n′′ − α)(α−m′′) ),
and the denominator of c1−α5 is
m′′(m′′ − 1)− n(n− 1)
n
y−12 − (1− λ)y−m2
y−n2 − y−m2
p
+
m(m− 1)−m′′(m′′ − 1)
m
y−12 − (1− λ)y−n2
y−n2 − y−m2
p+m′′(m′′ − 1)H4.
Hence, c4, c5 are independent to ρ.
B1, B2, B3, B4, are:
B2 =
p(yn2 − (1− λ)y2)−Hαkα−1b (yn2 − yα2 )
mkm−1b (y
n
2 − ym2 )
, B3 =
p(ym2 − (1− λ)y2)−Hαkα−1b (ym2 − yα2 )
nkn−1b (y
m
2 − yn2 )
,
B1 =
B2k˜
m
b +B3k˜
n
b +Hk˜
α
b −H1k˜αb −H2k˜b
k˜n
′
b
, B4 =
B2k˜
m
s +B3k˜
n
s +Hk˜
α
s −H3k˜αs −H4k˜s
k˜m′′s
,
CHAPTER 4. MFG WITH SINGULAR CONTROLS OVER INFINITE TIME 68
and y2 > 1 is the solution on (1,∞) to the equation: F (y2) = F1(y2)F2(y2) −
F3(y2)
F4(y2)
= 0 such that
F1(y2) =(
n′(n′ − 1)−m(m− 1)
m
yn2 − yα2
yn2 − ym2
+
n(n− 1)− n′(n′ − 1)
n
ym2 − yα2
yn2 − ym2
)
2cα
γ2(n− α)(α−m)
+ (
2c(α(α− 1)− n′(n′ − 1))
γ2(n− α)(α−m) −
2c(α(α− 1)− n′(n′ − 1))
γ2(n′ − α)(α−m′) )
F2(y2) =y
α−1
2 (
n′(n′ − 1)−m(m− 1)
m
yn2 − (1− λ)y2
yn2 − ym2
p
+
n(n− 1)− n′(n′ − 1)
n
ym2 − (1− λ)y2
yn2 − ym2
p+ n′(n′ − 1)H2)
F3(y2) =(
m′′(m′′ − 1)− n(n− 1)
n
y−m2 − y−α2
y−m2 − y−n2
+
m(m− 1)−m′′(m′′ − 1)
m
y−n2 − y−α2
y−m2 − y−n2
)
× 2cα
γ2(n− α)(α−m) + (
2c(α(α− 1)−m′′(m′′ − 1))
γ2(n− α)(α−m) −
2c(α(α− 1)−m′′(m′′ − 1))
γ2(n′′ − α)(α−m′′) )
F4(y2) =
∣∣∣∣m′′(m′′ − 1)− n(n− 1)n y−12 − (1− λ)y−m2y−n2 − y−m2 p
+
m(m− 1)−m′′(m′′ − 1)
m
y−12 − (1− λ)y−n2
y−n2 − y−m2
p+m′′(m′′ − 1)H4
∣∣∣∣.
Because of n > 1, 0 > m and m′′ < 0, n′ > 0, lim
y2→∞
F (y2) = +∞ and
lim
y2↓1
F (y2) =
1
λp(n′(n′−1)( 1
m
− 1
n
)+n−m) − 1λp|m′′(m′′−1)( 1
n
− 1
m
)−n+m)| < 0. So, there exists a solution
such that F (y2) = 0 on (1,∞) and by uniqueness of solutions of B1, B2, B3, B4, k˜b, k˜s, it is
unique. We will give numerical examples for this in section 4.3.
Step 2 In [11] and [63], for a diffusion process dXt = µ(Xt)dt + σ(Xt)dWt with reflecting
boundaries kb < ks, the scale density is s(x) = exp[−
∫ x
kb
2µ(y)
σ(y)
dy] and the scale density is
m(x) = 2
σ(x)2s(x)
. Then, the limiting stationary distribution for Xt is PX∞ =
m(x)
M(ks)
where
M(x) =
∫ x
kb
m(y)dy. The drift function of Kt is µ(y) =

(δ + θ)y y ≤ k˜b
δy k˜b < y < k˜s
(δ − θ)y k˜s ≤ y
. Then,
the limiting stationary distribution is
PK∞(y) =

1
M
y
2(δ+θ)
γ2
−2
y ≤ k˜b
1
M
k˜
2θ
γ2
b y
2δ
γ2
−2
k˜b < y < k˜s
1
M
k˜
2θ
γ2
b k˜
2θ
γ2
s y
2(δ−θ)
γ2
−2
k˜s ≤ y
where M = ( γ
2
2(δ+θ)−γ2 − γ
2
2δ−γ2 )k˜
2
γ2
(δ+θ)−1
b + (
γ2
2δ−γ2 − γ
2
2(δ−θ)−γ2 )k˜
2θ
γ2
b k˜
2δ
γ2
−1
s .
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Proof. The scale density with arbitrary ∆ > 0 is s(y) = exp{− ∫ y
∆
2µ(y)
γ2y2
dy}.
s(y) =

∆
2(δ+θ)
γ2 y
− 2(δ+θ)
γ2 y ∈ (0, k˜b]
∆
2(δ+θ)
γ2 k˜
− 2θ
γ2
b y
− 2δ
γ2 y ∈ (k˜b, k˜s)
∆
2(δ+θ)
γ2 k˜
− 2θ
γ2
b k
− 2θ
γ2
s y
− 2(δ−θ)
γ2 y ∈ [k˜s,+∞)
The speed density is m(y) = 2
γ2y2s(y)
and the density pi(y) is proportional to m(y). Since
pi(y) is proportional to m(y), we can ignore ∆ and 2
γ2
. Then,
m(y) =

y
2(δ+θ)
γ2
−2
y ∈ (0, k˜b]
k˜
2θ
γ2
b y
2δ
γ2
−2
y ∈ (k˜b, k˜s)
k˜
2θ
γ2
b k
2θ
γ2
s y
2(δ−θ)
γ2
−2
y ∈ [k˜s,+∞)
PK∞(y) =
m(y)∫∞
0 m(z)dz
M =
∫ ∞
0
m(z)dz =
∫ k˜b
0
z
2(δ+θ)
γ2
−2
dz +
∫ k˜s
kb
k˜
2θ
γ2
b z
2δ
γ2
−2
dz +
∫ ∞
k˜s
k˜
2θ
γ2
b k˜
2θ
γ2
s z
2(δ−θ)−2
γ2 dz
= (
γ2
2(δ + θ)− γ2 −
γ2
2δ − γ2 )k˜
2
γ2
(δ+θ)−1
b + (
γ2
2δ − γ2 −
γ2
2(δ − θ)− γ2 )k˜
2θ
γ2
b k˜
2δ
γ2
−1
s
Hence, updated long run average price is
ρ′ =
∫
(a0 − a1y1−α)PK∞(dy)
= a0 − a1
(
1
2(δ+θ)−αγ2 − 12δ−αγ2
)
k˜
2δ
γ2
−α
b +
(
1
2δ−αγ2 − 12(δ−θ)−αγ2
)
k˜
2δ
γ2
−α
s
( 1
2(δ+θ)−γ2 − 12δ−γ2 )k˜
2δ
γ2
−1
b + (
1
2δ−γ2 − 12(δ−θ)−γ2 )k˜
2δ
γ2
−1
s
From step 1, k˜b = c4ρ
1
1−α , k˜s = c5ρ
1
1−α and k˜b
k˜s
= c4
c5
where c4, c5 do not depend on ρ.
Consequently,
ρ′ =a0 − a1
(
1
2(δ+θ)−αγ2 − 12δ−αγ2
)
( c4
c5
k˜s)
2δ
γ2
−α
+
(
1
2δ−αγ2 − 12(δ−θ)+−αγ2
)
k˜
2δ
γ2
+α−1
s
( 1
2(δ+θ)−γ2 − 12δ−γ2 )( c4c5 k˜s)
2δ
γ2
−1
+ ( 1
2δ−γ2 − 12(δ−θ)−γ2 )k˜
2δ
γ2
−1
s
=a0 − a1
(
1
2(δ+θ)−αγ2 − 12δ−αγ2
)
( c4
c5
)
2δ
γ2
−α
+
(
1
2δ−αγ2 − 12(δ−θ)−αγ2
)
( 1
2(δ+θ)−γ2 − 12δ−γ2 )( c4c5 )
2δ
γ2
−1
+ ( 1
2δ−γ2 − 12(δ−θ)−γ2 )
k˜1−αs
Let ρ′ = a0 − a1c6k˜1−αs where c6 is independent to ρ, k˜b, k˜s.
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Step 3 Fixed point method
Fixed ρ
step 1: k˜b = c4ρ
1
1−α , k˜s = c5ρ
1
1−α
step 2: ρ′ = a0 − a1c6k1−αs = a0 − a1c6(c5ρ
1
1−α )1−α = a0 − a1c6c1−α5 ρ
c3, c4, c5 are independent to ρ. Hence, for any ρ1, ρ2,
|ρ′1 − ρ′2| = a1c6c1−α5 |ρ1 − ρ2|
If it is contraction mapping (i.e. |a1c6c1−α5 | < 1), it has a fixed point solution. Moreover,
the long run average price of the fixed point solution is ρ∗ = a0
1+a1c6c
1−α
5
. We will illustrate
numerical examples when |a1c6c1−α5 | < 1 with numerical solutions.
Solution to the SMFG model (4.12)
Let’s solve it through the mean field game framework.
Step 1 Fix µ as deterministic. As in [39], the HJB equation to the MFG (4.12)
min{rv − ckαρ− 1
2
γ2k2∂kkv − δk∂kv, ∂kv − p(1− λ), p− ∂kv} = 0
has a unique viscosity solution and it is the value function of the stochastic control problem.
The optimal state process under optimal controls K∗t is a geometric Brownian motion with
the reflecting boundaries kb < ks. Let y1 =
ks
kb
and
m = − δ
γ2
+
1
2
−
√
(− δ
γ2
+
1
2
)2 +
2r
γ2
< 0, n = − δ
γ2
+
1
2
+
√
(− δ
γ2
+
1
2
)2 +
2r
γ2
> 1
H =
2cρ
γ2(n− α)(α−m) .
Then,
kb =
(
2cα(yn1 − yα1 )
γ2(n− α)p(1−m)(yn1 − (1− λ)y1)
) 1
1−α
ρ
1
1−α = c1ρ
1
1−α
ks =y1
(
2cα(yn1 − yα1 )
γ2(n− α)p(1−m)(yn1 − (1− λ)y1)
) 1
1−α
ρ
1
1−α = c2ρ
1
1−α
where c1, c2 are independent to ρ and y1 > 1 is the solution to the equation
(n− α)(1−m)yn−11 (yα1 − ym1 ) + (α−m)(n− 1)ym−11 (yn1 − yα1 )
(n− α)(1−m)(yα1 − ym1 ) + (α−m)(n− 1)(yn1 − yα1 )
= 1− λ.
(By [39], this equation has a unique solution y1 on (1,∞).)
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The value function is
v(k) =

A1 + pk k ≤ kb
A2k
m + A3k
n +Hkα kb < k < ks
A4 + p(1− λ)k ks ≤ k
where A1, A2, A3, A4 are constants which are uniquely determined by continuity and C2-ness
of the value function, and the conditions kb = sup{k : ∂kv(k) = p}, ks = sup{k : ∂kv(k) =
p(1− λ)}.
A2 =
(n− 1)pkb + αH(α− n)kαb
m(n−m)kmb
, A3 =
(1−m)pkb − αH(α−m)kαb
n(n−m)knb
,
A1 = A2k
m
b + A3k
n
b +Hk
α
b − pkb, A4 = A2kms + A3kns +Hkαs − p(1− λ)ks
Step 2 From [39], the optimal state process K∗t is the reflected geometric Brownian motion
in [kb, ks] of drift δ and diffusion γ with two boundaries kb < ks.
Similarly with the step 2 in the previous section, for K∗t ,
s(x) = exp{−
∫ x
kb
2δy
γ2y2
dy} = exp{−2δ
γ2
∫ x
kb
1
y
dy}
= exp{−2δ
γ2
log(
x
kb
)dy} = k
2δ
γ2
b x
− 2δ
γ2 , x ∈ (kb, ks)
m(x) =
2
γ2x2s(x)
=
2k
− 2δ
γ2
b
γ2
x
2δ
γ2
−2
, x ∈ (kb, ks)
M(ks) =
∫ ks
kb
2k
− 2δ
γ2
b
γ2
x
2δ
γ2
−2
dx =
2k
− 2δ
γ2
b
γ2( 2δ
γ2
− 1)(k
2δ
γ2
−1
s − k
2δ
γ2
−1
b )
Consequently,
ρ′ =
∫
(a0 − a1x1−α)PK∗∞(dx)
=a0 − a1
∫ ks
kb
2δ − γ2
γ2(k
2δ
γ2
−1
s − k
2δ
γ2
−1
b )
x
2δ
γ2
−1−α
dx
=a0 − a1 2δ − γ
2
γ2( 2δ
γ2
− 1 + α)
k
2δ
γ2
−α
s − k
2δ
γ2
−α
b
k
2δ
γ2
−1
s − k
2δ
γ2
−1
b
=a0 − a1 2δ − γ
2
2δ + (α− 1)γ2
1− ( c1
c2
)
2δ
γ2
−α
1− ( c1
c2
)
2δ
γ2
−1 k
1−α
s
=a0 − a1c3k1−αs
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where c3 =
2δ−γ2
2δ+(α−1)γ2
1−( c1
c2
)
2δ
γ2
−α
1−( c1
c2
)
2δ
γ2
−1 does not depend on ρ,kb, ks. Therefore,
ρ′ = a0 − a1c3k1−αs = a0 − a1c3c1−α2 ρ
|ρ′1 − ρ′2| = a1c3c1−α2 |ρ1 − ρ2|
Step 3 As we have seen above, if a1c3c
1−α
2 < 1, this process has a fixed point solution.
Moreover, the long run average price of the fixed point solution is ρ∗ = a0
1+a1c3c
1−α
2
.
Limit behaviour of value functions
Proposition 7. v˜(k : θ) converges to v(k) as θ goes to ∞ pointwisely.
Proof. Under any fixed ρ, as θ →∞,
m′ = −δ + θ
γ2
+
1
2
−
√
(−δ + θ
γ2
+
1
2
)2 +
2r
γ2
→ −∞, n′ = −
2r
γ2
m′
→ 0
n′′ = −δ − θ
γ2
+
1
2
+
√
(−δ − θ
γ2
+
1
2
)2 +
2r
γ2
→∞, m′′ = −
2r
γ2
n′′
→ 0.
Hence, as θ →∞,
H1 =
2cµ
γ2(n′ − α)(α−m′) → 0
H2 = − 2θp
γ2(n′ − 1)(1−m′) =
2p
1 + δ
θ
− γ2
2θ
+
√
(− δ
θ
+ 1 + γ
2
2θ
)2 + 2rγ
2
θ2
→ p
H3 =
2cµ
γ2(n′′ − α)(α−m′′) → 0
H4 =
2θ(1− λ)p
γ2(n′′ − 1)(1−m′′) = (1− λ)p.
Therefore,
v˜(k :∞) =

B1 + pk k ≤ k˜b
B2k
m +B3k
n +Hkα k˜b < k < k˜s
B4 + p(1− λ)k k˜s ≤ k
Originally,
v(k) =

A1 + pk k ≤ kb
A2k
m + A3k
n +Hkα kb < k < ks
A4 + p(1− λ)k ks ≤ k
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Constants in both cases are uniquely determined by same conditions. Furthermore, we can
see k˜b → kb, k˜s → ks, B1 → A1, B2 → A2, B3 → A3, B4 → A4 as θ goes to ∞. Hence,
v˜ converges to v as θ goes to ∞ pointwisely. With fixed ρ, the value function of singular
controls of bounded velocity problem converges to the value function of corresponding sin-
gular controls problem. Furthermore, c4 and c5 are also converging to c1 and c2 because
of k˜b → kb, k˜s → ks. Hence, the fixed point solution price ρ∗ of the MFG with singular
controls of bounded velocity converges to the fixed point solution price ρ∗ of the MFG with
singular controls. Therefore, the value function v˜(k, θ) of the MFG with singular controls of
bounded velocity converges to the value function v(k) of the MFG with singular controls as
θ →∞.
Numerical examples
Numerical solutions of SMFGs Set p = 0.5, λ = 0.6, α = 0.6, δ = 1, γ = 2, r = 3, c = 1.
Denote θ =∞ as the case of singular controls.
1) SMFG model with singular controls (4.12) (i.e. θ = ∞) ; start with the initial price
ρ = 1. Then, as in [39], kb = 0.069 and ks = 4.83. In this case, c2 = 4.89 and c3 = 0.36.
Then, c3c
1−α
2 = 0.673 < 1. a1 is the ratio between one unit of the production level and one
unit of the price, so it will be very small number. So, a1 < 1 and a1c3c
1−α
2 < 1. Set a0 = 1
and a1 = 0.1. Then, this model has a unique solution and the long run average price is 0.937
and k∗b = 0.058, k
∗
s = 4.10.
2) SMFG with bounded velocity (4.13); start with the price ρ = 1. Then, repeat step 2
and 3 until fixed point solutions. In this case, c5 = 11.46 and c6 = 0.29. Then, c6c
1−α
5 =
0.78 < 1. a1 is the ratio between one unit of the production level and one unit of the price,
so it will be very small number: |a1| < 1 and |a1c3c1−α2 | < 1. Set a0 = 1 and a1 = 0.1. Then,
a1c3c
1−α
2 = 0.078 < 1. Therefore, there exists a unique fixed point solution and the long run
average price of the fixed point solution is ρ∗ = a0
1+a1c6c
1−α
5
θ 50 100 200 300 400 500 1000 ∞
k˜∗b 0.0680 0.0634 0.0609 0.0600 0.0596 0.0593 0.0588 0.0583
k˜∗s 9.4900 6.0819 4.9565 4.6412 4.4932 4.4074 4.2419 4.100
ρ∗ 0.928 0.9325 0.9347 0.9355 0.9359 0.9361 0.9365 0.9369
Table 1: Change of optimal controls and prices of the MFG as θ →∞
Single player models vs SMFG Changes of optimal controls with respect to the price
ρ; set p = 0.5, λ = 0.6, α = 0.6, δ = 1, γ = 2, r = 3, c = 1, and θ = 1.1. Optimal controls of
the fixed point solution have two thresholds k˜b and k˜s as k˜b = c4ρ
1
1−α and k˜s = c5ρ
1
1−α .
ρ 0.5 0.75 1 1.25 1.5 1.75 2
k˜b 0.0484 0.1334 0.2739 0.4785 0.7548 1.1096 1.5493
k˜s 0.3966 1.0928 2.2434 3.9190 6.1820 9.0885 12.6904
Table 2: Change of optimal controls as the price changes
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The upper line is ks and the lower line is kb
Figure 4.1: Change of optimal controls as the price changes
Hence, as ρ increases, k˜b, k˜s also increase. Hence, the expansion region [0, k˜b) is larger
and the contraction region (ks,∞) is smaller.
Furthermore, as ρ increases (i.e. the price goes up), the region of ”no action” [k˜b, k˜s] is larger.
So, k˜s− k˜b = (c5− c4)ρ 11−α and c5 > c4 are independent to ρ.) It can be interpreted in terms
of the benefit of good price for the player. For higher price, there are more the region of
”no action” [k˜b, k˜s]. So, the player does not need to expand or contract its capacity in many
situations. Vice versa, if the price is low, then the ”no action” region is small. So, the player
has to control its capacity (expansion or contraction) more frequently.
Sensitivity analysis with respect to λ for the SMFG model (4.13) Set p = 0.5, α =
0.6, δ = 1, γ = 2, r = 3, c = 1, and θ = 100. If λ is close to 1, the model is more irreversible.
Hence, the player unlikely controls its capacity since the investment is irreversible. In con-
trast, if λ is close to 0, the model is more reversible. Hence, the player more likely controls
its capacity. So, this case is more favourable to the player, and the optimal price will be
”good price” for the player.
λ 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
k˜∗b 0.0927 0.0726 0.0634 0.0583
k˜∗s 1.0807 2.2331 6.0820 33.4333
ρ∗ 0.9406 0.9382 0.9325 0.9217
Table 3: Change of optimal controls and prices as λ changes
CHAPTER 4. MFG WITH SINGULAR CONTROLS OVER INFINITE TIME 75
(a) The upper line is k∗s and the lower line is k∗b (b) ρ
∗ vs λ
Figure 4.2: Change of optimal controls and prices as λ changes
The red line in the left graph represents k˜∗s and the black line in the left graph represents
k˜∗b . So, as λ is close to 1, the waiting region [k˜b, k˜s] is larger and the optimal price decreases.
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Appendix
A.1. Viscosity solution
The definition of viscosity solution to (1.4) is as follows
Definition 10. vˆ is called a viscosity solution to (1.4) if vˆ is both a viscosity supersolution
and a viscosity subsolution, with the following definitions,
(i) viscosity supersolution: for any (t0, x0) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd and any ϑ ∈ C1,2,
if (t0, x0) is a local minimum of v
i − ϑ with v(t0, x0)− ϑ(t0, x0) = 0, then
−∂tϑ(t0, x0)− inf
α∈A
{1
2
tr(σ(t0, x0, µ, α)σ(t0, x0, µ, α)
TDxxϑ(t0, x0))
+ b(t0, x0, µ, α) ·Dxϑ(t, x) + f(t, x, µ, α)} ≥ 0,
and ϑ(T, x0) ≥ h(x0, µT ) for ∀x0 ∈ Rd;
(ii) viscosity subsolution: for any (t0, x0) ∈ [0, T ]× R and any ϑ ∈ C1,2,
if (t0, x0) is a local maximum of vˆ − ϑ with vˆ(t0, x0)− ϑ(t0, x0) = 0, then
−∂tϑ(t0, x0)− inf
α∈A
{1
2
tr(σ(t0, x0, µ, α)σ(t0, x0, µ, α)
TDxxϑ(t0, x0))
+ b(t0, x0, µ, α) ·Dxϑ(t, x) + f(t, x, µ, α)} ≤ 0,
and ϑ(T, x0) ≤ h(x0, µT ) for ∀x0 ∈ Rd.
A.2. Pareto optimality and Nash equilibrium
Consider the N player game
inf
αi∈A
J iN(α
1, · · · , αN) = inf
αi∈A
E
[∫ T
0
1
N
N∑
j=1
f0(t,X
i
t , X
j
t , α
i
t)dt+
1
N
N∑
j=1
h0(T,X
i
T , X
j
T )
]
,
(4.15)
with dynamics
dX it =
1
N
N∑
j=1
b0(t,X
i
t , X
j
t , α
i
t)dt+
1
N
N∑
j=1
σ0(t,X
i
t , X
j
t , α
i
t)dW
i
t , X
i
0 = x
i ∈ Rd,
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whereA is the admissible set of controls. A = {αt : αt is F−adapted and square integrable.}.
One needs to precise to define the filtration F of controls for adeptness. If the controls are
open loop, then {αt} is FW[0,t]-adapted and αt is the function of t and W[0,t]. If the controls
are closed loop, then {αt} is FX[0,t]-adapted and αt is the function of t and X[0,t]. If the
controls are closed loop in feedback form, then {αt} is FXt-adapted and αt is the function
of t and Xt which αt is Markovian control. In this thesis, we consider the controls as closed
loop in feedback form, so we could write αt = φ(t,Xt) for some function φ.
There are two types of equilibrium in this game: Pareto optimality and Nash equilibrium.
Definition 11 (Pareto optimality). Then, {αi∗t }ni=1 is called a Pareto optimal of the N
player game if for any i
J iN(α
1∗, · · · , αN∗) = inf
αi∈A
J iN(α
1, · · · , αN).
Definition 12 (Nash equilibrium). Then, {αi∗t }ni=1 is called a Nash equilibrium of the N
player game if for any i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and any αi′t ∈ A, J iN(αi′t , α∗−i) ≥ J iN(αi∗t , α∗−i),
where J iN is the cost function for the ith player and α
∗−i is the control processes {αj∗t }Nj=1,j 6=i
by all players except the ith player.
Pareto optimality is an optimal solution based on all players’ behaviour, but Nash equi-
librium is an optimal solution for a player given that all other players behaviours remain the
same. A Pareto optimality is also one of the Nash equilibria, but a Nash equilibrium is not
necessary to be a Pareto optimality. -Nash equilibrium is an approximation to the Nash
equilibrium. The definition of -Nash equilibrium is following.
Definition 13 (-Nash equilibrium). Then, {αi∗t }ni=1 is called an -Nash equilibrium of the
N player game if for any i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and any αi′t ∈ A, J iN(αi′t , α∗−i) ≥ J iN(αi∗t , α∗−i)−,
where J iN is the cost function for the ith player and α
∗−i is the control processes {αj∗t }Nj=1,j 6=i
by all players except the ith player.
Existence of the Nash equilibrium Because of N player game’s complexity, finding
a Nash equilibrium or a Pareto optimality is not simple. There are previous works on
existence of the Nash equilibrium in N player stochastic differential games. In [79], the Nash
equilibrium exists if the N player stochastic differential game satisfies the Nash condition.
The N player game (4.15) satisfies the Nash condition, so it has a Nash equilibrium.
Definition 14 (Nash condition). Consider the following N player game which has a cost
function for the player i as
J(α1, · · · , αN) = E[
∫ T
0
fi(t, xt, α
1, · · · , αN)dt+ h(xT )],
and dynamics as dxt = b(t, xt, α
1, · · · , αN)dt+σdWt, x0 = x0. Controls αi(t, x) are Markov
feedback controls. Define the Hamiltonian for each i = 1, 2, · · · , N as
Hi(t, x, pi : α
1
t , · · · , αNt ) = pib(t, xt, α1, · · · , αN) + fi(t, xt, α1, · · · , αN).
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The Nash condition holds if there exists processes αi∗t such that for all i = 1, · · · , N ,
Hi(t, x, pi : α
1∗, · · · , αN∗) ≤ Hi(t, x, pi : α1∗, · · · , αi−1∗, αi, αi+1∗, · · · , αN∗),
for all (t, x, α1, · · · , αN , p1, · · · , pN).
A.3. Schauder fixed point theorem
Proposition 8 (Schauder fixed point theorem). Let M be a nonempty convex subset in the
locally convex topological vector space. Then, any continuous mapping F : M → M has a
fixed point x such that F (x) = x if F (M) ⊂ M is compact. Furthermore, if the mapping is
contraction i.e. for all x, y ∈ M , d(F (x), F (y)) ≤ λd(x, y) with 0 ≤ λ < 1, then the fixed
point is unique.
A.4. Relationship between singular controls and
controls with bounded velocity - approximation of the
value function
We study the relationship between singular controls and singular controls of bounded velocity
which is previously studied in [44]. Define two HJB equation Fθ and F as
0 = Fθ(∂xxv, ∂xv, ∂tv, v, t, x) = ∂tv + Lv + f + θmin{0, g1 + ∂xv,−∂xv + g2}
0 = F (∂xxv, ∂xv, ∂tv, v, t, x) = min{∂tv + Lv + f, g1 + ∂xv,−∂xv + g2}
where L is a some second order uniformly elliptic partial differential operator, f is a bounded
and Lipschitz continuous function, and two positive constants p > q. g is continuous function.
We will study the relationship between solutions to Fθ and F . Consider new sequence of
functions
F˜θ(∂xxv, ∂xv, ∂tv, v, t, x)
= [∂tv + Lv + f ] · [∂tv + Lv + f
θ
+ g1 + ∂xv] · [∂tv + Lv + f
θ
− ∂xv + g2],
F˜ (∂xxv, ∂xv, ∂tv, v, t, x) = [∂tv + Lv + f ] · [g1 + ∂xv] · [−∂xv + g2].
Then, F˜θ goes to F˜ as θ →∞ uniformly on compact sets, and there is a large enough Θ > 0
such that for any θ > Θ, F˜θ, F˜ are uniformly elliptic partial differential equations.
Theorem 6. Let Θ > 0 be a large enough constant such that for any θ > Θ, F˜θ are uniformly
elliptic partial differential equations. Assume that F˜θ has at most one viscosity solution for
any θ > Θ and F˜ also has at most one viscosity solution. If for each θ > 0 Fθ = 0 has a
unique classical C1,2 solution vθ and F = 0 also has a unique classical C1,2 solution v, then
vθ converges to v uniformly on compact set as θ → 0.
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Proof. F˜θ has at most one viscosity solution and Fθ has a classical C1,2 solution vθ. Then,
0 = Fθ(vθ) = ∂tvθ + Lvθ + f + θmin{0, g1 + ∂xv,−∂xv + g2}. So, 0 = [∂tvθ + Lvθ − Π] ·
[∂tvθ+Lvθ+f
θ
+ g1 + ∂xv)] · [∂tvθ+Lvθ+fθ + (−∂xv+ g2)] = F˜θ(vθ). Hence, vθ is also a classical C1,2
solution to F˜θ, and it is a unique viscosity solution to F˜θ. Similarly, v is also a classical C1,2
solution to F˜ , and it is a unique viscosity solution to F˜ .
Let’s use following lemmas.
Lemma 11. (stability of viscosity solutions) Let {Gn(M, p, q, r, t, x)}∞n=1 be a sequence of
functions and assume Gn → G uniformly on compact sets for some function G. Let vn be a
viscosity solution to Gn(∂xxvn, ∂xvn, ∂tvn, vn, t, x) = 0. If vn → u uniformly on compact sets,
then v is a viscosity solution to G(∂xxvn, ∂xvn, ∂tv, v, t, x) = 0.
Lemma 12. vθ are classical C1,2 solutions to F˜θ = 0. Then, vθ converges to some function
w uniformly on compact sets.
Proof. Since L is uniformly elliptic, we can use the maximum principle.
Hence, ‖ vθ ‖∞≤‖ f ‖∞. Let’s replace f(x) to H(x) = f(x + h) for any h > 0. Then,
uθ(x+ h) is a solution to Luθ +H + θmin{0, g1 + ∂xv,−∂xv + g2} = 0 and
‖ vθ(·)− vθ(·+ h) ‖∞=‖ vθ − uθ ‖∞≤‖ f −H ‖∞=‖ f(·)− f(·+ h) ‖∞≤ C|h|
because f is Lipschitz. Therefore, {vθ} is bounded and equicontinuous. By Arzela-Ascoli
theorem, there exists w such that vθ → w as θ →∞.
By lemma 12, vθ converges to some function w. Then, by lemma 11, w is a viscosity solution
to F˜ . However, F˜ has a unique viscosity solution v, so w = v. Therefore, vθ converges to
v.
Fθ is the HJB equation for stochastic controls of bounded velocity and F is the HJB
equation for singular controls. Hence, if we know that two HJB equations have classical
solutions and if they are value functions, the value function of bounded velocity converges
to the value function of singular controls.
